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and 
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March 1997 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
1.  Almost a  year and  a  half ago,  the  international  community  pledged  US$1.8 
billion in financial assistance to support Bosnia and Herzegovina's economic recovery, 
and the first results were impressive, with noticeable improvements in living conditions 
in many areas of  the country.  Roads, railways, and airports have been re-opened, energy 
supply has become more regular, running water has reappeared in many municipalities, 
and  housing reconstruction  flourishes  in  many areas.  These  results have  been  made 
possible by the combination of  a strong desire by local people for a return to normal life, 
and  a  significant  level  of assistance,  both  advisory  and  financial,  from  the  donor 
community.  Donor support in  1996 generally met the needs identified in  the US$5.1 
billion  priority  reconstruction  program  and  made  the  recovery  program  -- by  any 
international  standard  of  comparison  -- one  of the  most  successful  attempts  to 
reconstruct a war-torn country in the last few decades. 
The Vision for 1997: Achieving sustainability 
2.  Continued  effort  is  necessary  in  1997  and  beyond  to  achieve  sustainable 
recovery in both parts of  the country and to alleviate unemployment, which still exceeds 
50  percent.  Social  and  infrastructure  facilities  must  be  repaired  and  sustained, 
institutions must be developed and staff trained.  And Bosnia and Herzegovina will have 
to undertake market-oriented economic reforms to fundamentally modify its  legal and 
regulatory system and its private and financial sector framework.  Substantial technical 
assistance will be required to that effect, as described in the annex of  this report. 
3.  This will be a multi-year effort for Bosnia and Herzegovina and donors alike, 
and, while much progress has been made, donors, authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
and observers should be prepared for a reconstruction process that will take a number of 
years to be completed. 
4.  While donor assistance will be required through the consolidation period (1997 
- 98)  and beyond,  it must progressively be  complemented and eventually replaced by 
other  resources  -- including  domestic  savings,  domestic  private  sector  resources, 
budgetary resources from all levels of  government, as the economy and budgets recover, 
and, eventually, also by the resources of  the international private sector. 
S.  To  achieve this,  donors and authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina must focus 
their joint efforts on  sustainability.  1996  was a year for  implementing quick  impact 
emergency projects.  Urgent repairs  were  mostly  financed  through  grants,  and  little 
attention  was  paid  to  the  conditions  under  which  restored  infrastructure  would  be 
operated  or  to  the  financing  mechanisms  that  would  ensure  sustainability  over  the 
medium-term.  In  1997  donors  assistance  must  move  toward  supporting  sustainable 11 
investments  and  reforms:  priorities  should  reflect  medium-term  needs,  operating 
conditions  should  be  defined  in  detail,  and  cost-recovery  mechanisms  should  be 
designed before investments are made. 
6.  Sustainability, which  should be  both  an  objective of,  and  a  pre-requisite for, 
donor support, is a broad theme.  It covers many areas, including: (i) better maintenance 
of  rehabilitated infrastructure, and cost-recovery through user charges, so that utilities in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina increasingly cover operating costs and contribute to investment 
costs; (ii) sustainable budgets at all levels of  government so that teachers and doctors can 
be paid; (iii) well-governed and capable public institutions; and (iv) privatization, and 
structural  reforms  in  the  banking sector to create viable  financial  intermediaries  and 
unleash private initiative.  Sustainable policies are critical to achieving high economic 
growth and, eventually, creditworthiness. 
7.  To promote these  reforms,  to  move toward medium-term sustainability and to 
ensure  that  resources  are  appropriately  directed,  sound  domestic  policies  on  the 
Bosnian side,  and effective donor coordination are  critical.  Efforts must be made to 
ensure that donor-funded projects are consistent with overall sectoral strategies, and that 
donors work together to support enhanced policy environments across all sectors.  Such 
strategies are described in the each of  the following chapters for each sector. 
The Reconstruction Financing Challenge 
8.  The US$5.1  billion, three- to four-year priority reconstruction program, aimed at 
restoring normal life, supporting economic recovery, and facilitating the reintegration of 
refugees and  displaced  persons,  remains  valid  as  an  overall  framework.  A desirable 
external .financing target for  1997  is  US$1.4  billion  (table  1).  Five  major  areas  of 
support can  be  distinguished:  infrastructure  networks;  support to  community revival; 
employment recovery and private sector development; social sectors; and support to the 
Governments for promoting institution building and sustainable budgeting.  Within this 
priority reconstruction program framework, the Refugee Return Task Force, established 
under the  Office  of High  Representative-chaired  Economic  Task  Force  and  working 
closely with UNHCR, is considering developing an integrated program bringing together 
specific projects in each of  these areas, aimed at supporting the return of  refugees. 111 
Table 1.  External Financing Requirements of the Priority Reconstruction Program (US$ million) 
Sector  Revised 3-4 Year 
Priority Program
2 
1996 Firm  1997 Requirements I 
Commitments  Sectoral Allocations 
Agriculture 
Education
1 
90 
70 
30  Employment Generation 
1 
Energy 
[District Heating and Natural Gas] 
1 
[Electric Power and Coal] 
Fiscal and Social Support I Balance of  Payments 
Health
1 
304 
273 
88 
871 
[257] 
[614] 
514 
73 
104 
54 
284 
[53] 
[231] 
276 
Ill 
302 
192 
310 
[110] 
[200] 
120 
H  .  I  ousmg 
Industry and Finance 
Landmine Clearing' 
Telecommunications 
Transport 
413 
693 
612 
203 
173 
583 
363 
51 
37 
192 
96  Water and Waste Managemene 
Subtotal 
Support to Peace Implementation 
1,772 
132 
Total  5,090  1,904 
1.  Many donor programs in these sectors are partly or fully designed to contribute to the reintegration of 
refugees and displaced persons. 
2.  Financial estimates have been revised in some sectors as a result of improved knowledge of  the current 
situation. 
3.  While not specifically earmarked, this total includes provision for the creation of  a "Quick Impact 
Regional Fund" to support regional economic cooperation by the Office ofthe High Representative (Box 1). 
Infrastructure Networks 
9.  External  financing  requirements  for  infrastructure  networks  -- transport, 
telecommunications,  electric  power  -- are  estimated  at  US$435  million  for  1997. 
Significant donor assistance is required, particularly for electric power and transport. 
•  There were significant achievements in  1996, but more remains to be done. 
Transport  infrastructure was  repaired and railways lines and airports have 
been  re-opened;  but  significant  civil  works  still  have  to  be  carried  out. 
Moreover,  policy  reforms  are  required  to  improve  cost  recovery,  and 
political compromises are needed to reach agreement on inter-Entity issues. 
In  telecommunications,  efforts  were  impeded  by  persistent  political 
difficulties  which  could  not  be  resolved.  Electric power facilities  were 
rehabilitated, regular power supply was  restored to many households,  and 
progress  was  made  toward  cost-recovery;  however,  a  large  part  of the 
country  still  remains  without  satisfactory  supply  of  electricity  and 
cooperation among the operating companies is still insufficient. 
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•  Efforts in  1997 should focus on continuing to rehabilitate damaged priority 
infrastructure  in  road,  rail,  power  and  telecommunications,  and 
implementing economic policy reforms; these reforms should be aimed at 
both ensuring cost recovery and setting up efficient operating mechanisms 
for those networks currently still split into three independent sub-systems, to 
restore communication and interaction between them. 
Community Revival 
10.  1997 financing requirements for activities directly supporting community revival 
and reintegration of  refugees and displaced persons -- housing, district and gas heating, 
water and waste  management,  and landmine  hazard management -- are  estimated at 
US$420  million.  The  design  of integrated  packages  in  these  sectors  is  critical  for 
facilitating  the  return  of refugees  and  displaced  persons.  Necessary  efforts  include 
works  and  physical  repairs,  as  well  as  reforms  aimed  at  improving  management of 
municipal companies (water and heating).  Many complex ownership issues also must be 
addressed before full-scale housing reconstruction can proceed. 
•  In  1996 a large number of activities were implemented in  a decentralized 
manner (through NGOs or direct contracts with municipalities) and were 
generally successful -- although the Iandmine clearing sector had a slow start 
due to political difficulties impeding donor efforts. 
•  In 1997 donor support is still critical.  Since implementation arrangements 
are likely to remain decentralized for the bulk of assistance, efforts should 
be  made  to  ensure  coordination  among  donors.  Regional  rehabilitation 
projects should be supported, and attention should be paid to distributing the 
assistance  in  a  balanced  fashion  throughout  the  country.  Programs 
specifically-designed  for  supporting  the  return  of refugees,  including  to 
areas such as Brcko, are being prepared by the Refugee Return Task Force 
under the  guidance of the  Office of the High  Representative,  within the 
framework of  the priority reconstruction program. 
Employment Recovery and Private Sector Development 
11.  .  Financing requirements  in  1997 to  re-start economic activities  in  the private 
sector  and generate  employment  -- industry,  financial  sector  development,  direct 
employment creation,  and agriculture  -- are  estimated at US$300  million.  Creating 
employment  over  the  medium-term  is  essential  for  repatriating  refugees  and 
reintegrating displaced persons, as well as for demobilizing armies.  Employment will be 
generated by supporting economically viable activities and by stimulating private sector 
development and reforming banks -- with more immediate "bridging projects'; to create 
em.ployment directly in the short-term. v 
•  In  1996  activities  focused  on  emergency  measures:  critical  imports  in 
agriculture,  quick-start  lines  of credit  in  industry,  and  specially  designed 
employment generation programs (public works, training and counseling and 
local  initiative  micro-credit  projects).  These  programs  were  generally 
successful, but they could address only a small part of the unemployment 
problem. 
•  Donor  efforts  should  be  stepped  up  in  1997,  with  assistance  gradually 
moving toward supporting measures that foster private sector development 
and foreign private investments in  Bosnia and Herzegovina, and promoting 
banking reform.  In parallel, direct employment programs should be used to 
facilitate the reintegration of  refugees and displaced persons.  Success in the 
field  of employment revival  and job creation,  more than  in  any other,  is 
directly linked to the commitment of the State and Entity Governments to 
reforming  the  legal  and  regulatory  framework,  restructuring  the  banking 
sector, re-orienting government activities and stimulating private initiative. 
Donors should strongly encourage Governments at all  levels to proceed in 
that direction. 
Social Sectors 
12.  Requirements for  the  social sectors  -- education  and health  -- in  1997  are 
estimated  at  US$160  million.  Major  needs  include  physical  repairs,  provision  of 
equipment and supplies (such as medicines), critical inputs (such as school materials), 
and technical assistance to reform the systems and ensure their sustainability. 
•  In  1996  support to the social  sectors was  substantial, and  several  donors 
continued  or expanded  emergency-type  activities  started  during  the  war. 
Many channeled their funding through international NGOs and implemented 
projects using direct contracts with beneficiary municipalities. 
•  In 1997 substantial financial assistance is required.  Donors should support 
the  design  and  implementation  of sectoral  investment  strategies  and  the 
resolution of policy issues, especially financial and budgetary sustainability. 
In  addition,  efforts  should  be  made  to  improve  donor  coordination.  A 
review of the 1996 social sectors program showed that since salaries were 
generally paid in  1996,  albeit erratically and at reduced  levels,  and  since 
donors  cannot  substitute  for  the  Governments  over  the  medium-term, 
recurrent financing of salary support should no  longer be  included  in  the 
social sectors allocation. 
Institutional Support 
13.  The  reconstruction program includes direct assistance to  the State and Entity 
Governments,  estimated at US$120  million for 1997.  This assistance  includes  fiscal 
support for promoting good governance and  setting up the corresponding institutional 
structures, and for establishing a social safety net for the neediest.  It also includes the VI 
provision of  technical assistance to help developing appropriate policies and institutions, 
at the State end Entity level. 
•  Fiscal support in  1996 was extensive, and largely directed to the Federation. 
A  minimum safety net was put in  place with  donor funding.  In  addition, 
more than US$55 million of  technical assistance was provided by a number 
of countries  to  strengthen  Government  institutions,  mainly  within  the 
Federation, to design market-oriented policy reforms and to coordinate the 
overall reconstruction program. 
•  Continued  fiscal  assistance  is  required  in  1997  to  support  a  successful 
budget  reform  process  and  to  develop  an  appropriate  safety  net  for  the 
medium-term.  The provision of a  large amount of well-targeted technical 
assistance  will  also  be  critical  to  designing the  policy  reforms  needed  to 
ensure  the  sustainability  of  reconstruction  efforts,  to  setting  up  or 
strengthening the corresponding  public  institutions,  and  to  supporting the 
establishment of  the joint State institutions. 
Next Steps: Challenges for Bosnia and Herzegovina and for the Donor 
Community 
14.  An  extraordinary  effort  will  be  required  of the  people  of Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina and their Governments at the State and Entity levels to achieve the postwar 
reconstruction of  their country.  Significant progress has already been made.  But much 
remains to be done.  Volunteers in  Bosnia and Herzegovina have carried out emergency 
repairs  of  gas  networks,  owners  have  started  reconstructing  their  homes,  public 
institutions have designed and implemented large projects, and private companies have 
been created.  Initial steps have been taken in  building Federation institutions (such as 
the  tax  and  customs  administrations);  privatization  teams  have  been  set  up  in  both vii 
Entities, and discussions on State-level institutions are underway.  But these initiatives 
still  have  to  be  transformed  into  sustainable  activities  over  the  medium-term,  cost-
recovery mechanisms have to be developed and implemented, and much more has to be 
done  in  setting up  adequate  institutional arrangements.  Thus a comprehensive policy 
framework must be  outlined to justify continued donor support,  and the allocation of 
resources to specific  sectors.  Further,  compliance with the  Peace  Agreement by  the 
parties, progress on the political front and  in  economic reforms would help encourage 
donors to come forward. 
15.  The success of  the recovery effort still depends on continued donor support and 
substantial foreign financial assistance is  essential to  ensuring a lasting peace and to 
making it possible for refugees to return.  Challenges for the donor community include 
providing sufficient assistance (including a high level of  concessional funding), ensuring 
that support is directed to those projects that best meet the beneficiaries' needs (rather 
than donors' priorities), and working for an effective coordination through the Sectoral 
Task Forces.  The  success  of the  peace  process  will  depend  on  the capacity of both 
donors and Bosnians to unite their efforts toward achieving these goals. IX 
FOREWORD 
The following sector reports present an update of the priority reconstruction program in each of 
the reconstruction sectors.  Topics covered include: (i) a brief description of  the background and 
prewar  situation,  consequences  of the  war,  and  regional  differences;  (ii)  the  objectives  and 
financing needs of  the three- to four-year priority reconstruction program as modified in light of 
1996  experiences  and  assessments;  (iii)  an  in-depth  review  of  donor  activities  and 
accomplishments  in  1996;  (iv)  the  external  financing  requirements  under the  1997  program, 
including  major  objectives  and  recommended  implementation  arrangements;  and  (v)  policy 
issues  to  be  addressed  in  the  next  years  for  the  reconstruction  effort  to  be  successful  and 
sustainable. 
The data shown in these reports are as  reported by each donor to the European Commission -
World Bank-managed data base,  as  of December  1996.  In  particular, the  firm  commitments 
reported for  1996  are pledges which have been (i) approved by a national legislative body or 
multilateral board; and (ii) allocated to a specific sectoral program or project.  Information gaps 
exist, however, and figures should be considered best estimates. 
These  sector  reports  were  prepared  the  European  Commission,  the  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank, with the valuable assistance of experts in 
the Sector Task Forces in Sarajevo.  The authors would like to thank especially the International 
Management Group (IMG), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the 
UNESCO, the World Health Organization (WHO) and the many bilateral donors participating in 
these task forces  for their helpful comments.  Discussions with representatives of the Bosnian 
authorities also yielded many helpful insights.  Nevertheless, the authors are solely responsible 
for any errors in the report. TABLE OF CONTENTS 
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I.  BACKGROUND 
An adequate prewar transport system 
1.  Before the hostilities, the transport system in Bosnia and Herzegovina was organized to meet the 
needs of  the former Yugoslavia.  Management was centralized at the level of  the Republic, and the extent 
and condition of the transport infrastructure were generally adequate -- with 8,600 kilometers (km) of 
main  and  regional  roads;  1,030  km  of railway  lines  (75  percent  electrified);  two  civil  airports  (in 
Sarajevo and Mostar), and public transportation available throughout the country. 
Severe war damage 
2.  The hostilities caused heavy damage (box 1  ),  with transport links leading to or near the lines of 
confrontation suffering the most destruction.  Transport institutions  lost their premises,  records,  staff, 
and  funds,  and  many lost access to those parts of the system that remained operable.  Moreover, the 
institutions, never large, were forcibly broken up, and communications among them were severed. 
3.  Since  the  end  of hostilities,  transport  infrastructure  conditions  have  improved  significantly. 
Road  and  railway  links have been gradually restored throughout the country.  Traffic on  some of the 
main roads is approaching prewar levels.  The Sarajevo-Place railway line has been repaired.  A limited 
number of  civilian scheduled charter flights are available at Sarajevo Airport.  And public transportation 
companies are resuming operations. 
4.  Difficulties remain, however.  In the road sector more than half of the main network still needs 
rehabilitation,  maintenance  is  urgently  required  to  prevent  collapse  of existing  infrastructure,  and 
maintenance institutions need to be organized and equipped.  In the railway sector repair of infrastructure 
-- including restoration of the essential components of the signaling and telecommunications systems --
• is  being  completed  on  most of the  network.  Cooperative  mechanisms  still  need  to  be  established 
between the currently existing railway companies and organizational measures remain to be taken before -2-
trains can run  not only on small  segments  but on the entire  network.  Sarajevo airport will  require 
extensive  work  to  accommodate  regular  traffic  at  acceptable  levels.  And  a  considerable  level  of 
assistance to public transport systems will be needed in the years to come. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
5.  Restoring an effective transport network is a precondition for e.conomic recovery-- for restarting 
industry,  allowing  the  return  of  refugees  and  displaced  persons,  and  reviving  communities. 
Reconstruction efforts aim to: 
•  Remove critical bottlenecks; 
•  Restart the operation of  transport systems; 
•  Ensure the sustainable development of  the transport sector; and 
•  Rebuild the local contracting and consulting industry. 
6.  In December 1995  a Transport Reconstruction Program was prepared by the Government with 
the support of the World Bank, the European Commission (EC), the European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD), and various donors. This program has been continually updated and remains 
valid.  It will require US$583 million for the three- to four-year reconstruction period
1 within the overall 
US$5.1 billion priority reconstruction program (table 1): 
2 
•  In 1996, US$192  million  was firmly committed,  leaving  a  significant gap  of US$125 
million  in  the  original  first-year  program  requirements (originally  estimated  at  US$317 
million); 
2  nevertheless, achievements were significant (paragraphs 8 to 16); 
•  In 1997, US$175  million is  required -- 17  percent of which would  go  to the  State, J8 
percent to the Federation, and 45 percent to Republika Srpska (paragraphs 17 to 25); and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, about US$216 million will be needed -- and policy issues should be 
addressed to ensure the medium-term sustainability of the program, which will require the 
continued involvement of  the donor community (paragraphs 26 to 29). 
The  original  total  cost  of US$698  million  for  the  program  has  been  reduced  to  US$583  million:  IFOR 
activities  -- wide-scale  patching  of roads,  installation  of many  "temporary"  bridges,  and  assistance  with 
railway repairs-- have made it possible to address some needs; and rehabilitation of  the secondary and tertiary 
road networks has been extended beyond the three- to four-year reconstruction period since these networks are 
not of  major economic significance. 
However, the first year requirements had been revised to US$163  million in view of persistent difficulties in  · 
appraising a country-wide program, and a still limited local absorptive capacity. -3-
Table 1.  Transport Reconstruction Program External Financing Needs 
(US$ million) 
3-4 year  1996 Firm 
1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments 
Requirements/ 
Requirements/ 
Allocation 
Allocation 
Roads and bridges  341  118  100  123 
Roads  [173]  [54) 
3  [48]  [71] 
Road safety  [10]  [OJ  [I]  [9] 
Bridges  [75]  [26]  [37]  [12] 
Tunnels and slips  [13]  [9]  [3]  [1] 
Road equipment  [50]  [20]  [9]  [21] 
Asphalt plants and quarries  [20]  [9]  [2]  [9] 
Sava River ports  5  0  0  5 
Railways  90  15  38  37 
Civil aviation  43  24  12  7 
Urban transport b  46  10  13  23 
Mine clearing  8  3  2  3 
Institution building  7  3  3  1 
Technical assistance  34  16  7  11 
Recurrent costs  9  3  0  6 
Total  583  192C  175  216 
a This amount includes commitments reported by donors as part of  their "municipal infrastructure projects". 
b The allocations for 1998 and 1999 are tentative and relate mainly to buses, tramways and related spare parts, 
and workshop equipment to cover remaining emergency needs.  The estimate is subject to successful 
implementation of  the "1,000 buses" operation being set up by Italian municipal transport agencies. 
c In addition, extensive works were undertaken by IFOR. 
7.  The priority reconstruction program includes several components: 
•  Rehabilitating and restarting the maintenance of  the main road network; 
•  Restoring the main railway lines and restart traffic; 
•  Completing the first phase of rehabilitation of Sarajevo Airport so that it  duly fulfills the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) requirements; 
•  Upgrading the airports in Mostar and Banja L_uka; 
•  Rehabilitating two ports on the Sava River; 
•  Rehabilitating public transportation systems in the main cities; and 
•  Undertaking related works (such as  mine clearing) and  providing consulting services and 
support to institutions. -4-
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
8.  In  1996 the program's objectives were to remove bottlenecks in  high-priority links, to provide 
equipment and assistance for maintaining critical parts of the network, and to prepare a framework for 
the development of  Bosnia and Herzegovina's transport system.  These objectives required: 
•  Rehabilitating about 50 km of  roads and reconstructing fourteen bridges; 
•  Supplying construction and maintenance equipment to local contractors; 
•  Reopening the Federation railway network and gradually upgrading it; 
•  Resuming civilian and commercial flights from Sarajevo Airport; 
•  Delivering 100 buses to urban transport companies in the main cities; and 
•  Providing  the  necessary  technical  assistance  and  equipment  for  developing  institutional 
capacity (including about 300 person months of  consulting services). 
9.  Progress in  1996 was significant, with an  impressive result: the reopening of Sarajevo to some 
civilian  air  and  rail  transport  (pa;agraphs  II  and  12).  IFOR/SFOR's  efforts  to  restore  strategic 
infrastructure has largely contributed, although indirectly, to this success (box 2).  Substantial road works . 
were also initiated, with local consultants designing and supervising works and local contractors back in 
business.  Railway infrastructure was restored throughout the country, and operating conditions are under 
discussion  by  the  Entities.  Urban  transport restarted  in  the  main  cities,  and  Sarajevo tramways  are 
running  regularly  after  almost  four  years  of virtually  no  service.  The  resumption  of activities 
strengthened institutions for management, design, and supervision of works as well as for infrastructure 
maintenance.  These results reflect the efforts of  more than twenty donors in twenty subsectors (table 2). Roads and bridges a 
Railways 
Civil aviation 
Urban transport 
Institution building 
Technical assistance 
Total 
-5 -
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Amount 
16 c 
24 
10 
3 
16 
192 
Main Donors 
Belgium, EBRD, EC, Italy, Japan, Kuwait, Malaysia, 
Netherlands, Spain, UK, US, World Bank 
EC, France, Germany, Italy, UK, World Bank 
Austria, EBRD, EC, France, Italy 
Czech Republic, EC, Republic of Korea, Norway, Spain 
EC 
EC, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, US, World 
Bank, others 
a This amount includes commitments reported by donors as part of  their "municipal infrastructure projects". 
b Includes US$118 million for roads and bridges, US$3 million for supply of bitumen, and US$2 million for mine clearing. 
c Includes US$15 million for railways and US$1  million for mine clearing. 
Roads and bridges: Bottlenecks removed 
10.  Some 90 km of roads were rehabilitated with  World Bank funding,  making it possible to use 
approximately 300 km of  the main network.  Thirteen bridges are being reconstructed (five of  those were 
completed in  1996), including most bridges on the main road between Sarajevo and the port of  Ploce and 
two bridges on the Sava River connecting Bosnia and Herzegovina to Croatia (contracts for the Orasje 
bridge will  be awarded  in  early  1997,  and  works on the Brcko railway  bridge  started  with  USAID 
financing).  The EC, the Japanese Government, and the World Bank supplied construction, maintenance, 
and quarry equipment, as well as asphalt plants.  The EBRD approved a US$19.9 million loan for the 
repair of  some 300 km of  roads and several bridges in both Entities.
3 
Railways: Main part of  the network reopened 
11.  The railway line linking Sarajevo to the port of  Ploce on the Adriatic Coast reopened on July 30, 
1996.  Further upgrading is expected by mid-1997.  Works were carried out with parallel funding from 
members of the European Union.  Although technical conditions would allow the operation of two pairs 
of trains  a  day at an  average  speed  of 60 km  an  hour,  persisting tension  within the  Federation  has 
prevented the regular operation of commercial trains.  In  addition, IFOR/SFOR rehabilitated the East-
West line (Bos. Novi/Novi Grad - Tuzla).  The resumption of civilian traffic is,  however, impeded by 
political difficulties.  Thus restoring an effective transport network will require not only donor financing 
but also a  real  commitment by the authorities to  overcoming political  difficulties.  As  it  stands the 
Sarajevo-Ploce line has no regular operations, although restored. 
Civil aviation: Sarajevo Airport reopened 
12.  On  August  15,  1996,  Sarajevo Airport was reopened to  limited civilian traffic,  thanks to the 
efforts of IFOR,  the  French  military  detachment  at the  airport,  the  newly  formed  Sarajevo  Airport 
3  The loan was signed with the State and Entity Governments in December 1996. -6-
Authority, and the United States (US) Government.  The airport has not yet been reopened to regular air 
traffic, which will require meeting the standards set by ICAO. 
13.  Concurrently,  a  financial  package  of US$12.8  million  (in  addition  to  the  US$19.9  million 
mentioned above) was assembled by EBRD to implement a year-long program of facility rehabilitation, 
including upgrading the air traffic control system and the terminal.
4  To date, navigation aids, financed 
by France, have already been delivered, and procurement of air traffic control equipment with funding 
from Austria, has been initiated (civil and structural works will be carried out on the main runway and on 
the terminal building, and training will be provided to the Civil Aviation Authority). 
Urban transport: Public transportation resumed 
14.  Many  governments  and  local  authorities  in  Europe  helped  to  restore  minimal  public 
transportation in the main cities of Bosnia and Herzegovina, focusing their efforts on Sarajevo.  About 
fifty buses and twenty minibuses, including spare parts and workshop equipment, were delivered through 
both  the EC Essential  Aid  Program  and  bilateral  donations.  Spain  provided twenty used  buses and 
Norway ten.  In addition, about 100 new and used buses were donated by European cities to the main 
urban transport companies in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Italian cities are preparing a  special operation 
called "1 ,000 buses".
5  And two new tramways with spare parts donated by the Czech Government are 
on their way to Sarajevo. 
Technical assistance: Supporting local consulting 
15.  Technical  assistance  was  required  mainly  for  project  design,  project  management,  and 
supervision of works.  About 350 person months of technical assistance were provided, mainly to the 
State and Federation Ministries ofTransport.
6  Because the foreign assistance is designed to complement 
local  capacity,  not · substitute  for  it,  local  consultants  have  been  fully  involved  and  consulting 
organizations strengthened. 
4 
5 
6 
Aside  from  a US$12.83  million EBRD  loan,  funds  have  been  provided by  nearly all  the  countries from  the 
European Union and by the EC.  Technical assistance is also being provided by the US. 
This  project  would  supply  1,000  reconditioned  buses  (and  related  spare  parts)  from  Italian  municipal 
transportation  agencies.  It  will  set  up  maintenance  shops  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  is  expected  to 
generate 500 to 600 local jobs. 
Technical assist~nce was provided by: 
•  The Governments ofltaly, the Netherlands and Turkey, the EC and USTDA for Sarajevo Airport, 
aviation advisory services, and training; 
•  Several donors, through the International Management Group (IMG}, for establishment of  the Program 
Management Adviser's office, the establishment and operation of  a transport database, and project 
management assistance; 
•  The US for the preliminary studies and design of  the Gorazde road; and 
•  The Government of  the Netherlands and the World Bank for project preparation and supervision and 
Project Implementation Units (PIUs) operating costs. -7-
Institutional developments: A major challenge 
16.  During  the  war  separate  transport  organizations  were  established  in  Sarajevo,  Mostar,  and 
Republika Srpska.  For example, there are now three railway companies overseeing a prewar network of 
about  I ,080 km.  All  these organizations lack financial  resources and  qualified staff.  Efforts  in  1996 
targeted four main issues: 
•  The lack of sufficient project management capacity -- implementation units were set up at 
the  State  and  Federation  levels  to  develop  local  capacities;  a  Transport Task  Force  was 
established to  coordinate  donor efforts  in  the  field;  and  a  program  management adviser, 
funded by the EC through the International Management Group (IMG), was appointed;
7 
•  The absence of  a unified road authority in the Federation-- the prewar road organization was 
dissolved  without  an  appropriate  successor.  A  Federation  Project  Implementation 
Directorate was set up as a first step toward establishing a qualified authority;
8 
•  The  lack  of cooperation  among  the  three  railway  companies  -- a  nascent  cooperation 
between Bosniacs and Croats emerged with the reopening of  the Sarajevo-Pioce line; and 
•  The need to establish a proper civil aviation authority -- the Entities still have not reached 
agreement on forming a civil aviation authority.  Agreements should also be reached to re-
establish overflight air routes  for  air traffic  (until  such  an  agreement  is  made,  overflight 
revenues will continue to flow into Serbia and Montenegro).  IFOR, the Office of the High 
Representative,  and  others  have  worked  diligently to  develop  ICAO-required  authorities. 
Staffing  and  training  needs  were  also  identified  through  an  EC-financed  Civil  Aviation 
Master Plan. 
In parallel with these efforts, the Commission on Public Corporations was established to lead inter-Entity 
discussions on the operation of public infrastructure and utilities (box 3).  Progress was made in this area, 
and the Commission  is  now focusing  on  developing an  adequate  structure for  operating the  railway. 
Assistance is  being provided by advisers from the International Union of Railways.  Finally, a transport 
law is being prepared. 
7 
8 
The  program  management  adviser  also  chairs  the  railway  and  road/river  working  groups  set  up  by  the 
Commission on Public Corporation and the Transport Task Force. 
The situation in Republika Srpska is slightly better: a Road Directorate and a Road Fund (for maintenance) are 
in place, though barely operating.  Still, financial and advisory assistance is critically needed. -8-
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
17.  To meet 1997 challenges, US$175 million of external financing is  required.  While the focus in 
1996  was  on  emergency  operations,  in  1997  the  donor  community  should  focus  on  restoring  a 
sustainable  transport  system.  Two  sets  of issues  should  be  addressed  simultaneously:  short-term 
physical  reconstruction  and  maintenance  operations  and  medium-term  institutional  development  and 
sustainability.  Efforts should focus on: 
•  Completing high-priority reconstruction projects; 
•  Carrying out maintenance on the most critical parts of  the networks; 
•  Developing  an  efficient  transport  system  -- coordinated  within  the  country  and 
internationally; and 
•  Taking proper organizational measures so that rail  transport can  be carried out efficiently, 
safely, and (to the extent possible) in a financially viable way. 
18.  The success of the reconstruction program will depend on the ability of  the authorities in  Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina to  ensure that rehabilitated  infrastructure can  be  operated  and  maintained.  In  that 
respect, it is essential that the following steps be taken as soon as possible: 
•  Railway operations should be resumed to make trains running across the ethnic boundaries, 
over a certain continuous period of time, on  a reasonable technical and  commercial basis; 
and 
•  Road maintenance activities and organizational capacities should be developed; this would 
require the establishment of acceptable road administration structures and the guarantee that 
the  road  maintenance  budget for  1997  would  be  the equivalent of US$15  million  in  each 
Entity. 
19.  As a first step toward achieving financial sustainability for the reconstruction program, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina authorities should contribute to the costs on an  increasing basis.  As a first step, they 
are expected to finance  10  percent of the civil works to  be  implemented under a  World  Bank credit 
foreseen for approval in  1997. -9-
Roads and bridges (US$100 million): Completing restoration of  the primary network 
20.  Reconstructing all first priority bridges and tunnels and completing rehabilitation of priority road 
sections will  require US$100  million (with  priorities  selected on  the  basis of current conditions and 
estimated traffic). 
9  The program includes: 
•  Rehabilitating  about  300  km  of  roads,  including  repairs  to  landslides  and  tunnels 
(US$51 million); 
•  Repairing  seventeen  bridges,  including  four  bridges  on  the  Sava/Una  Rivers  (US$37 
million); and 
•  Providing road, asphalt, and quarry equipment for  local  contractors as well  as  road safety 
equipment (US$12 million). 
Donors should pay particular attention to repair and  reconstruction  needs in  Republika Srpska, where 
very few works were implemented in  1996.  Priority should also be given to repairing the few damaged 
road and bridge links that are hindering inter-Entity movements, as well as connections with neighboring 
countries. 
Railways (US$38 million):  Upgrading to internationally acceptable standards 
21.  With the main railway lines now rehabilitated, efforts shall be made to ensure that restored lines 
can be used.  The State and Entity Governments should enter into the necessary agreements as soon as 
possible to restart operation (box 4).  Once these arrangements are made, assistance should be provided 
to upgrade the rehabilitated infrastructure to internationally acceptable standards (current speed limits, 
line capacities, axle loads and traffic frequency are low, and operation safety is a serious concern) and to 
restore maintenance activities. 
Priorities for donor support include: 
9 
•  Upgrading  track  and  restoring  electrification  of the  economically  sensitive  parts  of the 
network; 
•  Supplying signaling and telecommunications equipment; and 
•  Providing maintenance equipment and tools. 
Beyond the  rehabilitation  phase  for  the primary  network,  the  next  objective  (part of the  1998-99 program) 
would be to reduce the backlog of maintenance on the entire road network.  Achieving this objective would 
require intensive participation by local transport institutions. - 10-
Civil aviation (US$12 million):  Restoring regular flights to Bosnia and Herzegovina 
22.  Restoring  air  traffic  between  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  other  countries  is  critical  to  the 
country's recovery.  Efforts should be aimed at expanding regular commercial flights  and  restoring a 
civil  aviation  authority that can handle air traffic over Bosnia and  Herzegovina -- a  major source of 
revenue before the war.  Priorities include: 
•  Upgrading civil aviation standards and ensuring countrywide coverage of  airspace control; 
•  Completing infrastructure rehabilitation, mainly at Sarajevo Airport; 
•  Supplying additional navigational and communications equipment to the Sarajevo, Mostar, 
and Banja Luka airports; and 
•  Providing necessary assistance and training to civil aviation staff. 
In  addition, the authorities  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina have plans for  a  US$20-30 million  project to 
support a new air traffic control center in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  However, in view of  the international 
trend to consolidate and reduce the number of  such centers, this proposal is not considered a priority. 
Institution building (US$3 million): Achieving nascent sustainability 
23.  The  program  would  support  the  establishment  and  strengthening  of transport  management, 
planning, and maintenance organizations -- taking into account the transport law currently being drafted. 
Priority activities include: 
•  Providing equipment and training to maintenance organizations; 
•  Setting up the Federation Road Directorate; 
10 
The main institution-building activities are handled by the Commission on Public Corporations. - 11  -
•  Assisting  urban  transport  companies  in  improving  operations,  collecting  fares,  and 
recovering costs and possibly in privatizing suburban services; and 
•  Undertaking a study to assess the medium-term investment needs for rehabilitating the ports 
on the Sava River. 
Technical assistance (US$7 million):  Moving toward locally managed projects 
24.  This component centers on  providing assistance to the Bosnia and  Herzegovina authorities to 
prepare  and  implement the  1997  program.  The objective  should  be  to  gradually  phase  out foreign 
assistance and increasingly involve local consulting groups in project management.  In 1997 assistance is 
required for: 
•  Program  management  advisory  services  in  1996  the  EC  funded,  through  IMG,  an 
international project management adviser to the State Government; this should be continued; 
•  Financing for the operation of  the authorities' implementation unit; and 
•  Engineering  services  for  project  feasibility  studies  and  design,  implementation,  and 
supervision of projects. 
Implementation arrangements 
25.  In view of experience in  1996 (box 5), several vehicles have been designed for channeling donor 
assistance in  1997.  The State and Entity Governments have prepared a comprehensive project for this 
purpose  consisting of independent  modules  corresponding  to  subsectors  (e.g.  roads,  railways)  or to 
geographic areas.  Donors are strongly encouraged to coordinate their activities within  this framework. 
They  can  obtain  information  and  assistance  from  three  sources:  the  State  and  Entity  Ministries  for 
Transport, the program management adviser, and the Transport Task Force.
11 
II 
Particular  attention  should  be  paid  to  properly  implementing  mine-clearing  activities  (see  section  on 
landmines).  Mine-clearing  agencies  should  be  involved  in  the  definition  of terms  of reference  and  the 
supervision of  works. - 12-
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
26.  To  develop  an  efficient and  sustainable  transport  system,  coordination  between  Government 
authorities in planning, operations, and funding is crucial.  In the road sector measures need to be worked 
out to ensure the financing of maintenance and  investments.  Fuel  and  other specific taxes should be 
introduced; where they are already in  place but do  not reflect the full  cost of the use of infrastructure, 
they should be increased.  Adequate revenues should be allocated to the authorities responsible for the 
roads  sector  in  each  Entity.
12  Tax rates  and  tax  collection  should  also  be  coordinated  between  the 
Entities  to  avoid  tax  evasion.  In  the  railways  and  public  transportation  sector  tariffs  should  be 
progressively raised  to ensure cost recovery -- and  well-targeted  mechanisms  should  be  designed  to 
protect low-income users. 
Toward cost-effectiveness 
27.  The transport sector is  still  managed as  it was  in  former Yugoslavia, as  a publicly owned and 
operated  system  with  companies monopolizing markets  in  their geographical  areas of operation.  To 
ensure cost-effectiveness and efficiency in  the sector, restore satisfactory service delivery and  improve 
financial  viability, significant restructuring  is  needed  -- management should be  improved and  staffing 
adjusted.  Inter-Entity  economies  of scale  should  be  sought.  An  appropriate  regulatory  framework 
should be designed as early as possible. 
Sector governance 
28.  Instead of direct control over publicly owned enterprises, Governments should exercise indirect 
guidance through regulation and pricing policies.  Privatization should be considered for most transport 
services.  Reintegration of the networks is  a likely by-product of the necessary reforms of the current 
regulatory  framework  and  the  general  management  practices  in  the  transport  sector.  Thus  the  two 
processes should be addressed together.  As long as  utilities are operated by monopolistic government-
owned companies, reintegration  is  likely to remain a highly politicized issue (separate companies have 
been established to demonstrate sovereignty as well as to limit interdependence).  Reforming the utility 
sectors and cutting back on the role of public authorities are probably the best ways to ensure service 
trade and network reintegration on an economic basis. 
29.  In  the  railways  sector investments and  maintenance of the network should be separated from 
operations.  Each  operating  company  should  be  authorized  to  operate  on  the  whole  network  on  a 
commercial  basis  (with  payment  of a  uniform  fee  to  the  network  companies)  as  per  contractual 
arrangements.  Third-party access should be granted automatically. 
12 
The EBRD will finance a road user charges study in  1997. TELECOMMUNICATIONS 
I.  BACKGROUND 
1  .  A modern prewar telecommunications network, though with limited coverage.  By the late 1980s 
Bosnia and  Herzegovina's telecommunications network was relatively modern, with  a  high  degree of 
digitalization.  But coverage was limited, with only 12 telephones for every 100 people.  Several post and 
telecommunications  (PTT)  enterprises  provided  basic  telecommunications  services  to  approximately 
750,000  subscribers  under  the  coordination  of the  Community  of PTT  Enterprises  of Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina General Directorate.  There were 6,000 international lines, including 700 direct links with 
countries  outside the  former Yugoslavia.  Most  international  calls  were  routed through  international 
telephone exchanges in Belgrade and Zagreb. 
2.  Telecommunications disrupted by heavy war damage.  During the hostilities the  long-distance 
transmission  network  was  heavily  damaged,  disrupting  important  interurban  and  international 
communications links -- with most damage occurring near the lines of confrontation (box 1  ).  As a result 
many  areas  now  have  very  limited  or no  access  to  external  communications  links.  About  215,000 
subscriber lines, or 30 percent of the local network lines, are out of order.  The PTT company was split 
into three separate companies, based  in  Sarajevo (PTT BH), Mostar (PTT HB), and Republika Srpska 
(PTT RS).  The  cost of restoring  the  sector,  including  rehabilitating  the  long-distance  transmission 
network and procuring auxiliary equipment (public phones, vehicles, instruments), has been estimated by 
Swedtel, a consultant for the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), at US$222 
million (annex 1). - 14-
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
3.  Based on  a detailed assessment of the war damage, the three- to  four-year reconstruction  and 
development program designed in  December 1995  has been updated and total external financing needs 
have been revised from US$567 million to US$173 million.  While US$222 million would be required to 
fully restore the system and an additional US$132 million would be needed to expand and modernize 
through  2000,  the  priority  reconstruction  program  endorsed  by  the  World  Bank,  the  European 
Community (EC), the EBRD, and the Government of Bosnia and  Herzegovina totals US$173  million 
within the overall US$5.1  billion priority reconstruction program (table 1).  It is  intended to cover only 
part of the total costs of restoration and rehabilitation, and presumes that the remaining funding can be 
obtained from the private sector or as contributions from the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
•  In 1996, US$37 million was firmly committed, about 23  percent of  the original US$160 
million estimated first-year needs; reconstruction activities suffered both from this shortfall 
in financing and from pre-election political uncertainty (paragraphs 6 to 13); 
•  In 1997, US$60 million is required, 29 percent of  which would benefit the State, 48 percent 
the Federation, and 23  percent Republika Srpska (paragraphs 14 to 16); and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, about US$76 million will be needed and, to ensure the recovery of  the 
sector, financial and institutional policy issues will need to be addressed, with strong support 
from the donor community (paragraph 17). 
Table 1. Telecommunications Program External Financing Needs 
(US$ million) 
3- 4 year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
Emergency repairs  45  7  20  18 
Reconstruction  120  29  39  52 
Technical assistance  8  6 
Total  173  37  60  76 
4.  The  reconstruction  program  will  restore  and  modernize  critical  parts  of existing  networks, 
establish a Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) network, support institution building, and 
provide technical assistance on  legal and regulatory matters to the Entity Ministries for Transport and 
Communications.  Works include:  · 
•  Repairing the long-distance network (the backbone network); 
•  Rehabilitating  the  trunk  network  (short-distance  transmission  and  intercommunication 
network); 
•  Providing power supply equipment, particularly standby batteries; 
•  Reconstructing technical buildings and towers; 
•  Restoring priority local exchanges with a view to the number of  subscribers and the extent of 
damage; - 15 -
•  Repairing local lines in affected areas; 
•  Installing a large network of  public pay phones; and 
•  Procuring tools, instruments, and vehicles. 
In  some cases,  new technological  systems  should  be  used  rather than  repairing or replacing existing 
systems (for example, a wireless local loop system rather than the traditional copper cable network). A 
detailed, prioritized list of investments has been established, as well as a Medium-Term Reconstruction 
and Development Plan to guide reconstruction and development activities through 2000. 
5.  Establishing a GSM is a high priority, and different options for an initial deployment have been 
studied.  Technical and economic scenarios have been prepared for both a national GSM operator and 
three  regional  operators  (investment  in  a  GSM  would  be  economically  sound  even  with  a  regional 
approach).  Since the private sector is  the natural source of financing for such services, donors should 
focus  on  providing foreign  investors with the necessary guarantees or lending conditions to  stimulate 
their interest.  However, the development of a GSM cannot substitute for (and requires for satisfactory 
functioning) restoration of  conventional services. 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
6.  At the end of 1995 the EBRD offered to act as the lead agency in  mobilizing and coordinating 
the resources  needed to  reconstruct the telecommunications network  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina.  In 
addition, under the auspices of the Office of the High Representative (OHR) and with assistance from 
International Management Group (IMG), the EBRD established two working groups in  February 1996, 
that  included  representatives  from  all  the  relevant  telecommunications  authorities  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina: 
•  The  technical  working  grpup,  with  the  assistance  of Swedtel,  prepared  a  comprehensive 
report assessing the damage, describing the current situation, and defining the immediate and 
medium-term needs for restoring and reconstructing of the telecommunications sector.  The 
report was finalized in  September 1996 and made available to  interested parties.  Although 
the report is not structured as an investment plan, it contains the information needed to select 
and define the most urgent investment projects in fixed and mobile telephony.  On the basis 
of this report, the cost of restoring the telecommunications system to  its  prewar condition 
was estimated at US$222 million; and 
•  The policy working group provided technical assistance to the State and Entity Ministries for 
Transport and Communications in developing a modern legislative and regulatory system for 
the entire country, consistent with practices and trends in  Europe and eventually integrated 
as per the provisions of  the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement. 
To ensure  proper coordination of donor efforts,  the  EBRD also  chairs a  Task Force where the  main 
organizations involved in the telecommunications reconstruction effort, including the EC, the OHR, the 
IMG, USAID, and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) are represented. 
7.  Donor commitments remained insufficient to undertake reconstruction activities on a large scale. 
Although needs for the first year initially had been estimated at US$160 million, only US$37 million was 
firmly  committed  -- by  the  EC,  the  Soros  Foundation,  the  Governments  of Germany,  Italy,  the 
Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,  Switzerland, and  the United Kingdom, and the EBRD (table 2).  Other - 16-
potential donors (including the Governments of Finland, Korea, Kuwait, Spain, and Turkey) expressed 
interest in  providing cofinancing for telecommunications but have  not yet made a  firm  commitment. 
Private investors were only marginally involved, mainly because of the unclear legislative, regulatory, 
and  political situation. The three PIT companies nevertheless undertook urgent reconstruction works, 
relying on their own limited resources.  However, by the end of January 1997 there were still no direct 
telecommunications links between the Entities. 
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Emergency repairs 
Reconstruction 
Technical assistance 
Total 
Damage assessment completed 
Amount 
7 
29 
37 
Main Donors 
Sweden, UK, Germany 
EBRD, EC, Italy, Norway 
Netherlands,  Sweden,  Switzerland, 
Soros Foundation 
8.  The technical working group completed an  inventory of the war damage, now available to  all 
interested donors and  investors, providing detailed information on  each category of equipment at each 
site -- down to the level of exchanges, transmission segments, technical constructions, local  networks, 
and power supply, and indicating the replacement costs.  This information was used to define the main 
priorities for reconstruction in  1996 and 1997. 
Medium-term reconstruction and development plan readied 
9.  This plan maps out the evolution of the network through 2000, based on the existing situation, 
making it possible to  link reconstruction activities with development works.  Among other things, the 
plan describes the current network configuration and the target network, provides a market and traffic 
forecast,  makes  several  recommendations  on  technology,  and  presents  a  detailed  proposal  for 
institutional strengthening.  During the initial phase efforts could focus on restoring local networks.  For 
the eventual  rehabilitation of a countrywide system, the  study recommends  developing a  ring-shaped 
backbone  network (rather than  using the traditional  star shape), which would  create  interdependence 
between  the  PIT companies  by  integrating  all  parts  of the  country  in  one  national  network  while 
maintaining some autonomy in operation.  In addition to the two existing international exchanges centers 
in  Sarajevo and Posusje (near Mostar),  the  plan  recommends  establishing  a third  one  in  Bijeljina or 
Banja Luka (in  Republika  Srpska)  and  using three transit centers,  working  in  pairs  (Sarajevo-Tuzla, 
Posusje-Mostar,  and  Banja  Luka-Bijeljina)  to  handle  long-distance  traffic.  However,  all  these 
recommendations  are  subject  to  further  consideration  and  analysis  in  conjunction  with  the 
telecommunications authorities of  Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Mobile telephony systems deployed in some areas 
10.  Mobile telephony was considered an investment priority from the beginning.  But because of the 
unclear legal framework and the differing views among the representatives of  the three PTTs, no national 
consensus on  deploying such  a  system  could be reached.  Instead,  all  three PITs are  independently 
developing regional GSM networks, following different ownership routes.  PIT Sarajevo has procured - 17-
and is deploying a GSM network in Sarajevo, Tuzla, and East Mostar.  The PTT in Mostar, in partnership 
with the Croatia post and telecommunications enterprise (HPT), has deployed a GSM system in  most of 
the areas it serves.  The PTT in Republika Srpska is  in the process of selecting a strategic partner for the 
provision  of GSM  services.  Inter-Entity  cooperation  is  urgently  needed to  reach  an  agreement  on 
frequency and interconnection between these GSM  networks. 
First phase of  sector policy development completed 
11.  This part of the program was aimed at assisting the Entity and State Ministries for Transport and 
Communications  in  formulating  policy  to  support  effective,  efficient  restructuring  of  the 
telecommunications  sector.  It  focused  on  strategy  sector  policy,  telecommunications  law,  mobile 
licensing and mobile network configuration issues.  The sector policy development was coordinated with 
the  OHR  (through  the  Joint  Civilian  Commission),  IMG,  and  the  Implementation  Force  (IFOR). 
Working documents-- a draft telecommunications law, sector policy statement, and GSM license-- for 
the Entities were developed  in  cooperation with the policy working group, taking  into  account other 
European  experiences and  with  a  view toward  eventual  integration  of the  networks  at a  State  level. 
Progress was slow, in  large part because of the reluctance of Republika Srpska to  recognize any State 
laws  or  institutions  before  the  elections.  A  second  phase  of technical  assistance  is  now  being 
implemented; this phase will focus on building the necessary legal framework for telecommunications at 
the State level. 
Urgent repairs implemented 
12.  The reconstruction work that began  last year was funded  almost entirely by  bilateral donors. 
Reconstruction activities include: 
•  Thirty-five thousand lines of  AXE switching equipment in Sarajevo (Sweden); 
•  An international EWSD exchange in Sarajevo (Germany); 
•  Power supply equipment (United Kingdom); and 
•  A microwave link between Sarajevo and Hungary (Sweden). 
The  PTTs  also  initiated  reconstruction  projects  with  their  own  financing.  But  the  main  objective, 
connecting the  two  Entities through  direct  lines,  was  not  met -- because  of political,  not  technical, 
difficulties. 
Preparation for comprehensive rehabilitation initiated 
13.  Project preparation for the full  restoration of the telecommunications network commenced last 
year, and all the detailed technical and financial information needed to develop an  investment project is 
now available.  But there have been two main obstacles to the selection of  concrete investment objectives 
and  initiation of the project:  the  lack of donor support, 
1 and the  difficulties  in  getting the  necessary 
agreement on the network development plan, especially on the configuration of the backbone network. 
The lack of  co financing prevented the EBRD from using its own funds. - 18-
A  compromise  solution  that  will  permit  commencement  of  the  works  on  the  country's  mam 
telecommunications highways, is expected in the next months. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
Reaching agreement on the basic framework 
14.  In  1996 the main successes occurred  in  studies and preparatory work.  In  1997 donors should 
focus  on  starting  physical  implementation  of  the  EBRD's  Telecommunications  Emergency 
Reconstruction Project.  But that will require the State and Entity Governments to reach an agreement on 
the structure of  the network and on the policy framework in which it will operate.  A technical assistance 
program designed to promote such an  agreement is  being offered to telecommunications authorities in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; this program would help initiate the necessary legal and regulatory reforms for 
operation of  the national and Entity telecommunications networks.  Both the Governments in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina  and  the  donor  community  should  consider  the  signing  of an  appropriate  agreement  a 
precondition for any significant donor support. 
3  Such an agreement must include the interconnection of 
the  PTT networks,  in  accordance with  the  conclusions of the December  1996 Peace  Implementation 
Conference. 
Defining and implementing the project 
15.  The preparation and appraisal of the Telecommunications Emergency Reconstruction Project is 
under way.  A mission including representatives of the EBRD and the Governments of Korea (MOF and 
2 
3 
The telecommunications law should clearly define the roles and responsibilities of the State and ofthe Entities 
with  regard to regulations and licensing.  It should also organize the State functions for  international traffic 
regulation.  This is  critical for addressing important issues such as the establishment of a national numbering 
system, international traffic routing, interconnection, frequency spectrum management, and tariff settlements 
and  to  prevent  development  of non-harmonized,  high-cost  systems  and  delays  in  restoring  satisfactory 
telecommunications services. 
After  an  agreement on  the  structure  of the  network  and  on  the  policy  framework  has  been  reached,  the 
Telecommunications 'Emergency  Reconstruction  Project  will  be  revised  to  take  into  account  the  proposed 
national network configuration. - 19-
EDCF) and Sweden (SIDA), as well as technical and policy consultants, visited Bosnia and Herzegovina 
in February 1997. In addition, two teams of  consultants are continuing project preparation in the field.  If 
potential agreements are reached and if cofinancing can be promptly secured, the first disbursements for 
the project could be expected during the third quarter of 1997.  Meanwhile, the EC is providing a US$1 0 
million grant to construct a backbone network in  Republika Srpska, to restore inter-Entity connections, 
and to rehabilitate local networks in priority areas in the Federation. 
Developing necessary institutions 
16.  A  Project  Implementation  Unit  (PJU)  needs  to  be  established  to  coordinate  all  project 
implementation activities (planning, procurement, technical assistance, training, and the like). Assisted 
by  foreign  experts, the PIU  would be  responsible for  activities related to the EBRD's project and  for 
coordination of all the donors' telecommunications projects (box 3).  Local PIUs could be established in 
each PTT, an action that would require US$5.4 million in external financing (box 4). 
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
17.  The policy working group, with the assistance of EBRD consultants, has initiated work on most 
of the policy, legal, and regulatory issues remaining to be resolved in the telecommunications sector and 
discussed them at the Entity level.  There is  a clear trend toward integrating legislation in  line with the. 
provisions of  the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement and the European Union recommendations.  Once these 
recommendations are properly  implemented, and after an  initial  reconstruction and buildup period (in, 
say,  two  years),  the  sector  could  be  expected  to  be  financially  sustainable,  assuming  adequate 
management and appropriate tariff levels.  To improve financial organization and management, human 
resource  management  and  development,  and  operational  and  technical  function,  a  comprehensive 
technical assistance package is envisaged as a part of  the implementation program (box 4). -20-- 21  -
Annex 1.  Restoration costs by category (US$ million) 
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a. ELECTRIC POWER AND COAL MINING 
I.  BACKGROUND 
1.  Before the war Bosnia and Herzegovina's electric power system consisted of: 
•  Thirteen hydropower plants with a total capacity of 2,034 megawatts (MW) and an average 
annual output of  6,922 gigawatt hours (GWh); 
•  Twelve brown  coal- and  lignite-fired  thermal  power plants  with  an  installed  capacity of 
1,957 MW and an annual output of I 0,675 GWh; and 
•  Transmission and distribution facilities interconnected and operated at 400, 220, II  0, 35, 20, 
10, and 0.4 kilovolts (kV) levels, with about 5,400 kilometers (km) of  transmission lines and 
92,000 km of  distribution lines. 
2.  The coal mining sector consisted of more than thirty coal  mines that produced  brown coal  or 
lignite for heating and  power generation.  Annual  production was about  I8 million tons, of which  I 0 
million  tons  was  brown  coal  and  8  million  tons was  lignite.  Within  the  Federation  production was 
concentrated  in  the  Tuzla and  Zenica areas  in  both  open-pit and  underground  mines.  In  Republika 
Srpska the two main  mines were Ugljevik (brown  coal) and Gacko (lignite), each  producing about 2 
million tons a year. 
3.  Both the power system and the coal mining sector suffered significant damage as a direct result 
of  war activities or because of prewar and war-related lack of maintenance (boxes I and 2). 
4.  Before the war Bosnia and Herzegovina's power system was operated by Elektroprivreda Bosne 
i Hercegovine (EPBiH).  The status of the coal mines varied from  one area to another: the Gacko and 
Ugljevik coal mines were the only significant mines belonging to the electric power company; the mines 
in the Tuzla region were grouped into one state-owned holding company; and other mines were operated 
as independent state-owned enterprises. 
5.  The power system is now de facto operated by three regional companies: EPBiH, in the Bosniac 
majority part of  the Federation; Elektroprivreda Herceg Bosne (EPHB), in the Croat majority part of  the 
Federation; and Elektroprivreda Republike Srpske (EPRS),  in  Republika Srpska.  In the coal sector, to 
facilitate the coordination of  emergency aid and control the application of scarce resources, the mines in 
the Federation have been grouped into two principal companies (Tuzla Coal Mines and Central Bosnia 
Coal  Mines),  that supply the  important Tuzla and  Kakanj  thermal  power plants.  A  third  group,  the -24-
Mostar Coal Mines, is of less economic importance, both  in  terms of output and product end-use.  No 
regrouping of  coal mines took place in Republika Srpska. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
6.  The objectives of  the reconstruction program in the electric power and coal mining sectors are: 
•  Restorating of  service to acceptable levels; 
•  Restorating of output of the  lowest-cost mines (which can provide the  largest increase  in 
output relative to the required investment) to levels sufficient to restart the operation of the 
thermal power plants at the desired capacity levels and to provide adequate fuel for industry, 
district heating, and households; 
•  Improving sector finances through increased billing and collection and a gradual phasing out 
of  price distortions; and 
•  Restructuring the electric power and coal sectors. 
7.  The reconstruction program submitted to donors in December 1995 and April 1996 remains valid 
as an overall framework for the three- to four-year program.  It will require US$614 million in  external 
support  for  the  three- to  four-year  period  within  the  overall  US$5.1  billion  priority  reconstruction 
program (table 1): 
•  In 1996, US$231  million  was firmly committed and  a  large  number of activities  were 
carried out successfully (paragraphs 8 to I I); 
•  In 1997, US$200 million in external financing will be required -- about 65  percent of 
which would benefit the Federation and 35 percent Republika Srpska (paragraphs 12 to 19). 
This includes the US$40 million shortfall carried over from  1996; and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, an estimated US$183 million will be needed and several policy issues 
should be addressed to ensure the long-term sustainability of the program (paragraphs 20 to 
21). Ill. 
-25-
Table 1.  Electric Power and Coal Mining Program External Financial Needs 
(US$ million) 
3-4 year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
Electric power 
Hydro generation  60  20  30  10 
Thermal generation  60  32  15  13 
Transmission lines  65  36  20  9 
Transmission substations/dispatch  80  21  19  40 
Distribution  191  67  65  59 
Communications  6  0  3  3 
Transportation  23  0  10  13 
Spare parts  30  24  5 
Engineering and technical assistance  25  10  8  7 
Sub-total  540  210  175  155 
Coal mining 
Equipment and spare parts  70  20  22  28 
Technical assistance  4  3  0 
Sub-total  74  21  25  28 
Total  614  231  200  183 
1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
8.  There have been many positive developments in the electric power sector since the signing of  the 
Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement.  The US$196 million Emergency Electric Power Rehabilitation Project, 
financed by a  large number of financiers,  is  being implemented and is  progressing well.  This Project 
includes most of the emergency reconstruction program for  1996 (table 2).  Under the auspices of the 
Office of the High Representative, contacts were initiated between the electric power companies of the 
Federation and Republika Srpska, which led to increased sectoral cooperation.  Although much remains 
to be done  in  this area, the general managers of the Federation and  Republika Srpska electric power 
companies met to define reconstruction priorities and establish coordination and liaison mechanisms. -26-
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Electric power 
Generation 
Transmission and distribution 
Maintenance/operation equipment 
Technical assistance 
Coal mining 
Total 
Amount  Main D.onors 
210 
[52] 
[124] 
[24] 
[10] 
21 
231 
Czech Republic, EC, Germany, 
Switzerland, UK, US, World Bank. 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, EBRD, EC, 
France, Germany, Italy, Norway, UK, 
US, World Bank. 
Belgium, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, 
Slovenia, Switzerland, World Bank. 
EC, Ireland, Switzerland, World Bank, 
others 
Czech Republic, EC, Poland, UK, US, 
World Bank 
9.  The amounts shown in Table 2 represent firm or indicative donor commitments through the end 
of December  1996 by:  the  Governments of Austria,  Belgium,  Canada,  the Czech  Republic,  Finland, 
France, Germany, Ireland, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom (UK), the 
United  States (US),  the European  Bank for  Reconstruction  and  Development (EBRD),  the  European 
Commission (EC),  the  Overseas Development Agency (ODA),  and  the  World  Bank.  Commitments 
made under the Emergency Electric Power Rehabilitation Project total US$156 million.  Commitments 
outside of  that project amount to US$75 million. 
10.  As part of the US$156 million committed under the Emergency Electric Power Rehabilitation 
Project, the Swiss Government approved a commitment of about US$7 million equivalent for financing 
of  Units 4 and 6 and the common facilities of  the Jablanica hydro power plant.  The US committed funds 
for the rehabilitation of Units 5 and 6 of  the Kakanj Cogeneration Plant as well as associated coal mines 
in Central Bosnia, for a total cost of  about US$23 million.  This leaves a financing gap ofUS$40 million 
in the US$196 million Emergency Electric Power Reconstruction Project; this amount has been included 
under the 1997 requirements.  The largest unfunded items in the Project are the Mostar hydropower plant 
(US$13.5 million) and distribution components in various areas (US$12 million). 
11.  The emergency electric power reconstruction program is making good progress: 
•  Four major 220 kV transmission lines had been restored to service as of September 1996, 
between Tuzla and Zenica, Jablanica and Mostar, Kakanj  and Salakovac, and  Mostar and 
Salakovac. These transmission lines will significantly improve the reliability of the 220 kV 
core  transmission  system.  In  addition,  the  rehabilitation  of the  220kV  trans-country 
transmission line (Trebinje- Jablanica- Jajce- Prijedor- Bihac) was near completion at the 
end of  December 1996. 
•  The Salakovac hydropower plant was in full operation at the end of  December,  1996.  Two 
damaged  turbine-generators,  together  with  their  auxiliary  equipment,  were  entirely 
overhauled,  re-installed,  and  prepared  for  mechanical  revolving,  allowing  operations  to 
resume in December 1996. 
•  The  Grabovica  hydropower plant  was  recommissioned  at  the  end of December  1996. 
Rehabilitation of  the damaged tailrace channel and stilling basin for the Grabovica plant is of -27-
prime  importance,  since  tailrace  failure  can  cause  loss  of the  entire  output of the  plant. 
Dredging  of the  tailrace  channel  has  been  completed.  The  recommissioning  of the 
Salakovac  and  Grabovica  hydropower  plants  has  permitted  since  December  1996,  a 
significant  increase  in  the  power  supply  capacity  in  the  southern  part of the  Federation, 
relieving part of  the expected power shortages. 
•  Preparation of  the rehabilitation of  the Jablanica hydropower station is in full swing.  Major 
reconstruction is expected to start in early spring 1997. 
•  Rehabilitation  of three  major  thermal power plants  (Tuzla,  Kakanj,  and  Ugljevik)  and 
associated coal mines has started.  The Ugljevik power plant was commissioned recently. 
Spare parts have been provided to keep the smaller generating units of Tuzla and  Kakanj 
operating.  Unit  6  at  the  Kakanj  power  plant  was  commissioned  at  the  beginning  of 
November  1996  and  the  rehabilitation  of Unit  5  is  under  way  and  is  expected  to  be 
completed by mid-March 1997.  Procurement of the major components for the Tuzla power 
plant and urgent spare parts for the Tuzla coal mine are well under way.  A 200 MW unit at 
the Tuz1a power plant was commissioned at the beginning ofNovember 1996. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
12.  The priorities of  the 1997 reconstruction program are to: 
•  Carry out a long-term development strategy study, which the Swiss Government has offered 
to finance; 
•  Further improve the reliability, availability, and quality of supply to electricity consumers in 
the  Federation  and  Republika  Srpska  in  order  to  facilitate  economic  recovery,  by:  (a) 
rehabilitating  the  distribution  network  and  transmission  networks;  (b)  where  necessary -28-
reconnecting areas that were cut off from  electricity supply;  and  (c)  strengthening power 
generation  capacity,  necessary  for  domestic  electricity  consumption,  by  rehabilitating 
hydropower and thermal power plants where justified; 
•  Enhance cooperation between Entities through a joint study on the rehabilitation of the 400 
kV transmission system, and encourage power exchange through system reintegration; 
•  Support institutional improvements in  the internal organization and operation of the electric 
utilities and coordination between them; and 
•  Help develop a suitable regulatory framework and an  improved electricity tariff structure. 
13.  To  meet these  objectives,  financial  assistance  in  the  order of about US$200  million  will  be 
required from the donor community for  1997.  This includes about US$40 million  in  unfunded project 
components from  the Emergency Electric Power Sector Reconstruction Project and US$160 million  in 
new investments.  About one-third of all new reconstruction investments (US$50-60 million) would take 
place in Republika Srpska. 
Transmission and distribution 
14.  While  local  distribution  will  be  given  highest  pnonty,  it  will  also  be  important  to  rebuild 
selected  220  and  110  kV  transmission  facilities  (including transmission  lines  and  substations).  The 
Banja Luka and Bihac regions, the Neretva Valley, and the Lasva Valley are expected to be part of the 
priority areas.  The 400 kV system  is  mainly for  interstate transmission, rehabilitation of which should 
wait until a thorough study has been completed; rehabilitation could be included in the 1998-99 program. 
15.  Consultants are being engaged under EC financing to review investment priorities throughout the 
country and to prepare cost estimates and technical specifications for bidding documents. Identification 
of the  individual  components to  be  financed  by this  program  will  be  a  painstaking  process,  in  part 
because  of the  physical  dispersion  of the  assets  as  well  as  the  fact  that three  Elektroprivredas  are 
involved.  Hence the results will not be  available until after the Spring Donors Conference.  It should be 
emphasized that the cost estimate for the  1997-99 electric power and coal mining program are tentative 
and based  largely on the estimates submitted by the Elektroprivredas and the mines.  Major selection 
criteria to determine reconstruction priorities are listed in box 4. 
Generation 
16.  In  hydropower generation,  priority  should  be  given  to the  Mostar (3x25  MW),  Rama (2x80 
MW),  Bocac (2x55  MW), and  Trebinje hydropower plants.  Detailed damage assessments should  be 
carried out before costs can be accurately estimated.  For example, the Mostar hydropower station was 
badly damaged and the machine hall flooded; the generating units, including auxiliary equipment, have 
been  completely submerged  for  the  past three years and  have to  be  lifted out for  cleaning, damage 
inspection, and testing.  In thermal power plants and associated coal mines priority should be given to 
the Gacko thermal power plant (lx300 MW) and associated coal mine.  To evaluate the possibility of 
full-scale rehabilitation of the  300 MW unit at the Gacko plant, an  in-depth review should assess the 
status  of the  turbine-generator,  boiler,  instrumentation  and  control,  fuel  requirements  and  supply, 
environmental impact and mitigation measures, and electrical, auxiliary, and general station equipment. -29-
Implementation arrangements 
17.  Implementation  of many of the  components of the  above  program  can  for  the  most  part  be 
undertaken  independently  by  each  of the  three  Elektroprivredas.  For  interface  areas,  however, 
implementation  requires  a  significant degree of cooperation  between  the  three  electricity companies. 
While this can, in  principle, be done by continuing the ad-hoc arrangements that have characterized this 
process thus far, the establishment of a collaborative organizing framework would improve this process. 
In  some  cases,  donors  may  not  be  willing  to  support  investments  unless  these  better  collaborative 
arrangements are achieved. 
18.  A Project Implementation Unit (PIU) for power sector investments has been established within 
EPBiH with adequate staffing and assistance from  external experts; such external assistance should be 
continued, with an added emphasis on support for improved project management.  Similar arrangements 
should  be  made  by  the other two Elektroprivredas.  Although the  PIU or project management teams 
exercise control  over all  project-related activities, they receive support from  other units of the power 
enterprises for procurement, technical support, legal matters, budgeting, accounting, disbursing and cost 
control,  scheduling,  manpower  allocation,  operational  support  and  so  on.  Implementation  of the 
subprojects  is  the  responsibility  of the  local  generation,  transmission,  and  distribution  entities. 
Replacement of transmission equipment is  performed  by the transmission  organizations'  maintenance 
staff on  force  account,  who have  satisfactorily handled  similar works  in  the  past.  In  most instances 
installation of major equipment is  being done by suppliers on a turnkey basis, using local construction 
companies as much as possible. 
19.  In the case of projects which benefit the coal sector, the mining companies would be responsible 
for project implementation. For example, under the World Bank financed part of  the Emergency Electric 
Power  Rehabilitation  Project,  the  Tuzla  Mining  Company  has  assumed  sole  responsibility  for - 30-
procurement and implementation.  In  procurement matters it  is assisted by an experienced foreign trade 
company.  Within the Federation, the Ministry of Energy and Industry is  to be responsible for a sector 
restructuring study and for ensuring close cooperation between the mining and electric power companies. 
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
20.  The main policy issues to be addressed over the short term are: 
•  Electric power sector financial viability.  In  1994 and  1995  the  Elektroprivredas  incurred 
substantial losses.  Furthermore, the financial difficulties faced by households and corporate 
consumers during the war caused  bill  collection rates to  be  very low (although collection 
performance  improved  significantly  in  1995,  reaching  around  50  percent  in  the  case  of 
EPBiH).  Billing  and  collection  rates  should  be  gradually  but  aggressively  increased  to 
approach  I 00 percent by  1998 at the latest.  The financial viability of the power sector also 
depends on the price of coal per kWh, which should be examined in  the context of the coal 
sector restructuring study. 
•  Coal mining sector restructuring.  Some activity,  although  not necessarily  production,  is 
being maintained in  all twenty-eight mines in  the Federation, although about 70 percent of 
production originates from four surface mines.  An assessment is needed to determine which 
mines are the  lowest-cost and  most competitive producers.  Reconstruction  efforts should 
focus on  economically viable mines that are capable of providing the desired coal quality. 
This approach is expected to result in the concentration of production in a few large mines. 
•  Coal mining staffing levels.  Before the war the coal mines employed about 26,000 workers 
and had a low average productivity per worker.  The current staffing level is about 20,000, of 
which  about  half are  actually  working.  Staffing  should  be  gradually  decreased  so  that 
productivity can be increased well above past and current levels. - 31  -
•  Coal mining production costs.  Present production costs appear to be at or above the world 
market  level  of coal  prices.  Hence,  costs per ton  should  be  lowered  as  soon  as  possible 
through reduced staffing levels, selective mine closures, and better preventive maintenance 
and spare parts management. 
21 .  The main policy issues to be addressed over the medium term are: 
•  Electric power sector restructuring.  The power sector clearly falls within the jurisdiction of 
the  Commission  on  Public  Corporations,  created  by Annex 9  of the  Dayton-Paris  Peace 
Agreement.  A  working  group  created  by  the  Commission  has  discussed  cooperation 
between the Entities, and the Commission itself has  started to examine the organization of 
the electric power sector.  While the  power system  may be  too  small  to enable effective 
competition, measures can  and  should  be taken to  introduce a  sector structure that would 
facilitate ultimate privatization.  One potential scenario is as follows: 
•  First,  inter-utility  cooperation  must  be  further  developed  so  that  the  use  of the 
existing infrastructure can  be  optimized and  the rehabilitation can be planned and 
carried  out  in  a  coordinated  manner.  At  the  same  time,  laws  and  regulations 
governing the energy sector should be prepared in order to set the legal framework. 
•  Second,  generation  should  be  separated  from  transmission  and  distribution  and 
responsibility  divided  among  several  generating  companies,  each  operating  on  a 
commercial  basis.  The transmission  system  should  be  operated  in  a  coordinated 
fashion throughout the country to ensure the optimization of power transmission and 
permit effective  power trading  and  system  stabilization.  Distribution  enterprises 
would  be  organized  on  a  local  basis.  An  electricity  law  would  be  passed  under 
which a Regulatory Authority would be set up to regulate power prices and to ensure 
third-party  access  to  the  transmission  system.  Such  a  law  is  currently  being 
prepared, although at this stage there are at least three competing drafts. 
•  Third, once the new structure is  in  place and is operating with reasonable autonomy, 
the generation and distribution companies could be partially or totally privatized. 
•  Settlement of  liabilities between the three existing electricity companies.  There are three de 
facto electricity companies in  Bosnia and Herzegovina.  While the different companies took 
over the assets of the prewar organization in their respective areas, they did not yet assume 
the corresponding part of  the liabilities.  This issue must be resolved. 
•  Electric  power  tariff increases.  Over  the  medium  term  tariff levels  should  be  raised 
progressively  to:  (i)  permit  adequate  internal  generation  of funds  to  cover  the  power 
companies' expenditures and provide modest cash balances; (ii) provide full cost recovery as 
the power companies undertake further necessary efficiency-improving investments; and (iii) 
enhance energy conservation and efficiency. 
•  Coal mines privatization.  While  privatization of even the most efficient brown  coal  and 
lignite mines in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina is  probably not an  option  in  the near term due to 
lack  of  investor  interest,  the  regulatory  framework  for  private  ownership  should  be 
established. HOUSING 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A predominantly private sector before the war 
1.  Before the start of hostilities, Bosnia and Herzegovina's 4.4 million people were generally well 
housed.  With an  estimated  I ,295,000 housing units, each household generally had  its  own unit.  The 
housing  stock  was  of  relatively  high-quality  construction,  and  about  half  was  built  after  1971. 
Residential  infrastructure coverage was high  in  urban  areas,  although services often  lagged  behind  in 
unplanned and privately developed areas in the suburbs. 
2.  As in many formerly socialist economies, the housing sector was a two-tier system consisting of 
public  and  private  housing.  In  public  housing  -- multifamily  blocks  of rental  apartments  -- tenure 
bestowed many of the benefits of full  ownership.  Public housing accounted for only 20 percent of the 
total housing stock, but for more than half the housing in the largest towns of  Bosnia and Herzegovina --
although only 40 percent in  Sarajevo.  The rest of the urban population and all of the rural population 
lived in  private, single-family homes financed by household savings and remittances.  By contrast with 
many of the countries in  the region, most of the housing (80 percent) was privately owned, and private 
housing production consistently outpaced public through 1991, even in urban areas. 
War damage and exodus 
3.  The hostilities wrought havoc in  the housing sector (box  1).  The damage and destruction are, 
however, spread unevenly through  Bosnia and Herzegovina, with  localities near the front  lines  in  the 
Sarajevo, Bihac, and Mostar areas, and minority villages in  Eastern and Central Bosnia hit particularly 
hard.  The war damage to housing has been exacerbated by collateral damage due to weather,  lack of 
maintenance, and deterioration of infrastructure and connections to networks.  The war caused an exodus 
to  other  countries  and  massive  population  movements  within  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  and  further 
population shifts are now occurring as some of the displaced persons and refugees seek to return to their 
homes.  Creating the  conditions  for  their  return  by  addressing  the  constraints  posed  by  inadequate 
housing, lack of  proper infrastructure, and unemployment remains an overriding priority. - 34-
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
4.  The housing reconstruction program aims to: 
•  Create conditions to enable the return of refugees and the internally displaced; and 
•  Rapidly expand the usable housing stock for the entire population. 
5.  The program structure takes into account the reconstruction work that local contractors are able 
to undertake  in  the next three years and the need to front-load the reconstruction efforts and  stimulate 
investment in the first two years of the program to improve the quality and quantity of  the housing stock 
as rapidly as possible.  It is assumed that the number of people needing direct assistance to improve their 
housing conditions will decline as the economy improves and  incomes recover (so that households can 
invest  in  repair of their own  housing).  The  challenge  will  then  be  to  leverage  household  resources, 
supplementing scarce donor grant  resources through  household  investment savings  or possibly,  later, 
borrowing. 
6.  The  reconstruction  program  presented  in  December 1995  remains  largely  valid  as  an  overall 
framework.  The program will require US$693 million in external financial support for the three- to four-
year reconstruction period within the overall US$5.1  billion priority reconstruction program (table I): 
•  In 1996, US$302  million was firmly committed, 83  percent more than  was targeted for 
housing in  the first year (US$165  million), and  implementation of emergency repairs was 
highly successful (paragraphs I 0 to 18); 
•  In 1997, US$150 million is required, 
1  75  percent of which would benefit the Federation 
and 25  percent Republika Srpska (paragraphs 19 to 29); and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, about US$241 million will be needed, andto ensure the recovery of  the 
sector, financial and institutional policy issues will need to be addressed with strong support 
from the donor community (paragraphs 30 to 41 ). 
Table 1.  Housing Progr.am External Financial Needs 
(US$ million) 
3-4 year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocations  Allocations 
Emergency repairs  232  191  22  19 
Reconstruction  318  80  72  166 
Sarajevo program  123  25  50  48 
Technical assistance  20  6  6  8 
Total  693  302  150  241 
Within this framework, programs specifically aimed at facilitating refugee returns are being contemplated by 
the Refugee Return Task Force (RRTF), established under the Economic Task Force (ETF). - 35-
7.  The  program's priority  is  to  seek cost-effective  means  for  rapidly  increasing  the  number of 
usable units.  Works are limited initially to housing that can be easily brought to a minimum habitable 
standard and to restoring the external structures and common elements of public housing (damages are 
not only war-related but also due to the lack of maintenance before and during the war).  This approach 
has allowed the program to jump-start the process of increasing the supply and quality of housing units. 
To  have  an  impact on  the  overall  supply of units  and  for  equity reasons,  the  program  will  need  to 
undertake in a second phase cost-effective repairs to private units and public housing that have sustained 
greater  damage.  The  program  should  also  start  addressing  issues  of financial  and  institutional 
sustainability and establishing a policy framework to ensure sustainable recovery of  the sector. 
8.  The  geographic  distribution  of the  program's efforts  should  reflect the  housing  needs  of the 
population,  with  priority  given  to  those  areas  already  identified  by  the  United  Nations  High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and by the Entity Governments in conjunction with the Housing 
Task  Force  (paragraph  13).  To  the  extent  possible,  housing  repairs  should  be  accompanied  by 
infrastructure projects to ensure the viability of communities and to create adequate conditions for the 
return of  displaced persons. 
9.  The program includes four activities: 
•  Emergency repairs: rapidly increasing the stock of usable housing by rehabilitating units that 
are less than 30 percent damaged; 
•  Reconstruction: reconstructing private and public housing units that are more than 30 percent 
damaged; 
•  Sarajevo Program:  focusing on  the  Sarajevo area, where more than  50,000 units,  half the 
stock, are damaged; and 
•  Technical assistance:  providing  management and  implementation  support and  institution-
building support for the design of  adequate policies. 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
10.  During the first year of reconstruction the priorities were to launch an emergency housing repair 
program  that could  rapidly  restore  damaged  public  and  private  housing  and  to  establish  appropriate 
implementation and coordination mechanisms.  Much  progress was made on  both fronts.  In  addition, 
the  first  steps  were  taken  toward  introducing gradual  rent  increases to  recover the  costs of housing 
repairs. 
11.  The extensive damage to the stock and the urgent need to restore housing to livable conditions 
generated considerable donor response.  For the first-year program donors committed US$302 million 
for  projects  in  different municipalities  (table 2).  The  speed  and  size  of the  commitments  reflected 
donors'  awareness of the  need to make up  the shortfall  in  usable  housing, to act quickly in  the short 
construction  period  before  the  onset  of winter,  and  to  assist  in  the  repatriation  of refugees  and 
resettlement of the internally displaced.  The extent of  the needs, combined with the priority of  ~argeting 
needy households among the displaced, led most donors to emphasize emergency assistance grants for 
private housing during the first year. Emergency repairs 
Reconstruction 
Sarajevo program 
Technical assistance 
Total 
- 36-
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Amount 
191 
80 
25 
6 
302 
Main Donors 
Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, EC, Finland, FRY, FYROM, 
Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, OIC, 
Romania, Spain, Slovenia, UK, US, World 
Bank. 
Brunei, Czech Republic, Denmark, EC, 
Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Saudi 
Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland. 
Austria, Czech Republic, EC, Malaysia, US, 
World Bank. 
Austria, Canada, EC, Germany, Netherlands, 
Soros Foundation, World Bank 
12.  Local contractors were able to supply adequate  labor and  materials for  repair projects.  Both 
small  and  large contractors participated  in  these projects.  The ongoing housing repair projects will 
generate an estimated 180,000 people months of labor.  Despite the disruption in  local production, the 
supply of building materials was not a constraint.  Supplier networks were able to meet demand, with 
suppliers and contractors turning to imports when materials (such as glass and electrical and plumbing 
fixtures) were not available locally.  Although it is unclear what effect the reconstruction program had in 
stimulating the re-establishment of local manufacturing capacity, there are signs of resumed production 
of  such items as roof  tiles and cement. 
13.  The pace of implementation of  donor resources channeled through NGOs in  1996 was extremely 
uneven.  With the many donors and NGOs implementing programs in  the sector, the coordination of 
housing priorities, policies, and activities is critical to ensure the most effective use of funds.  A Housing 
Task Force has been established to ensure coordination (box 2). - 37-
Emergency repairs: About 24,000 units repaired before the winter 
14.  Emergency repairs in  1996 rehabilitated about 24,000 units, benefiting more than 95,000 people, 
and  were  in  progress,  as  of the  end  of 1996,  on  another  23,700  units.  In  addition,  the  UNHCR 
established a priority list of municipalities and identified units that could eventually house an estimated 
184,000 refugees and displaced persons.  The bulk of the assistance was programmed for Sarajevo and 
its  suburbs,  the Neretva Canton (around  Mostar),  and  the Tuzla region.  Programming  in  Republika 
Srpska lagged behind, though projects are planned for the Anvil area.
2 
15.  Public housing.  This program component, managed by the PIU, includes repair to the external 
structures and  common elements of public  housing with joint or parallel  financing  by  the European 
Union, UNHCR, the Government of the Netherlands, and the World Bank. In  1996 about 11,400 public 
housing units were weatherproofed before winter in the main cities of  the Federation, including Sarajevo 
(box 3).  These works will facilitate future repairs to flats and will, in some instances, lead to the creation 
of  additional dwelling units. 
16.  Private housing.  Donors channeled financing for rehabilitating private housing through NGOs, 
bilateral agencies or the Housing Project Implementation Unit (paragraph 17).  Overall, 12,300 dwellings 
were rehabilitated by the end of 1996,  in  part in  the target areas defined by the UNHCR.  A program 
developed jointly by the UNHCR and the United Methodist Church of Relief (UMCOR) to distribute 
materials is expected to contribute to the repair of about 6,000 houses in the Federation and 2,600 houses 
in  Republika Srpska.  In  addition, the  largest bilateral  program  (US$25  million) is  funded  by the US 
Agency for International Development (USAID) and implemented by NGOs.  It combines housing repair 
with infrastructure rehabilitation and has benefited about 2,500 households. 
Technical assistance: Coordinating numerous activities · 
17.  The implementation of donor-assisted housing programs in  the Federation was enhanced by the 
establishment of a PIU  in  the Ministry of Physical  Planning and  Environment.  The PIU, assisted  by 
technical experts funded by the German and Dutch governments, is developing and managing part of  the 
housing reconstruction program in close collaboration with the municipalities.  Since its establishment in 
May 1996, the PIU has attracted US$65 million in donor funds enough to improve housing conditions for 
2 
The Anvil area, around Mrkonjic Grad and Sipovo, was heavily damaged in fighting in September 1995, when 
it was conquered by the Federation.  Following the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement, this area was reattached to 
the territory of  Republika Srpska. - 38-
about 20,000 households.  The Governments of Italy, Japan (through the United Nations Development 
Program), and Saudi Arabia made US$29 million available for the direct implementation of works by the 
PIU.  Working  in  close coordination with  the  UNHCR and  the  Ministry of Refugees,  the  PIU  had 
completedrepairs to 212 private housing units and 11,200 public housing units by December 1996. 
18.  As  a first step toward cost recovery for the external repairs to public housing, the PIU entered 
into agreements with municipal authorities to gradually increase rents at a rate that would at a minimum 
recover  the  cost  of repairs.  Decisionmaking  in  selecting  units  for  repair,  assessing  damage,  and 
supervising  repairs  was  decentralized  at  a  local  level:  procurement  and  disbursement  remained 
centralized.  This system made it possible to promote partnership between the PIU and the municipalities 
and "ownership" of the programs by local and national bodies, and kept the time from  identification to 
completion of  projects to an average of  four to five months. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
19.  Much progress has  been made in  1996  in  financing and launching emergency repair projects. 
But substantial needs remain to be addressed, particularly in  housing reconstruction  in  Sarajevo and  in 
technical  assistance  to  build  institutional  and  implementation  capacity.  In  view  of both  donors' 
disbursement procedures and local implementation capacities, it is estimated that US$150 million can be 
effectively allocated to the sector in  1997 -- based on the pipeline of projects that can be rapidly prepared 
for implementation, largely in UNHCR-identified areas.
3 
20.  In  1997 the program aims to enable refugees and displaced persons to return or resettle while 
focusing on general issues such as ownership and cost recovery.  Priorities include: 
3 
•  Continuing the  repair  programs  initiated  in  the  first  year,  focusing  on  units  that  can  be 
rapidly restored and on target municipalities (including Sarajevo); 
•  Initiating reconstruction projects to restore more heavily damaged public and private housing 
to minimally habitable standards in  target communities and in Sarajevo; 
•  Strengthening implementation and programming capacity; and 
•  Addressing sectoral issues and the institutional and financial sustainability of  reconstruction. 
In addition, the UNHCR is seeking US$70 million for shelter assistance. - 39-
21.  To achieve these objectives  it  is  critical  that all  parties coordinate their efforts to  ensure that 
resources are used  effectively.  To aid  resettlement,  information on  how housing conditions affect the 
decisions of displaced persons to return to their homes and their ability to do so (for example, if their 
homes are occupied by others, or are too severely damaged) needs to be collected and disseminated in a 
more systematic fashion (box 4).  These efforts would allow a more efficient allocation of resources and 
a  more  demand-driven  approach  to  designing  programs  and  setting  priorities  than  in  1996.  Other 
priorities will  include  creating a  coherent framework  for  establishing  property  rights,  facilitating  the 
reclamation of property by returning refugees and displaced persons, and establishing terms for "tenure" 
of  occupants in property that is not their own. 
Emergency repairs (US$22 million): Ensuring minimal standards 
22.  The  program  will  complete  the  emergency  repair  phase  now  under  implementation  --
undertaking repairs on an estimated 8,000 more private units.  Donors should select areas for emergency 
repairs on the basis of the UNHCR priority list, with the approval of the Entity Ministries of Physical 
Planning and Environment and in coordination with the Housing Task Force.  Implementation should be 
at the municipal level, with overall project management, supervision, and disbursement functions at the 
ministerial level (through the PIU). 
Reconstruction (US$72 million): Remedying heavy damage 
23.  Reconstruction  efforts  will  focus  on  public  and  private  units  that  suffered  heavier  damage, 
including  structural  damage to external  walls, roofs,  and  internal  walls  and  damage to more  than  50 
percent of windows and doors.  Projects should benefit both private and public housing units.  Projects 
will arrange for major repairs that are  beyond the ability of occupants, such as  roof repairs and  major 
concrete works by contractors, which should be selected on  a competitive basis.  The projects could be 
implemented by the PIU and supervised by housing reconstruction units to be  set up within the Entity 
Ministries of  Physical Planning and Environment. -40-
·Sarajevo Program (US$50 million): Addressing extensive needs 
24.  This component will focus on substantial needs, as identified by the Sarajevo municipality, in the 
public housing sector that still  have  not been addressed.  It will  weatherproof buildings  by  repairing 
roofs, windows, external walls, entrances, staircases, and damaged utilities.  Repairs inside apartments 
will be the responsibility of  owners. 
Technical assistance (US$6 million): Providing essential support 
25.  Technical assistance should be  directed to  all  relevant institutions  in  the housing sector.  The 
respective roles of the different levels of government have not yet been defined in  either the Federation 
or Republika Srpska.  In the Federation, Cantons are likely to receive most of the responsibilities, while 
the  Federation  Government would  have  a  legislative  and  regulatory  function  (planning  laws,  issuing 
construction regulations, etc.).  Technical assistance should not, therefore, be  limited to the Federation 
Governments but should also be provided at the local and cantonal levels. 
26.  Technical assistance should be provided to support preparation, administration, and supervision 
of works.  Municipalities and implementation agencies should be the main beneficiaries of this support. 
Additional  support  would  be  needed  to  help  formulate  adequate  policies  for  guiding  housing 
reconstruction,  recovery,  and  development,  including  cost  recovery  and  safety  net  measures  -- and 
neither  the  Housing  Task  Force  nor  the  PIUs  can  substitute  for  Entity  Governments  in  this  role. 
Priorities  include  strengthening  property  and  collateral  rights,  promoting  land  and  infrastructure 
development, and privatizing housing and land.  Teams of experts from Bosnia and Herzegovina, drawn 
from the appropriate government and local institutions, should be formed and made responsible for the 
design of proper policies and implementation strategies, with the technical support of  foreign experts. 
Implementation arrangements: Focusing on local implementation 
27.  Donors should focus on improving coordination to ensure an effective, consistent, and equitable 
allocation of  scarce resources.  To that end, the Housing Task Force should: 
•  Take the lead in defining eligibility and selection criteria for target areas and beneficiaries; 
•  Ensure transparency and adequacy for programming resources to target areas; and 
•  Coordinate project implementation and effectiveness. 
These actions would support a more coordinated and flexible approach based on a sound understanding 
of the determinants of demand and on experience with  implementation strategies.  The Housing Task 
Force has established a policy group to ensure coordination on  issues of program criteria, sustainability, 
and cost recovery.  But success depends critically on donor participation in the Task Force. 
28.  Implementing projects through the PIUs has proved to  be  effective:  donors are encouraged to 
channel  resources  directly  to  the  PIUs  and  local  offices  (which  should  enhance  their  capacities)  to 
undertake programs and gather information at the local leve1.
4  The PIUs should remain responsible for 
both managing implementation of  certain assistance programs and coordinating the implementation of  ali 
programs.  As a minimum requirement, donors should ensure close coordination with the PIUs to avoid 
4 
A PIU should be established in Republika Srpska. - 41  -
duplication of effort and conflicting strategies.  In designing and implementing assistance programs the 
PIUs will  need  to take  into  account the  rapidly changing environment.  Housing assistance  programs 
should  evolve  as  the  economy  recovers,  local  institutional  capacity  is  restored,  building  materials 
industry  capacity  increases,  and  banks  become  able  to  handle  housing  reconstruction  loans.  These 
changes will reduce the need for donors to get directly involved in managing contracts for housing repair 
and  reconstruction.  The  PIUs'  role  should  expand  to  include  monitoring the  sector and  developing 
information on  factors  affecting housing supply and  demand  in  different localities.  This  information 
should  be  used  in  targeting  housing  assistance  and  programming  resources  to  respond  to  changing 
priorities.  Donors can obtain information and assistance from the Entity Ministries of Spatial Planning 
and the Housing Task Force. 
29.  As  mentioned  above,  pnonty should  be  given  to  identified  areas  where  physical  and  social 
infrastructure need to be rehabilitated.  The UNHCR has drawn up a list of such areas, which are targets 
for the return of refugees and displaced persons.  Housing reconstruction  projects, physical and social 
infrastructure  projects,  and  employment generation  activities  should  be  coordinated  to  maximize the 
benefits of investments.  This coordinated approach not only would create appropriate conditions for the 
return  of refugees  and  displaced  persons  and  a  return  to  normal  levels  of activity,  but  also  could 
encourage households to invest their own resources in  improving their housing conditions. 
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
30.  In  the  short  term  there  is  a  role  for  Governments  in  managing  and  setting  priorities  for 
emergency housing assistance programs aimed at jump-starting the repair of war-related damage.  Short--42-
term efforts should focus on completing this repair and handling the return of  the displaced population in 
light of the 1996 experience (box 5). While housing needs clearly go beyond donors' and Governments' 
capacities, there are still many uncertainties about where households will finally reside and thus where 
housing shortages will be greatest. Targeted housing assistance for some population groups will probably 
remain necessary for some time.  But such assistance programs have limited objectives and cannot assure 
the sustainable recovery of  the housing sector over the medium term. 
31.  Over the medium to long term ensuring that the housing sector is able to recover and respond to 
demand  will  require  attention to  long-standing sectoral  constraints and  a  transition  from  the  supply-
driven model of  the past toward market-oriented policies.  The Governments will need to take the lead in 
establishing a policy and regulatory framework that encourages private investment and development of  a 
housing market.  This work should begin as soon as possible.  Though burdened by the inefficiencies of  a 
legal and regulatory framework focused on social production, the prewar housing sector in  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina demonstrated considerable capacity by the private sector to construct and finance housing. 
There is every reason to believe that the private sector can resume this role within an enabling policy and 
institutional  framework  as  the  economy recovers.  Donors  should  ensure that adequate  measures are 
taken-- since doing so will make it possible for them to reduce their support. 
32.  Experience with transition in the housing sectors of  other countries in the region may not be fully 
representative of the nature and  sequencing of reforms  needed  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina.  None of 
these  countries  faced  the  dramatic  decline  in  the  quality  and  quantity  of housing  that  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina has as a result of the war, and thus the urgency of stimulating production and investment in 
the immediate term.  In  Bosnia and Herzegovina the challenge of overcoming war-generated shortages 
will  remain  a  priority  for  some  time,  but  several  other  issues  also  need  to  be  addressed  to  ensure 
sustainable recovery of  the sector. 
Financial issues 
33.  Introducing cost recovery.  During the first year of the reconstruction program most programs 
overlooked cost recovery and  transparency or equity in  the design of grant funding  in  the  interest of 
responding rapidly to  an  emergency situation.  Assistance has  been  provided without consideration of 
households'  ability  to  pay,  and  different  programs  have  established  different  ceilings  and  allocation 
criteria for grants to  beneficiaries.  But given the scarce resources and  the enormity of the need,  this 
approach  is  not sustainable over the medium term:  it  induces  lack of efficiency  in  the allocation of 
resources as well as considerable inequities.  There is  a need to ensure that available resources provide 
the greatest benefit to the largest number of people in a transparent, equitable, and well-targeted manner. 
The Governments are aware of this issue and are interested in applying cost recovery principles in  both 
private and public sector programs. 
34.  Introducing  cost  recovery  for  private  housing  would  provide  incentives  for  beneficiaries  to 
utilize resources more effectively and involve them directly in the decisions to repair their homes.  One 
option would be to provide a one-time grant from donor resources to supplement loans based on ability 
to pay.  Such grants should be  based on clearly defined eligibility criteria to ensure that resources reach 
the neediest, complement household resources, and support cost recovery.  Above all, the use of grants 
for housing assistance should be consistent across donor programs. 
35.  Introducing  cost  recovery  and  more  targeted  subsidies  would  require  changes  m  the 
implementation  mechanisms  established  during  the  emergency  period.  It  would  also  require - 43-
strengthening  administrative  capacity  for  implementing  targeted  assistance  programs  and  collecting 
adequate information to ensure that the choice of instruments is appropriate and to monitor their impact. 
36.  Rationalizing rental charges in public housing.  Enterprises and municipalities do not have the 
resources to maintain the system of subsidized production and maintenance of housing in  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  Moreover,  in  the past this system was neither efficient nor equitable in  responding to 
housing demand.  Over the medium term, as the economy recovers, rental rates should be raised to cover 
the full costs of maintenance and operations for both legal tenants and occupants in order to ensure that 
repairs are maintained.
5  To avoid causing hardship for the poorest households, who may not be able to 
afford  higher rental  rates,  some form  of housing allowance  could  be  considered.  Rationalizing  and 
reducing  subsidies  in  the  public  housing  stock  would  also  require  improving  the  efficiency  of 
management and maintenance by introducing competition in contracting for these functions. 
37.  Developing housing finance.  The lack of credit to finance housing has always been a constraint 
to the development of  private sector housing.  Remittances and savings have often been the only recourse 
for the private sector.  Over the long term  developing housing finance will  be critical to the sector's 
recovery.  It  will  depend  on  progress  in  overall  reforminf  and  strengthening  the  banking  system, 
reforming the housing sector, and clarifying property rights.  Until long-term financing through banks 
becomes available, consideration could be given to using donor resources to establish lines of  credit or a 
revolving housing fund as a limited interim measure.  This solution should be combined with measures 
to address long-term constraints on housing finance development, such as reforming the legal framework 
for collateral security, enforcing and ensuring transparent property rights, and reforming and developing 
the banking system and financial sector. 
Institutional issues 
38.  Clarifying property rights.  A clearly defined, fair, stable, and enforceable property rights system 
for land and housing is key to the effective development of housing markets.  Perhaps the most important 
institutional constraint to the housing sector's recovery in the short and medium term is the complex set 
of  disputes over property rights that have arisen as a result of  the war.  Households that have lost or been 
displaced from their homes are occupying units to which they have no legal claim as tenants or owners. 
A Commission for the Real Property Claims of  Displaced Persons and Refugees has been established in 
accordance with the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement to settle disputed claims by owners and tenants and 
lease and mortgage properties.
7  While establishing mechanisms for settling claims will be a lengthy and 
difficult  process,  priority should  be  given to  assuring that there  is  a  clear registry of ownership and 
5 
6 
7 
The Emergency Housing Repair Project has begun making public housing repairs  conditional on  incremental 
increases in  rents.  While this  is  a modest step, as  present rental rates still are  lower than  prewar rates,  it has 
encouraged municipal authorities to increase rental rates to cover repair costs and some costs of operations and 
maintenance. 
Progress in the development of well-functioning market-based mortgage finance systems in other countries in 
the  region  has  been  extremely  slow.  It has  depended  on  macroeconomic  conditions  and  on  reform  and 
developments  in  the  financial  and  housing  sectors,  particularly  those  related  to  property  rights  and  the 
enforceability of contracts.  Specialized institutions to  fill  the  void and  meet financing needs have  been  less 
effective in postwar situations (such as  in Lebanon) than a system of targeted direct grants to households or of 
credit administered through the banking system. 
Funding requirements for this body are part of  the 1997 UN Consolidated Appeal. -44-
tenancy rights and claims, and to defining terms for leasing by those occupying property that is not their 
own.  Restitution rights may complicate the resolution of property rights issues.  It is  critical that all 
these issues be addressed within a comprehensive and coherent framework to avoid conflicting strategies 
and delays in establishing an  enforceable system of  property rights. 
39.  Privatizing housing.  A  housing privatization law  is  under discussion in  the Federation, but its 
presentation to  the parliament was  postponed  until  after the elections.  The draft  legislation  proposes 
privatizing the public housing stock over a three-year period and offering rights of first refusal to legal 
tenants.  No similar legislation has been prepared in  Republika Srpska.  Privatizing housing would help 
reduce  the  budgetary  outlays  of local  governments  and  contribute  to  the  development  of housing 
markets.  Experience  in  other countries  has  shown  that the  success  of housing  privatization  efforts 
depends on  accompanying reforms  in  tenancy rights and  controlled  rental  charges.  In  the  long term 
success also depends on  a  legal  framework that establishes the rights and obligations of owners with 
regard to maintenance and management costs and clear and tradable ownership rights.  Also important is 
to  separate  public  housing  from  enterprises  so  as  not  to  deter  privatization  in  other  sectors  of the 
economy.  Most  housing  privatizations  in  transition  economies  have  been  undertaken  directly  by 
municipalities after a transfer of the stock to municipal authorities, rather than through enterprises or a 
separate privatization agency. 
40.  The  speed  with  which  privatization  can  occur will  depend  initially on  progress  in  clarifying 
tenancy rights and the status of occupants who are not legal tenants.  Because many occupants, unable to 
find  other accommodations, are likely to  remain as "tenants,"  priority should be given to  establishing 
registries of  the status by legal tenants and occupants in public housing. 
41 .  Reforming  the  legal and regulatory framework.  The  basic  laws  and  regulations  governing 
housing are oriented toward a social housing finance and production system. These laws define tenancy 
rights, rental charges, enterprise finance for housing, and housing standards.  In the prewar period much 
informal  but  good-quality  private  housing  was  developed  in  contravention  of existing  land  use  and 
building regulations -- but at unnecessarily high cost.  Reform of the legal and regulatory framework is 
needed to  encourage private  investment  in  rental and own  housing,  as  well  as  the development of a 
housing market.  In addition to clarifying property rights, building development standards and land use 
regulations will need to be eased and simplified to ensure a responsive supply of land and housing by the 
private sector.  The legal  and regulatory framework also should be reviewed to ensure that restrictive 
zoning constraints to developing land and infrastructure are eased. DISTRICT HEATING AND NATURAL GAS 
I.  BACKGROUND 
District Heating 
1.  In  1991  Bosnia and Herzegovina had district heating systems in most towns and cities with more 
than  25,000  inhabitants.  These  systems  served  a  total  of 120,000  customers,  equivalent to  445,000 
inhabitants, or 10 percent of  the total population.  The systems were generally run by municipally owned 
district  heating  enterprises  which  ensured  the  supply  and  distribution  of heat.  Cogeneration  was 
provided by the combined heat and power plants in Tuzla and Kakanj, as well as by local industries such 
as the steel industry in Zenica.  In all other cases heat was generated by local heat-only boilers. 
2.  All district heating enterprises, except in Zenica, were created and controlled by municipalities. 
Heat prices differed from one municipality to another based on the cost of inputs (primarily fuel) and on 
whether or not the  municipality helped  finance  investments,  debt service  and  other costs.  Hence,  in 
many cases district heating prices were well  below economic levels, as were the prices of most fuels. 
The average subsidy was US$1 00 per annum per consumer, compared to an  average annual heating bill 
of about US$370 per consumer.  The war's effect on the district heating sector is summarized in box 1. 
Natural Gas 
3.  Development of the  natural  gas  system  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  began  in  1975.  At  the 
beginning  of 1992  gas  was  used  primarily  for  industrial  and  commercial  needs  along  the  Zvornik-
Sarajevo-Zenica  pipeline  and  for  space  heating  in  Sarajevo  and  Zenica.  The  gas  supply  network 
consisted of: -46-
•  Some 190 kilometers (km) of  transmission mains (16 inch/50 bar) and offtake pipes, running 
from Zvornik to the Sarajevo area via Semizovac, and from Semizovac to Zenica; 
•  Eight large regulation stations in Sarajevo, Ilijas, Visoko, Kakanj, Zenica, and Zvornik; and 
•  A distribution network of  450 km with about forty smaller regulation stations. 
4.  Gas consumption peaked  in  1990 at 610 million cubic meters, equivalent to  8 percent of total 
energy consumption in  Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In Sarajevo there were 15,000 household connections, 
and all the major boiler houses in  the city's district heating system had  been converted from  coal to gas 
firing. 
5.  Gas  is  imported  under a contract between Energopetrol (a Bosnian oil  and  gas company) and 
Gazexport (the export branch of Russia's Gazprom).  Gas imports are metered at the border of Ukraine 
(Beregov,  the  contractual  point of delivery  of the  gas)  and  Hungary.  From  there  gas  is  transported 
through the Hungarian and Serbian transmission systems to Zvornik, in  Republika Srpska, at the border 
with  Serbia  (where  it  is  also  metered).  The  gas  transporting  cost  from  Russia  to  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina through Hungary and Serbia is  paid in  kind (in gas) and averages about 40 percent of the 
contracted gas volume, much higher than is standard for such transit.  This higher cost is primarily due to 
"penalties" being levied by Serbia.  Before the war, transmission, distribution, and maintenance of the 
gas networks throughout the country was the responsibility of Sarajevogas, a utility company owned by 
the city of Sarajevo.  During the war Sarajevogas split into two companies, one of which is active in the 
Federation (Sarajevogas) and the other one in  Republika Srpska (Sarajevogas-Lukavica).  The situation 
in the natural gas sector as a result of  the war is summarized in box 2. 
6.  Gas  has  been  supplied  without  interruption  since  the  conclusions  of the  Dayton-Paris  Peace 
Agreement,  although  Gazexport  repeatedly  threatened  to  interrupt  supplies.  Payment  for  gas 
consumption has been only partial, corresponding roughly to estimated consumption  in  the Federation. 
The  number of normalized  gas  connections  has  increased  from  15,000  to  25,000,  and  about 30,000 
consumers were disconnected from the gas network in  1996 due to the successful implementation of the 
Emergency District Heating Reconstruction Project.  In  addition the number of illegal connections has 
dropped from 74,000 to 34,000. -47-
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
District Heating 
7.  The objectives of  the district heating reconstruction program are to: 
•  Repair  the  district  heating  systems  to  restore  urban  heating  services  to  adequate  levels, 
particularly in the most populated cities; 
•  Rehabilitate building internal heating installations; 
•  Strengthen sector institutions and  introduce a program to gradually increase cost recovery 
during 1996-99; 
•  Improve the efficiency of  the district heating systems and undertake studies to determine the 
optimal configuration of  each city's future heating system; and 
•  Mitigate  the  energy  security risk  associated  with  a  single  source of energy  supply.  By 
ensuring  that  the  oil-firing  capacity  of the  Sarajevo  district  heating  system's  boilers  ts 
operational, Bosnil} and Herzegovina could potentially reduce its reliance on natural gas. 
8.  The district heating reconstruction  program  submitted to donors  in  December 1995  and  April 
1996  remains  valid  as  an  overall  framework  for  the  1997-99  program.  It will  require  an  estimated 
US$175  million in  external support for the three- to four-year period within the overall US$5.1 billion 
priority reconstruction program (table I): 
•  In  1996,  US$33  million  was  firmly  committed;  reconstruction  was  carried  out  very 
successfully  in  Sarajevo  despite  an  exceedingly  tight  deadline  (paragraphs  12  and  13), 
although  a  financing  gap  of US$17.9  million  remains  to  be  covered  to  complete  the 
financing of  the ongoing Emergency District Heating Reconstruction Project; 
•  In  1997,  US$65  million  in  external  financing  will  be  required  --- about  73  percent 
(US$47.5 million) would benefit the Federation and 27 percent (US$17.5 million) Republika 
Srpska (paragraphs  17  to  20); this amount  includes  the  US$17.9  million  shortfall  carried 
over from  1996; and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, about US$77 million will be needed and several policy issues should be 
addressed to ensure the longer-term sustainability of  the program (paragraphs 26 and 27). -48-
Table 1.  District Heating Reconstruction Program External Financial Needs 
(US$ million) 
3- 4 year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
Heat sources  83.0  9.0  32.0  42.0 
Heat distribution  30.0  7.5  11.5  11.0 
Heat substations  28.0  2.5  12.5  13.0 
Internal installations  14.0  7.0  3.0  4.0 
Heat meters  3.0  1.5  0.5  1.0 
Control equipment  5.0  0.0  2.0  3.0 
Other equipment  1.5  1.5  0.0  0.0 
Site preparation  1.5  0.5  l.O  0.0 
Technical assistance  9.0  3.5  2.5  3.0 
Total  175.0  33.0  65.0  77.0 
Note:  Costs include physical contingencies of20 percent but exclude spare parts, taxes, and 
duties. 
Natural Gas 
9.  The objectives of  the natural gas reconstruction program are to: 
•  Reconfigure the gas network and restore safe service to an acceptable level; 
•  Ensure demand management by disconnecting illegal consumers that can be reconnected to 
the district heating system, introducing energy-efficient appliances, and gradually increasing 
cost recovery during 1996-99; and 
•  Strengthen sector institutions. 
10.  The natural gas reconstruction program submitted to donors in  December 1995 and April  1996 
remains  valid  as  an overall  framework  for  the  1997-99  program.  It will  require  US$82  million  in 
external  support  for  the  three- to  four-year  period  within  the  overall  US$5.1  billion  priority 
reconstruction program (table 2): 
1 
•  In 1996, US$20 million was committed; despite a  63  percent (US$35  million) financing 
gap over the  US$55  million  first-year  estimate,  a  number of activities  were carried  out 
successfully, thanks  in  particular to additional  donations from  various cities  not reported 
here (paragraphs 14 to 16); 
Additional financing would be needed to meet the requirements set by the Entity Governments to: _ (i) develop 
a gas distribution system in  Zvornik (Republika Srpska) for 20,000 households and (ii) restore the main  pipe 
from  Sarajevo to Zenica.  These projects have, however, not been  incorporated in the priority reconstruction 
program:  in Zvornik, the proposed project is  a development activity -- not rehabilitation.  The restoration of 
the  Sarajevo  - Zenica  main  pipe  would  mainly  benefit  the  steel  plant  in  Zenica  and  therefore  should  be 
examined in the context of  the overall restructuring of  this factory. -49-
•  In 1997, US$45 million in external financing will be required--- about 78 percent (US$35 
million) would  benefit the Federation  and  22  percent (US$10  million)  Republika  Srpska 
(paragraphs 21  to 23).  This amount includes the US$35 million carried over from  1996; and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, US$17  million  will  be necessary.  This  amount could,  however,  be 
reduced  to  take  into  account  in-: kind  contributions  and  volunteer  work  (paragraph  II). 
Several  policy  issues  should  be  addressed  to  ensure  the  long-term  sustainability  of the 
program (paragraphs 26 and 27). 
II.  In addition to the donor commitments reported in tables 2 and 4, several Italian cities, the city of 
Ankara, and the city of Sarajevo provided in-kind contributions and volunteers carried out civil works. 
These donations had a value estimated at about US$IO-I2 million. 
Table 2.  Natural Gas System Reconstruction Program External Financing Needs 
(US$ million) 
3-4 year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation ·  Allocation 
Engineering  5.0  1.4  3.6  0.0 
Transmission  10.0  1.2  5.8  3.0 
Distribution  44.0  4.9  27.1  12.0 
Strategic planning, T  A  1.0  0.3  0.7  0.0 
Billing  software  and 
equipment  1.0  0.2  0.8  0.0 
Land mine clearing  1.0  0.0  1.0  0.0 
Sub-total  62.0  8.0  39.0  15.0 
Payment for gas supply  20.0  12.0  6.0  2.0 
Total  82.0  20.0  45.0  17.0 
Note: Costs include a physical contingency of 10 percent but exclude spare parts, taxes, and duties. 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
District Heating 
I2.  The ongoing US$44.5 million Emergency District Heating Reconstruction Project is focused on 
Sarajevo but also contains a US$0.5 million project preparation component for Banja Luka.  The project 
cost has been increased from the original US$40 million because repairing building internal installations 
will  cost  more  than  was  originally  estimated.  Financing  for  the  reconstruction  of this  sector  was 
provided by the Governments of Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, the European 
Commission (EC), and the World Bank for a total of US$33  million (table 3).  But since part of the 
commitments were not allocated·to the Emergency District Heating Reconstruction Project, this project 
has a US$I7.9 million financing gap to be covered in  1997. District Heating 
Total 
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Table 3.  Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Amount  Main Donors 
33  Denmark,  Finland,  Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, EC, World Bank 
33 
13.  The  project  is  progressing  extremely  well  and  is  expected  to  be  completed  on  schedule  by 
September 30,  1998.  In  the space of just six months and  under a very tight deadline (the start of the 
1995/96 heating season) -- and despite the technical complexity of  the damaged systems -- the following 
major successes were achieved: 
•  The  entire  district  heating  system  underwent  an  engineering  survey  and  assessment  to 
determine its condition and identify possible improvements; 
•  To ensure that priority targets would  be met,  reconstruction works to be undertaken were 
divided  into  a  fast-track  program  (implemented through  December  1996)  and  a two-year 
program (through September 1998); 
•  The two-year program has been developed to complete the ambitious scope of  the project; it 
is aimed at reconstructing of the whole Sarajevo's district heating system with a significant 
increase in efficiency.  Design of the two-year program is to be completed by March  1997, 
and implementation will start at that time; 
•  Approximately  45,000  flats  were  surveyed  to  determine  the  exact  damage  to  building 
internal heating installations; 
•  About 32,000 flats were reconnected to the district heating system and heated by December 
1996 after extensive rehabilitation of building  internal  heating installations; another 4,000 
flats  were  reconnected  by  the  end  of December  1996,  and  the  remaining  flats  will  be 
reconnected progressively by September 1997; 
•  Most of  the boilers and substations were repaired to a level sufficient to operate on base load 
(meeting 60-80 percent of peak heat demand) throughout the winter of 1996-97; 
•  About 3 kilometers (km) of network pipes were replaced; and 
•  A  new  billing  and  collection  system,  including  software  and  hardware,  was  introduced, 
allowing billing and collection to restart in  January  1997 after a five-year interruption.  In 
addition, a database of flat owners/occupants and addresses was created. 
Natural Gas 
14.  Gazexport's  past  threats  to  cut  off the  gas  supply  because  of non-payment  have  made  the 
conclusion  of a  reliable  long-term  gas  supply  agreement  (including  credible  payment  mechanisms) 
between Bosnia and Herzegovina and Gazexport a prerequisite for funding by major financier:s.  Despite 
this, significant progress was made during 1996 (table 4). -51 -
Table 4.  Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Repair  works  and  technical 
assistance 
Payment for gas supply 
Total 
Amount 
8 
12 
20 
Main Donors 
EC,  Germany,  Netherlands,  UK,  World 
Bank 
Netherlands, Turkey 
15.  The  UK Overseas  Development Administration  (ODA),  the  EC,  other European  and  Middle 
Eastern donors, the City of Sarajevo and citizen volunteer labor financed equipment and works valued at 
about US$17 million.  This resulted in the following achievements: 
•  About  40  percent  of the  engineering  for  the  transmission  and  distribution  system  was 
completed; 
•  About 20 percent of the transmission system reconstruction was completed, including repair 
of  the block valve, cleaning, transmission metering and regulating stations; 
•  Cathodic protection replacement and repair has been completed; 
•  Distribution system repair is  about 34 percent complete.  Most large consumers have had 
their regulating and metering facilities repaired; 
•  Approximately 200  km  of network  piping has  been  installed.  Most of this  was  installed 
utilizing "citizen selfhelp"; and 
•  About 30 percent of the measurement and  regulating works for  residential consumers and 
about" 12  percent of the in-house installations (interior piping,  heaters, cookers) have been 
completed. 
16.  The World Bank released US$2  million  in  project start-up advance funds  to  help  finance  gas 
equipment  for  the  district  heating  boilers  and  to  finance  the  installation  of regulators  and  meters 
(provided by the EC) to normalize about 3,500 illegal connections. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
District Heating 
17.  District heating challenges for 1997-98 are two-fold: 
2 
•  Implementation  of the  two-year  program  developed  in  Sarajevo  under  the  Emergency 
District  Heating  Reconstruction  Project.  Improvements  are  expected  in  all  parts  of the 
district  heating  system:  damaged  or  inefficient  equipment  will  be  replaced  by  modern 
technology, the main heat load will be shifted to the most efficient heat production units, and 
heat production will be adjusted to heat demand by remote control;
2 and 
In addition, heat meters will be installed in all supplied buildings to initiate energy savings, reducing both the 
environmental impact and the costs of  district heating. -52-
•  Reconstruction of the district heating systems in  possibly up  to thirty-seven priority cities 
throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, of  which up to thirty-four in the Federation and three in 
Republika Srpska (including Banja Luka and Doboj). 
In  1997  commitments  of about  US$65  million  are  required  to  meet  the  first  part  of the  1997-98 
challenges,  including  US$17 .9  million  to  fill  the  financing  gap  of the  ongoing  Emergency  District 
Heating Reconstruction Project in  Sarajevo (primarily to finance the reconstruction of building internal 
installations). 
18.  Damage to district heating systems was typically caused by  direct shelling and/or by  indirect . 
damage  due  to  corrosion  and  cracking  of boilers,  substations,  and  pipes  in  the  network.  Lack  of 
maintenance due to war shortages has further compounded these problems.  In many cities fuel supplies 
were interrupted during the war.  Due to non-usage of most of the system, damage has been caused by 
corrosion, freezing, and cracking, compounded by a lack of maintenance and repair.  Building internals 
(pipes,  radiators,  valves) also may have  incurred  substantial damage due to rusting and cracking.  In 
addition, a large influx of refugees in some cities warrants expansion of  the district heating system. 
19.  In  1997  priority should  be  given to cities where the  largest impact can  be  made  in  terms of 
enabling apartment dwellers to switch back to district heating, instead of using wood and coal for their 
space heating needs.  Prime candidates (in alphabetical order) are the cities ofBanja Luka, Bihac, Doboj, 
Mostar, Tuzla, Vitez, and Zenica.  Medium-size cities for which  rehabilitation has  been requested are 
Grbavica,  Gorazde,  Jajce,  Livno,  Maglaj,  Novi  Travnik,  Prozor-Rama,  Sanski  Most,  and  Travnik. 
Smaller cities  for  which  significant  funding  has  been  requested  include  Banovici,  Bosanska Krupa, 
Bosanski Petrovac, Busovaca, Cazin, Capljina, Citluk, Drvar, Glamoc, Kakanj, Kiseljak, Kladanj, Kljuc, 
Konjic, Kupres, Ljubuski, Lukavac, Tesanj, Tomislavgrad, Velika Kladusa, and Zepce. 
20.  Consult!tnts are being engaged under EC financing to review investment priorities in each city's 
district heating system throughout the country and to prepare cost estimates and technical specifications 
for bidding documents. Identification of the individual components to be financed within this program 
will be a painstaking and time-consuming process, in  part because of the geographical dispersion of the 
systems.  Thus the cost of the  1997-99 district heating program  is  tentative and  based  largely on  the 
estimates submitted by district heating enterprises.  In some cases emergency reconstruction costs appear 
to have been significantly underestimated, while in other cases they may have been overestimated. 
Natural Gas 
21.  The US$45 million natural gas program consists of: 
•  About US$35  million to close the financing gap for the proposed Emergency Natural Gas 
System  Reconstruction  Project,  of which  the  World  Bank would  finance  US$15  million 
(including US$2 million disbursed in  1996, see paragraph 16); 
•  US$4 million to regularize thousands of improvised gas connections; and 
•  US$6 million for payments of  part of  the ga:> supply. 
No  funding  will  be  provided  for  the  reconstruction  of the  Semizovac-Zenica  transmission  pipeline 
portion (US$17 million), since this is  closely linked to the future of the Zenica steelworks.  Also not 
included is a request for an estimated US$21  million to construction a new gas distribution network for -53-
about  20,000  individual  consumers  in  Zvomik,  since  this  falls  outside  the  scope  of the  emergency 
reconstruction program.  Currently, only the district heating boilers in Zvomik receive gas. 
22.  Within this program priorities include:  (i) engineering analysis and design;  (ii) reconstruction 
and rehabilitation works on both the transmission pipeline and the distribution network (for Sarajevo the 
latter includes, as a major component, the normalization of illegal connections in areas not served by the 
district heating  system  and  where  gas  heating  is  economically justifiable); (iii) procurement of spare 
parts  and  service  vehicles;  and  (iv)  technical  assistance  for  project  implementation  and  institution 
building. 
23.  Works on the transmission pipeline include repairs of: (a) the most heavily damaged parts of the 
pipeline; and (b) the valve, measurement, regulating, and metering stations in Butila, Hum, and Kladanj. 
Works  on  the  distribution  network  include:  (a)  converting  improvised  connections  to  standard 
connections for  consumers that can  not be  connected to  the  district heating  system,  and  introducing 
energy-efficient  appliances;  (b)  constructing  distribution  piping  to  safely  expand  the  network;  (c) 
measuring and  regulating  installation;  and  (d) measuring calibration and  reinstalling meters  for  large 
consumers. 
Implementation Arrangements 
District Heating 
24.  In  each of the cities where  rehabilitation work  is  to  be  undertaken, implementation would  be 
ensured by the municipal district heating companies.  Project management units should be set up within 
each district heating enterprise or group of enterprises depending on  size, needs,  proximity, and other 
factors.  In the ca.se of projects funded in  part by the World Bank, Project Implementation Units (PIUs) 
would be set up.  For example, the PIU of Toplane-Sarajevo (the district heating company) consists of 
about twelve Toplane engineers and about eight expatriate engineers.  It is responsible for overall project 
scheduling, coordination, procurement of goods and services, management of funds, project monitoring, 
and progress reporting. 
Natural Gas 
25.  With some assistance in  project engineering, management, and supervision, Sarajevogas would 
be able to implement the reconstruction program.  The company has already a functioning PIU.  Most of 
the needs of the 1996-97 project are  in  the Federation.  Implementation of the works to  be carried out 
within  the  Federation  would  be  the  responsibility  of Sarajevogas.  · Cooperation  with  Sarajevogas-
Lukavica  (in  Republika  Srpska)  will  be  necessary,  particularly  for  works  to  be  carried  out  on  the 
transmission  system  between  Zvomik  and  Kladanj.  Cooperation  between  the  two  companies  is 
satisfactory. -54-
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
26.  The main short-term policy issues to be addressed in  light of the 1996 experience (box 3) in the 
district heating and natural gas sectors are: 
•  Cost  recovery.  Because  of the  financial  difficulties  faced  by  consumers,  billing  and 
collection  for  district  heating  and  natural  gas  services  were  suspended  for  household 
consumers  throughout  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  These  billing  systems  must  now  be 
restored, upgraded, and  reintroduced; this task is  complicated by the numerous changes  in 
owners/occupants of dwellings and  in  street names.  Metering, billing, and collection must 
be gradually but aggressively increased to ensure full cost recovery in the sector at the latest 
by the end of  the transition period. While households may not be able to afford to pay much 
now,  it is  important that household tariffs (which currently cover only about 20  percent of 
economic costs) be  increased as  rapidly as  possible during  1996-98 to cover all  operating 
costs.  Doing so would generate critically needed cash flow for the enterprises and suppress 
uneconomic demand (e.g.  inefficient home-made appliances and  leaking pipes have driven 
up  per capita gas consumption to a level that is  perhaps twice as  high as it would be under 
normal circumstances); 
•  Payment for current gas consumption.  This issue is linked to cost recovery and is of primary 
importance  the  conclusion  of a  sound  long-term  gas  supply  agreement  with  Gazexport 
(paragraph 14); and 
•  Institution  building.  A portion of technical  assistance should  be concentrated on  training 
management  and  staff of the  district  heating  and  natural  gas  entities  in  modern  utility 
management and operating techniques. 
27.  The  main  medium-term  policy  issues  to  be  addressed  in  the  district  heating  and  natural  gas 
sectors are: 
•  Network  reconfiguration.  Network  planning  studies  should  be  launched  tQ  guide 
rehabilitation beyond the priority repairs and to prepare the optimal configuration of each 
city's future heating and natural gas system; -55-
•  Settlement of  past debts to  Gazexport.  Normalization of the financial  arrangements in  the 
gas sector and determination of the share of the debt to be repaid by Republika Srpska and 
the Federation, respectively, for their gas consumption since 1992 will be essential; and 
•  Sector restructuring.  Special attention should be paid to sector restructuring options such as 
breaking  up  Sarajevogas  into  a  transmission  company  and  several  independent  local 
distribution companies, and in the long run possibly privatizing selected components of the 
system.  Since most district heating systems are too small to warrant splitting production, 
transmission, and distribution, there appears to be very limited scope for restructuring in the 
sector other than eventual privatization. WATER AND WASTE MANAGEMENT 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A well-functioning water, sanitation, and solid waste collection system devastated by the 
war 
I.  Before the  war water and  waste management services  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina were good, 
both  in  coverage and  in  quality.  In  urban areas piped water served 94  percent of the  inhabitants and 
sewerage 72  percent, water production capacity kept pace with  demand, and twenty-four  hour service 
was the norm.  In rural areas 35  percent of the population was connected to piped water supply systems 
and  10  percent to  sewerage  systems,  a  rate  comparable to  that  in  most  industrial  countries.  Trash 
collection services were well managed, leaving urban areas reasonably free of litter; however, services 
were locally organized, using highly inefficient collection equipment with no recycling.  Solid waste was 
disposed of  in landfills, but few of  the facilities were properly designed or managed to modern standards. 
Investment  was  adequate  in  water  supply  and  solid  waste  disposal,  but  insufficient  in  wastewater 
collection  and  disposal.  Thus  sewerage  coverage  lagged  well  behind  water  supply  coverage,  and 
secondary treatment of  wastewater was limited to Sarajevo and seven other medium-size cities. 
2.  Massive population movements during the war and high population concentrations in the parts of 
the country considered to  be the safest intensified the effect of direct war damage,  resulting  in  major 
problems in the delivery of basic water and sanitation services.  Leakage losses increased, reaching up to 
50 percent (compared with 30 percent before the war).  In the Federation twenty-seven of the sixty-nine 
municipalities  no  longer have  twenty-four hour  service,  and  clogged  sewerage  and  drainage  systems 
have left areas flooded for extensive periods.  In Republika Srpska war damage seems relatively minor, 
but all facilities have suffered from  lack of maintenance.  The problems have been exacerbated by the 
division of the country: water sources for municipalities in  one Entity that originate in  the other Entity · 
are no longer functioning, largely because access is denied.  The war also severely impaired the quality 
of solid  waste  services.  In  addition  to  extensive  damage  to  collection  equipment,  accessibility  to 
landfills has been severely limited by landmines and the overburdening of  small urban tipping areas. 
Neglect and lack of  maintenance of  irrigation and flood control systems 
3.  Infrastructure  for  irrigation,  flood  control,  and  drainage  was  not  extensive  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina before the war.  Irrigation was developed  in  the southern part of the country to  produce 
Mediterranean  crops.  Most  irrigation  systems  relied  on  piped  delivery  systems  used  primarily  for 
conveying drinking water.  Flood control works comprised river draining and levees and were limited to 
the  main  streams of the  Sava, Neretva,  Bosna,  Sana,  and  Una river basins.  In  the  Sava river  basin, 
drainage canals were constructed to reclaim poorly drained land for development. 
4.  Damage to  irrigation systems during the war came mainly from  neglect, and  rehabilitation of 
these systems  is  a relatively low  priority except where required to  restore drinking water service.  In 
some  areas  flood  control  embankments  were  extensively  damaged  by  the  digging  of trenches,  the 
building of bunkers, the passing of heavy military vehicles, or artillery bombardments.  Several drainage -58-
pumping stations that pump water from behind the levees were military targets during the fighting and no 
longer function.  Repair of  these systems is critical to prevent future flood damage. 
Disorganized institutions 
5.  Before the  war municipalities were  responsible  for  providing  water supply,  solid  waste,  and 
sanitation services in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  These services were ensured by komunalcos (municipal 
service companies) that functioned as municipally owned joint stock companies.  The Government was 
responsible for policy, master planning, regulation, technical support, flood control, and regional water 
systems construction and  for providing most of the  major  investment financing to the municipalities. 
Government functions were ensured by the Ministry of Agriculture, Water Management, and Forestry 
through  its  implementing agency, Vodoprivreda Bosnia and Herzegovina (VBH), with a staff of about 
350.  Investment proposals were generally initiated by the komunalcos.  Planning and  implementation 
were the responsibility of  the komunalcos for local projects requiring no federal funding and of  the VBH 
for regional projects. 
6.  The war had a major impact on both the structure and the effectiveness of sectoral institutions. 
Though the division of responsibilities between the central Government and the municipalities did not 
change, the Federation and Republika Srpska now have independent water management enterprises -- the 
VBH in  the Federation and Zavod za Vodoprivredu Republike Srpske (ZVRS) in  Republika Srpska.  In 
the Federation most cantons formed water management departments, though with unclear responsibilities 
-- a  further  modification  of institution  arrangements.  Staffing  was  severely  reduced  at  both  the 
Government and municipal levels, as most qualified personnel left the country. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
7.  The three- to four-year reconstruction program aims to: 
•  Restore water, sewerage, solid waste disposal, flood control, and irrigation systems to prewar 
levels; and 
•  Establish the proper institutional arrangements to make the improvements sustainable. 
8.  The program prepared in  1995  remains valid as  an  overall framework.  It will require US$363 
million for implementation over the three- to four-year reconstruction period within the overall US$5.1 
billion priority reconstruction program (table 1): 
•  In 1996, US$96 million was firmly committed, leaving a financing gap of US$44 million 
in  the  first-year  program  requirements  (originally  estimated  at  US$140  million); 
achievements were nonetheless significant (paragraphs 10 to 16); 
•  In 1997, US$100 million is required, 51  percent of which would benefit the Federation and 
49 percent Republika Srpska (paragraphs 17 to 24); and 
•  In  1998  and  1999,  US$167  million  will  be  needed, and  issues  of sector organization, 
investments priorities, and sanitation services upgrading should be addressed to ensure the 
medium-term sustainability of the reconstruction program, which will require the continued 
involvement of  the donor community (paragraph 25). -59-
Table 1.  Water and Waste Management Reconstruction Program 
External Financial Requirements (US$ million) 
3-4 year 
Program 
1996 Firm 
Commitments 
1997  1998-99 
Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
Federation 
Works and goods  238  87  44  107 
Water supply  [188]  [77] a  [28]  [83] 
Wastewater  [20]  [6]  [6]  [8] 
Solid waste  [20]  [0]  [8]  [12] 
Flood control and irrigation  [1 0]  [4]  [2]  [4] 
Institutional strengthening  16  7  5  4 
Project management  4  1  2 
Sub-total  258  95  51  112 
Republika Srpska 
Works and goods  95  0  43  52 
Water supply  [52]  0  [29]  [23] 
Wastewater  [20]  0  [6]  [14] 
Solid waste  [15]  0  [5]  [10] 
Flood control and irrigation  [8]  0  [3]  [5] 
Institutional strengthening  7  I  4  2 
Project management  3  0  2 
Sub-total  105  I  49  55 
Total  363  96  100  167 
a Includes commitments reported by donors as part of their "municipal infrastructure projects" 
9.  The priority reconstruction program includes several components: 
•  Works and goods:  rehabilitation, reconstruction, and upgrading beyond prewar levels when 
economically justified  (for example,  in  case  of demand  shifts  as  a  result of population 
movements).  A  detailed  reconstruction  plan,  including  needs  assessments  and  priority 
projects, was completed in September 1996 for the Federation.  A similar plan was finalized 
in February 1997 for Republika Srpska; 
•  Institution  strengthening:  technical assistance,  training,  reconstruction of office facilities, 
and recurrent cost financing aimed at strengthening the Entity Vodoprivredas and Project 
Implementation  Units  (PIUs)  to  give  them  the  capacity  to  manage  the  reconstruction 
program (see below) and preparing an institutional assessment of  the sector and developing a 
long-term strategy for the sustainability of  the reconstruction measures. 
•  Project  management:  although  there  is  a  need  for  recurrent  cost  financing  for  system 
operations, the amount budgeted is  for  implementation of the reconstruction program; the 
funds  will  be used  mainly for  institutional  support of the Vodoprivredas, the new canton 
organizations, and the komunalcos, not for operating costs. - 60-
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
10.  The objectives of  the first-year program were to: 
•  Organize and plan the reconstruction effort for the sector; and 
•  Implement emergency measures. 
Donors provided substantial funding to that effect (table 2). 
Water supply 
Wastewater 
Solid waste 
Flood control and irrigation 
Institutional strengthening 
Recurrent costs 
Total 
Table 2.  Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Amount 
77.0 a 
6.0 
0.5 
4.0 
7.5 
1.0 
96.0 
Main Donors 
Austria, Canada, EC, France, Germany, ICRC, 
Italy, Kuwait, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, 
Saudi Arabia, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, US, World 
Bank 
Austria, EC, Luxembourg, US, World Bank 
EC, WHO 
us 
Netherlands, Switzerland, WHO, World Bank 
Netherlands, World Bank 
a This amount includes commitments reported by donors as part of their "municipal infrastructure projects". 
11.  In  1996, activities concentrated mainly on emergency water works and equipment to Federation 
municipalities.  Significant efforts were also made to reactivate and strengthen the Entity Vodoprivredas. 
Rehabilitation works: Emergency waterworks and equipment supply 
12.  Many successful reconstruction or rehabilitation works were undertaken in  1996.  Daily water 
service was reestablished in  Sarajevo (although only for two hours a day in  many areas).  Materials and 
equipment were supplied and repairs were made in a number of municipalities. 
13.  Two types of implementation arrangements were used: 
•  Some donors implemented projects directly.  The largest effort of this type is the European 
Commission's (EC) supply of materials and equipment to rehabilitate forty-seven Federation 
water  and  sewerage  systems;  the  EC  wor.ked  closely  with  the  VBH  to  design  standard 
equipment and material packages base~ on the number of  customers served, but it carried out 
procurement and delivery of the packages directly.  The  Swiss  Government  is  funding  a 
directly  implemented  institution-building  program  in  the  Bihac  canton,  the  Austrian 
Government  is  financing  system  upgrading  projects  in  three  municipalities,  and  the  UK 
Overseas  Development  Administration  (ODA),  the  U.S.  Agency  for  International 
Development  (USAID),  the  Red  Cross,  and  the  World  Health  Organization  (WHO)  are 
implementing their own programs (box 1  ); and - 61  -
•  Other donors including the Governments of France, Italy, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia, and the 
World Bank, relied upon the Vodoprivredas (mainly VBH in  the Federation) to  implement 
their projects. 
Institutional development: Reactivating the Vodoprivredas 
14.  The main  institutional  success was the reactivation of the Federation Vodoprivreda, the VBH. 
With forty-five employees, the VBH is  implementing twenty-five projects (twelve of them high-priority 
emergency  measures)  and  preparing  an  additional  twenty-one  for  future  implementation.  The 
strengthening of the VBH was made possible by a grant from  the Government of the Netherlands, that 
was used to outfit the VBH with computers, vehicles, office machines, office furniture, and instruments 
and to provide computer training for key staff.  Similar efforts have been initiated in Republika Srpska. 
15.  The newly strengthened VBH assumed primary responsibility for the reconstruction program in 
the Federation, including setting priorities and carrying out the contracting for projects using funds under 
government  control.  Municipalities  were  responsible  for  supervising  the  contracts  once  they  were 
awarded. 
16.  Another major contribution to the organization and planning of the reconstruction effort was the 
completion of sector needs assessments and sector emergency reconstruction and development plans for 
the Federation and Republika Srpska.  The plans identify and prioritize water supply, wastewater, and 
solid  waste disposal  projects  and  identify  but do  not  prioritize  essential  flood  control  and  irrigation 
projects.  The Federation  plan  includes a proposal to  restructure the solid waste disposal  sector at the 
canton  level  in  order  to  increase  efficiency  and  reduce  costs.  The  proposal  was  accepted  by  the 
Government, and all proposed measures in the solid waste disposal sector are consistent with the plan. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
17.  In  1997  donors  should  maintain  the  momentum  of 1996  and  expand  their  activities  into 
Republika Srpska.  In  1997, US$100 million is needed to: 
•  Implement  new  investments  within  the  framework  of Federation  and  Republika  Srpska 
priority programs; 
•  Strengthen  institutions  by  preparing an  institutional  assessment and  strategic  plan  for  the 
institutional strengthening and restructuring of  the sector; obtaining from each beneficiary of - 62-
the  program  cost  recovery  and  system  operations  and  maintenance  plans  as  a  first  step 
toward  sustatinability and  establishing a  monitoring system  and  indicators  for  measuring 
reconstruction progress; and 
•  Cover minimal recurrent expenditures. 
Emergency plans and physical investments identified (US$87 million) 
18.  The  proposed  physical  investments  for  the  1997  program  are  based  on  water and  sanitation 
emergency reconstruction plans prepared for the Federation and Republika Srpska (see annexes  1 and 
2).
1  Each plan includes a comprehensive assessment and a prioritized list of projects designed to meet 
the  most urgent needs within the US$258  million  budget for  the Federation and  the  US$1 05  million 
budget for Republika Srpska for the three-to four-year reconstruction period (the plans are available from 
the World Bank, EC, and International Management Group).  The listed measures are grouped into three 
categories: 
•  Emergency  measures  -- projects  that  can  be  implemented  for  less  that  US$150,000, 
completed in less than one year, and have an immediate positive impact; 
•  Reconstruction  measures  -- larger  projects  designed  to  eventually  restore  prewar  service 
levels; and 
•  Development measures -- designed to meet service levels in the future. 
Strengthening institutions:  A first step toward sustainability (US$9 million) 
19.  Institutional assessment and strategic plan.  Even before the war, water management in  Bosnia 
and Herzegovina was highly centralized and services were heavily subsidized.  The resulting investment 
planning  and  implementation  were  inefficient,  and  maintenance  was  poor  (with  a  high  level  of 
unaccounted-for  water).  Setting  up  a  new  structure  is  a  precondition  for  achieving  sustainable 
reconstruction  investments.  As a  first  step toward restructuring the  sector, the  institutional  situation 
should  be  assessed  from  the  municipal  level  up;  in  particular,  the  role  of the  cantons  in  water 
management  should  be  defined.  A  plan  could  then  be  drafted  addressing  organizational  changes, 
personnel requirements, water management policy, privatization, and regulatory policy. The assessment 
and strategic plan should be completed and agreed on in  1997 for implementation beginning in  1998. 
20.  Cost recovery and operations and maintenance plans.  Setting up cost recovery mechanisms is 
critical given the magnitude of the investments required, the need for covering operating costs, and the 
lack of budgetary resources.  Donors should ensure that municipalities are prepared to use  investments 
properly.  Each municipality or other organization that receives donor funds should be obligated to first 
submit a  cost recovery  plan  for  operating and  maintaining water supply,  sewerage,  and  solid  waste 
collection systems.  The cost recovery plans should be gradual, targeting recovery of operating costs in 
The desired level of services were defined in  consultation with the Vodoprivredas.  Gaps between the actual 
situation  and desired  service  levels  were  quantified  and  measures  were  formulated  to  bridge the gaps  and 
provide the desired service levels.  A multicriteria evaluation computer program, PrimaVera, was applied to set 
priorities.  Criteria used consisted of location  factors  such  as  the refugee situation, damage to  housing,  the 
potential  in  the  region  for  economic revival,  and  project benefits such  as· cost-benefit ratio  and  number of 
persons benefited.  · - 63-
three years and full cost recovery in five years.  The plan should also explain how operational costs will · 
be met during the first three years. 
21.  Monitoring system.  To further improve donor coordination and ensure that scarce resources are 
directed to  meet priority  needs,  a  systematic monitoring and  reporting  system  should  be  established. 
Reports would  be distributed to all  members of the water management task force  (paragraph  24) and 
would be available to all potential donors. 
Implementation arrangements 
22.  Donor support can be provided in three ways: 
•  Grants or credits to the Governments; 
•  Direct assistance to the benefiting municipality or canton; and 
•  A World Bank-administered trust fund (funds must be untied, and procurement is subject to 
World Bank procedures). 
The Vodoprivredas in the Federation and in Republika Srpska should play an increasingly greater role in 
implementing projects,  including preparing engineering designs and  bidding documents,  handling the 
bidding process, contracting, and administering contracts.  The municipality water companies should be 
made responsible for supervising contracts and for approving payments to contractors. 
23.  Regardless of the implementation arrangements, donors should coordinate their activities with 
the PIUs set up  in the Entity Ministries of Agriculture, Forestry, and Water Management.  The PIUs act 
as  a  clearinghouse  for  all  assistance  and  monitor  implementation  of projects.  Together  with  the 
Vodoprivredas, they also decide on priorities with the assistance of  the International Management Group 
(IMG).  Donors should consult with the PIUs before allocating resources to specific projects to ensure 
that the works they plan to undertake are a priority and are not already being financed by another donor. 
During implementation donors should keep the PIUs informed on a regular basis about their activities 
and the progress of  their projects. 
24.  A Water, Sanitation, and Solid Waste Task Force has been established under IMG-chairmanship 
to review donor activities in the sector, discuss mutual problems and concerns, and address policy issues. 
The Task Force, which  meets about once every three months,  includes representatives from  the main 
donors in the field, from the Vodoprivredas, and from the PIUs. - 64-
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
25.  Most  structural  issues  should  be  identified  and  addressed  through  the  sector strategy  plan,  a 
component of  the 1997 program.  The recommended measures should then be implemented, including: 
•  Maintenance and further strengthening of existing capacities through training and technical 
assistance (technical assistance could take the form of twinning arrangements to emphasize 
financial management and commercial orientation); 
•  Private sector participation in, at least, providing selected services and running operations; 
•  Required changes in the regulatory framework; and 
•  Prioritization  of  investments,  with  a  gradual  transition  from  restoring  basic  services  to 
enhancing service quality and  upgrading sanitation and solid waste services, which  are of 
particular concern from a public health perspective. - 65-
Annex 1.  Federation Projects for the 1997 Program 
1  Categories are:  E-emergency; R-rehabilitation; and D-development. - 66-
Annex 2.  Republika Srpska Projects for the 1997 Program 
1  Categories are:  E-emergency; R-rehabilitation; and 0-development. - 67-
Annex 2.  Republika Srpska Projects for the 1997 Program 
1  Categories are:  E-emergency; R-rehabilitation; and D-development. LANDMINE HAZARD MANAGEMENT 
I.  BACKGROUND 
1.  With more than 17,000 mine fields already identified, large areas in  both Entities of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are inaccessible because ofthe threat of mines. 
1  Mine contamination is particularly severe 
in  bands of contamination about 5 kilometers (km) wide along former confrontation lines  Unexploded 
ordnance  remains  in  most  places  where  fighting  occurred.  "Booby traps"  pollute  former  areas  of 
confrontation and regions from which ethnic minorities have been expelled.  And uncertainty about the 
location and extent of  mine fields exacerbates the problem -- since land is prevented from being used due 
not only to mines but also to the fear resulting from lack of information on the mine situation. 
2.  Clearing all mines will take years -- probably decades -- and implementation will have to rely on 
local  capacities  beside  international  contractors.  Developing  adequate  local  capacity  is  a  major 
challenge,  since  mine  clearing  is  a  new  sector  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina as  it  would  be  in  most 
countries.  All  the  other  areas  of the  reconstruction  program  draw  on  structures  and  experienced 
capacities that  existed  prior to  the  war.  In  the  case  of landmines  new  institutions  and  operational 
organizations have to be created, staffed, trained, and equipped -- and time to address this issue is very 
short, since the nascent sector has to face the challenge of urgently undertaking an enormous amount of 
mine clearing.  During the first phase of  reconstruction interim implementation arrangements to carry out 
urgent works shall be put in place. 
3.  Landmine contamination threatens all  aspects of Bosnia and  Herzegovina's recovery.  Mines 
were  laid  to  prevent the  use  and  rehabilitation  of infrastructure (bridges,  buildings,  water wells) and 
reconstruction contracts cannot be implemented until mine hazards have been eradicated.  Resettlement 
of refugees and  displaced persons  is  slowed by the threat (real and  perceived) of mines -- a threat to 
which  these  populations  are  particularly vulnerable  since  they  have  no  easy access  to  reliable  mine 
information.  Community revival is often endangered by mine hazards.  Thus implementation of a mine 
clearing  program  is  essential  to  preventing  delays  in  every aspect of reconstruction  and  community 
recovery  -- and  a  substantial  amount of assistance,  both  financial  and  advisory,  is  needed  from  the 
international community to support this effort. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
4.  The  obj~ctives of the landmine program are to make land available for use -- both by clearing 
identified mine fields and systematically surveying "priority areas" to remove most of  the uncertainty on 
As  used  here,  the  term  "landmine"  or  "mine"  includes  antitank  and  antipersonnel  landmines,  unexploded 
ordnance (mainly shells), and "booby traps" (i.e. concealed explosive devices contrived to go off when some 
harmless-looking object is touched). -70-
the mine situation -- and to prevent mine-related accidents.  These activities are to be carried out to 
support reconstruction and resettlement objectives, and to provide assistance to communities at risk? 
5.  The  reconstruction  program  submitted  in  December  1995  and  April  1996  to  achieve  these 
objectives remains valid.  It will require US$203  million in  external financial  support for the three- to 
four-year period within the overall US$5.1  billion priority reconstruction program (table I): 
•  In 1996, US$51 million was committed, which left a 27 percent financing gap over initial 
estimates of  first-year needs, estimated at US$70 million (paragraphs 7 to 16); 
•  In 1997, US$60 million of external financing is  required -- 65  percent of which would 
benefit the Federation and 35 percent Republika Srpska (paragraphs 17 to 27); and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, some US$92  million will  be needed -- and  policy  issues  should  be 
addressed  to  ensure  medium-term  sustainability of the  program,  which  may  require  the 
continued (although substantially reduced) involvement of  the donor community (paragraph 
28). 
Table 1.  Landmine Program External Financial Requirements 
(US$ million) 
3-4 year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
Institution building  21  9  8  4 
Local capacity building  30  22  6  2 
Mine awareness  10  2  3  5 
Mine hazard assessment  4  0  3 
Marking and clearing  138  18  42  78 
Total  203  51  60  92 
6.  Five priority actions are to be carried out under the program: 
2 
•  Institution building:  setting  up  and  developing  local  institutions  at a  level  sufficient to 
conduct mine clearing operations over the medium term; 
•  Local capacity building: developing and strengthening local implementation capacities (e.g. 
commercial companies, NGOs, and so on);  . 
•  Mine awareness: reinforcing mine awareness to prevent accidents, particularly among the 
most vulnerable groups (returnees, children); 
•  Mine hazard assessment: conducting surveys in  priority areas (particularly reconstruction 
sites  and  target  resettlement  areas)  to  reduce  uncertainty  and  thereby  shrink  the  areas 
considered inaccessible; and 
A distinction  is  sometimes made  between "humanitarian mine-clearing",  aimed  at  diminishin'g mine-related 
risks in everyday life, and "reconstruction mine-clearing", in support of rehabilitation projects.  In Bosnia and 
Herzegovina the  links between the various aspects of the  country's recovery (reconstruction, reintegration of 
refugees  and  displaced  persons,  revival  of communities)  make  it  impossible  to  draw  a clear  line  between 
various "types" of mine clearing (clearing mines to rehabilitate housing in  a village to which refugees are to 
return is a mix of support to reconstruction and resettlement, and has a significant humanitarian impact). - 71  -
•  Marking and clearing: marking known mine fields that cannot be cleared in the very short 
term  and  carrying  out  urgent  mine  clearing wherever necessary  (manually  or with  "dog 
teams"). 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
7.  The aim of the 1996 program was to simultaneously (i) establish the core capacity for handling 
mine clearing over the next few  years and  (ii) conduct mine field  surveys and  urgent mine  clearing. 
Through the  combined efforts of bilateral and  multilateral donors,  the  Implementation Force (IFOR), 
NGOs,  and  the  governmental  authorities  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  progress  was  made  on  the 
institutional side with the establishment of mine clearing agencies (by the State and Entity Governments 
as well as by the United Nations), emergency mine clearing took place, and no significant infrastructure 
reconstruction contract was held up for mine-related reasons. 
8.  However,  much  less  emergency  mine  clearing  took  place  than  had  been  expected,  mainly 
because of  the weakness of  the local mine clearing sector (which was almost nonexistent at the beginning 
of the year).  Recognizing the capacity constraints, the Mine Clearing Program  ~ubmitted in December 
1995  recommended  a  two-pronged  approach:  making  use  of international  capacity  for  urgent  mine 
clearing while simultaneously building local capacity.  This approach was modified in  practice, because 
of the Government's desire to maximize the use of local mine clearers from the start and to avoid the 
relatively high costs of using foreign companies.  The development of  appropriate alternative approaches 
(joint ventures,  use  of international consultants for  team  management and  site  supervision, etc.) has, 
however, taken time.  Additional difficulties resulted from  persistent disagreements between the State 
and Entity Governments on the sharing of  responsibilities.  Works started on a small scale in falll996. 
9.  The  main  donor  commitments  for  mine  clearing  operations  are  shown  in  table  2.  The 
achievements made possible by these contributions are described in more detail below. 
Institution building 
Local capacity building 
Mine awareness 
Mine hazard assessment 
Marking and clearing 
Total 
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Amount 
9.0 
22.0 
2.0 
0.1 
18.0 
51.1 
Main Donors 
EC, Japan, Sweden, US, World Bank 
Denmark, EC, Italy, Norway, US 
Canada, Denmark, Sweden 
World Bank 
Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, Sweden, World Bank -72-
Institution building: Mine clearing agencies established 
10.  In  1996 the authorities in  Bosnia and Herzegovina and the international community set up -- and 
made operational-- a core institutional structure for mine-related issues (box 1  ), particularly for: 
•  Mine information management; 
•  Contracting, supervision of  works, and quality assurance; 
•  Design of  procedures (e.g. for prioritization or safety standards); and 
•  Coordination of mine clearing activities. 
Local capacity building: Nearly 600 mine clearers being trained - 73-
11 .  Because local implementation capacity is still at a nascent stage, mine clearing efforts were slow 
in  1996.  Most of the existing mine clearing organizations lack equipment and skilled personnel -- and 
the military mine clearing experience of many demobilized soldiers is not readily transferable to civilian 
operations (box 2).  Efforts in  1996 were directed toward providing training for mine clearers and site 
supervisors, designing employment mechanisms for  newly trained specialists, and  making equipment 
available to them: 
•  The United States is funding the training and employment (for one year) of about 165  mine 
clearers.  The total  cost of the  operation  in  1996  and  1997  amounts  to  US$15  million. 
Training  has  been  completed  and  survey  and  demining  operations  commenced  in  early 
November  in  the  Banja  Luka,  Tuzla,  Sarajevo,  and  Mostar  areas;  other  operations  are 
expected to commence in  the Jablanica and Trebinje areas during December.  The United 
States also established a small school for deminer and mine dog training at Brus (close to 
Pale, in Republika Srpska); 
•  The European Commission (EC) is financing a similar (US$8 million) program for 250 mine 
clearers that is expected to be operational by early spring 1997; and 
•  Norwegian  People's  Aid  has  established,  with  Norwegian  Government  funding  (US$5 
million), a training school in Srebrenik (near Tuzla) and has trained 60 mine clearers. 
Mine awareness: A focus on the most vulnerable groups 
12.  During  the  war  mine  awareness  programs  were  developed  and  implemented  by  both  the 
governmental authorities and the international community.  These activities continued into 1996 with a 
special  focus  on  the  most  vulnerable  groups  (returnees,  children).  State  and  Entity  Governments, 
together with local and international NGOs, have used television broadcasts and programs implemented 
through the Entity Ministries of  Education to raise awareness of  mine dangers.  Through local initiatives, 
IFOR also has contributed to community-level mine awareness. 
Mine hazard assessments: More than 17,000 mine fields identified 
13.  Identifying the  location  and  the  extent of m inefields  by  collecting,  validating  and  recording 
information -- from  the former warring factions, as required by the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement, or 
from  local residents -- was a high  priority in  1996.  IFOR and the Stabilization Force (SFOR) made a 
significant contribution  by  identifying more than  17,000  mine  fields  with the  assistance of the  local 
armed forces and building on the initiatives of the United Nations Protection Force.  Information has 
been forwarded to a centralized database established with financial support from the United States and 
managed by the United Nations-established Mine Action Center (MAC).  The database is  incomplete, 
however, and believed to cover only 50 to 60 percent of  the total number of mine fields. 
14.  In  parallel, an initial list of priority areas for reconstruction, recovery, and resettlement has been 
assembled by the Governments.  Preliminary surveys (mainly compiling of  existing information, such as 
police and civil defense reports and  interviews with local authorities and residents) were conducted to 
define the level of mine-related risk in  each of these areas.  The Government issued "Risk Assessment - 74-
Certificates" based  on  these  surveys.
3  A  mine clearing works  program  should  now  be  designed  by 
integrating  data  from  the  MAC-managed  database  with  information  related  to  the  scheduling  of 
subsequent activities on the site. 
Marking and clearing: A slow start 
15.  Urgent mine clearing was required in  1996 for many areas -- where reconstruction was urgently 
needed, where refugees or displaced persons were prevented from  returning by mine hazards, or where 
communities  were  at  risk.  Funds  were  made  available  for  this  purpose  in  the  framework  of the 
Emergency Landmine Clearing Project, designed by the State and Entity Governments with the support 
of the  World Bank and  MAC  in  early summer 1996, and  aimed at clearing mine fields  in  support of 
reconstruction, reintegration of refugees and displaced persons as well  as  community recovery, and at 
supporting  local  mine  clearing  institutions.  The  main  donors  were  Italy  (US$3.9  million),  the 
Netherlands (US$1.8 million), and the World Bank (US$7.5  million).  Works started slowly, however, 
with the first contracts awarded in October 1996 (box 3). 
16.  IFOR/SFOR engineers were also engaged in clearing areas of importance for military operations 
(Sarajevo Airport, Mostar Airport, railways bridges, camp areas), either by using international troops or 
by contracting local companies.  These works have often had major benefits for civilian populations and 
reconstruction  activities.  IFOR/SFOR  also  supervised  the  lifting  of mines  by  soldiers  from  former 
warring  factions:  mines  have  been  removed  from  about  1,600  mine  fields  (11  percent  of the  total 
number).  However,  such  "lifting of mines"  often  does  not  meet  civilian  standards,  and  IFOR  has 
repeatedly warned that the corresponding areas should not be considered fully cleared. 
3 
Areas  are  defined  as  "low risk",  where  human  activities  can  start  immediately;  "high  risk",  where  mine-
clearing  works  have  to  be  carried  out  first;  and  "unknown  status"  where  additional  surveys  (with  mine-
detecting dogs or specific equipment) are required - 75-
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
Overall objectives and financing requirements 
17.  Challenges in  1997 result from  the combination of two factors:  the major reconstruction effort 
under way requires the surveying of a large number of areas and the probable clearing of many of them; 
and the  mine  clearing sector is  still  nascent and  capacities are  limited.  Thus donor support in  1997 
should focus on: 
•  Transforming  the  1996  core  capacities  into  a  developed  mine  clearing  sector  that  can 
implement large-scale activities over the medium term; and 
•  Carrying out urgent works as required for implementation of the reconstruction program, for 
resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, and for a reduction of mine hazards at the 
community  level  -- which  will  require training,  surveying,  mine clearing,  and  promoting 
mine awareness. 
18.  To  achieve  these  objectives  and  prevent  mine-related  delays  in  the  implementation  of the 
reconstruction and  resettlement programs, financial  assistance totaling US$60 million will  be  required 
from the donor community. 
Institution building (US$8 million): Strengthening local agencies 
19.  Continued  financial  and  technical  assistance  is  needed  to  strengthen the  Governments'  mine 
clearing agencies.  By the end of the year these institutions should have the necessary expertise, skills, 
and capacities to implement large-scale mine clearing activities (including developing a work program, 
preparing  mine  clearance  contracts,  establishing  and  monitoring  accounting  procedures,  designing 
technical and safety standards, and ensuring the quality of  the works) with limited external assistance. 
20.  While local agencies are being progressively strengthened, the MAC will have to play a critical 
role  by  providing the  necessary  technical  expertise.
4  Continued  financial  support (in  terms of both 
staffing and cash) should be provided by the donor community. 
21.  A special effort should also be made to continue developing the mine information system within 
MAC by collecting additional information, checking and updating existing data, and making them widely 
available.  Donor assistance is required not only to cover (limited) incremental operating costs but also to 
ensure that information collected during implementation of their projects is  properly communicated to 
the central database.  The continued operational assistance of IFOR/SFOR is critical in this regard. 
Local capacity building (US$6 million): Developing an industry 
22.  Developing sufficient mine clearing capacity remains important for the  implementation of the 
1997 reconstruction and repatriation programs.  Support, both financial and technical, is required: 
4 
•  Provide training:  according to  MAC's first  estimate, up  to  1,200  mine clearers and  site 
supervisors  should  be  trained  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  (mainly  through  three-week 
MAC will be handed over to government authorities by the end of 1997, and much attention should be given 
to  the  transfer  process,  which  should  be  smooth  and  gradual  -- the  MAC's role  should  be  progressively 
reduced while the capacities of  government agencies are developed. -76-
sessions  for  demobilized  soldiers).  Donors  could  either  provide  further  support  to 
organizations that have  already established training  facilities  (paragraph  11)  or assist the 
Governments' agencies in setting up new training capacities to address uncovered needs; and 
•  Establish  employment  mechanisms:  experience  in  other  countries  has  shown  that 
employment opportunities must exist in  order for training programs to be effective.  Thus 
donors  that  support  training  activities  should  ensure  that  adequate  structures  (such  as 
commercially or governmentally controlled companies) will have the capacity to employ the 
newly trained mine clearers and that corresponding resources for mine clearing are available. 
In some cases, it will be needed to provide support to such organizations during the start-up 
phase. 
23.  In the absence of appropriate employment mechanisms, several donors established mine clearing 
capacities operating under their direct control in  1996, with a view to eventually handing them over to 
the Governments or to local structures once strengthened -- probably in  1997.  The transfer of  capacities 
should be carefully designed to ensure not only that the transferred capacities can be used optimally, but 
also that the transfer process does not weaken other components of  the mine clearing sector (for 
example, the transfer of large capacities to public authorities could destabilize the newly established 
commercial sector). 
Mine awareness (US$3 million): Preparing for the medium term 
24.  To prevent accidents in the years -- and possibly decades -- to come, awareness of mine-related 
risks has to be continuously reinforced within the population.  Financial support should be  provided to 
the Governments and to  experienced NGOs to  both  continue projects currently under implementation 
(such as broadcasting and distributing "mine-awareness comics") and  initiate new activities (mainly at 
the community level), with a special focus on the most vulnerable groups (children, displaced persons 
and refugees).  Assistance should not be limited to short-term activities and should focus on developing 
the  medium-term  capacities  that  are  required  to  address  this  issue  beyond  the  three- to  four-year 
reconstruction program. 
Surveying, marking, and clearing (US$43 million):  Surveying and clearing priority areas, 
and marking known mine fields 
25.  Information is still insufficient to clarify the mine risk (real and perceived) in all areas.  Because 
mine clearing is a very slow process, it should be limited to areas where the presence of mines impedes 
critical activities or where communities are exposed to an  unacceptable level of risk.  A two-pronged 
strategy is proposed: 
•  Priority  areas  for  reconstruction,  community  recovery,  or  resettlement  should  be 
systematically surveyed  prior to starting implementation of any activity.  Once  the 
likelihood of mine fields within these areas has been assessed, a decision should be made on 
whether development activity can proceed or mine clearing is  required (should that be the 
case, clearing should be undertaken as soon as possible); and 
•  Identified mine fields  should be surveyed to  locate exactly the  outer edge of the  mine 
fields and, in the case of isolated mines, to remove these mines.  The use of mine dogs or of 
mechanical equipment should be considered for that purpose. -77-
Implementing mine clearing operations: A multi-pronged approach 
26.  In  1996  donors  carried  out  mine  clearing  works  through  two  main  sets  of implementation 
arrangements: 
•  Awarding  contracts  to  local  commercial  companies  through  a  compettt1ve  bidding 
process; the State and Entity Governments support this "competitive contracting approach" 
(in  Croatia,  the  Government's  initial  investigations  indicate  that  this  is  the  most  cost-
effective  option);  and  the  World  Bank-supported  Emergency  Landmine  Clearing  Project 
provides a useful vehicle for that purpose; and 
•  Funding  local  or  international  NGOs  operating  under  direct  donor  superv1s1on;  this 
approach  was  used  successfully  in  1996,  mainly  by  Norwegian  People's  Aid  for  mine 
clearing in support of  reconstruction projects and humanitarian activities. 
In parallel, several actors in the field have proposed alternative implementation methods: 
5 
•  Establishing a transitional mine-clearance capability, initially under the control of MAC, 
and eventually transferred to  local authorities; this effort would be supported by qualified 
foreign  specialists  to  instruct,  manage,  and  supervise  mine-clearance  teams;
5  such  an 
approach has been developed successfully by the United Nations in  a number of countries 
(such as Cambodia); and 
•  Establishing operational teams under the control of government authorities; under this 
scheme donor efforts would be limited to providing training and equipment, possibly to the 
armies; Governments -- State, Entities, or Cantons-- would be responsible for carrying out 
works effectively; the U.S.  Government has announced its commitment to train and equip 
150 soldiers in each of  the three armies for this purpose. 
International  staff could  be  either provided  by  donors  as  in-kind  contributions  or recruited  by  the  United 
Nations if no other employment mechanism can be put in place rapidly. - 78-
Since mine clearing is a new activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina, following a multipronged approach in 
1997 should minimize the risks associated with the program.  The outcome should be reviewed at the end 
of the year to take stock of progress and best advise the donor community on further financing.  Subject 
to  the  availability  of  necessary  resources,  different  arrangements  would  then  be  developed 
simultaneously and in a coordinated way. 
27.  Additional recommendations can be made in view ofthe experience gained in  1996 (box 5): 
•  Mine clearing activities in support of infrastructure reconstruction projects should be 
funded as part of the corresponding sectoral programs, to ensure adequate financing and 
smooth  implementation  -- donors  should  be  ready  to  allocate  part  of their  sectoral 
infrastructure contributions to required mine clearing activities.  The sectoral PIUs would be 
responsible  for  defining  detailed  mine  clearing  requirements  as  well  as  for  overall 
implementation;  they  should,  however,  delegate  the  contracting  and  supervision  of mine 
clearing to the Government mine clearing agencies; 
•  The governmental  mine clearing agencies  established at the Entity levels  should  be 
made fully responsible for implementing all mine clearing activities not directly related 
to sectoral programs (training, mine awareness, mine clearing in support of communities at 
risk and so on); and 
•  Coordination  of donor  activities  in  the  field  is  essential  to  ensure  that  activities 
complement one another and to  avoid  overlapping or inconsistencies (such  as  the  use  of 
incompatible  equipment),  as  well  as  to  ensure  that  funds  are  spent  in  support  of 
Governments' priority programs; all donors should support the UN-Ied Sectoral Task Force 
in  its efforts to maximize the value and impact of  foreign funding. -79-
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
28.  Substantial  resources  will  be  needed  in  the  years,  and  possibly  in  the  decades,  to  come  to 
progressively  reduce  mine-related  risks.  Financial  support  from  the  international  community,  while 
necessary in  the short-term, cannot substitute in  the medium term  for locally generated resources, and 
Governments will have to design adequate mechanisms to mobilize the necessary funds: 
•  Mine  clearing  in  support of technical  sectors  (mainly  construction  and  rehabilitation  of 
various  kinds  of infrastructure and  facilities)  should  increasingly be  funded  through each 
secter's income  (e.g. through  fuel  or vehicle taxes  for  the  road  sector or electric  power 
company revenues for the power sector); and 
•  For activities with no  prospect of generating revenue (such as mine clearing of community 
areas), donor funding is likely to remain necessary for some time to come.  donors should be 
prepared to extend their contribution over the three- to four-year reconstruction program (as 
has been the practice in  most other mine-polluted countries), but Governments will need to 
contribute to the costs on an increasing basis. INDUSTRY AND FINANCE 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Before the war, an important sector on its way to a market economy 
1.  Before the war Bosnia and Herzegovina had  considerable industrial activity, natural resources, 
capital  stock,  and  technical  and  commercial  human  skills.  Industry contributed  about  half of gross 
national product (GNP) and nearly half of nonagricultural employment.  There were about a dozen large 
conglomerates, generally export oriented, and about a thousand small and medium-size firms supplying 
local markets.  Production ranged from  intermediate industrial products to consumer goods.  Companies 
were  managed  according  to  "market socialism"  and  "self-management"  principles.  Enterprises  were 
"socially owned": assets were owned by the society at large (there was no  state property), and workers 
councils  ran  the  companies.  In  principle,  key  decisions  were  made  by  workers;  in  practice, 
decisionmaking was delegated to managers formally selected by workers councils and tacitly approved 
by  the  political  system.  Although  there was  some  competition  in  product markets,  competition  and 
mobility in  the labor and financial markets were restricted.  Commercial banks were the only source of 
institutional capital, and bank credit was the only form of financing for enterprises.  Banks were owned 
and controlled by large companies, which used them to obtain financing on favorable terms. 
2.  Yugoslavia  initiated  structural  reforms  in  1988-89  to  improve  the  legal  and  regulatory 
framework for private enterprises and to restructure socially owned companies.  After independence in 
1991  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  prepared  further  reforms,  but  the  outbreak  of war  prevented  any 
significant progress.  Since 1992 three legal frameworks have been developed in  parallel.  The Bosniac-
majority  part  of the  Federation  and  Republika  Srpska  established  centralized  systems  of control 
(primarily for military reasons):  socially owned assets were nationalized and  new management boards 
were appointed.  The Croat-majority part of the Federation made some progress toward privatization and 
authorized  companies  to  develop joint ventures  and  similar types  of private  business  arrangements, 
although the authorities reserved the right to appoint enterprise management. 
Opportunities for revival despite the impact of  the war 
3.  Today  industrial  sector  is  a  shadow of its  former  self.  The war severely set back  industrial 
development, n6t only because of  the extensive physical destruction but also because of  the disruption of 
trade links (particularly within the former Yugoslavia) and the legal confusion it created.  The industrial 
sector operates at just 10 to 30 percent of its capacity, and the unemployment rate outside of agriculture 
is  devastatingly  high,  at around 50  percent in  the Federation and  more than  60  percent in  Republika 
Srpska. Contraction of  output has been uneven throughout the country: 
•  The Bosniac-majority part of  the Federation suffered the heaviest physical capacity damage, 
with production currently at 15 to 20 percent of its prewar level; 
•  Republika  Srpska  suffered  less  extensive  physical  damage,  but  industry  was  severely 
affected by the economic embargo; production is  currently at 8 to  10  percent of its  prewar 
level; and - 82-
•  The Croat-majority part of the Federation maintained production and trade throughout the 
war, although at a reduced  level;  it  also has a  larger number of private enterprises, liberal 
foreign investment policies, and strong links to foreign countries. 
4.  The  banking sector also  suffered  from  the  war.  Foreign  currency  assets  were  frozen · at the 
beginning of the war, which created deep distrust of banks.  The banking system  is  largely devoid of 
funds, and enterprises lack critical cash resources.  Large amounts of nonperforming loans in the banks' 
assets, extensive foreign exchange deposit liabilities, and the virtual extinction through hyperinflation of 
the real deposit base in  local  currency have undermined the ability of banks to extend credit, generate 
income,  and  help  restore  confidence  in  the  banking  system.  Household  deposits  are  negligible, 
commercial  and  public  sector  deposits  are  low,  and  only  a  limited  amount of short-term  credit  is 
extended -- which is  insufficient to finance the investments needed to revive the economy.  In  addition, 
accounting standards need to be improved to reflect balance sheet values and income and loss streams; 
there are currently no suitable loan classification standards and loan  loss provisioning requirements, and 
the regulatory framework is insufficient for developing a market-based banking sector. 
5.  There is,  however, real  potential for revitalizing the industrial  sector despite the overall  bleak 
picture (box 1  ).  Box 2, later in  the text, presents the preliminary results of a survey conducted to assess 
the importance of various  factors as impediments to business revival. 
II.  RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
6.  The primary aim of  the industry and finance recovery program is to stimulate sustainable growth 
and employment by: - 83-
•  Facilitating  private  sector  involvement  and  preventing  the  re-emergence  of  direct 
government involvement in industrial production and transactions; 
•  Developing small and medium-size economic activities -- an effective way of creating long-
term employment opportunities; 
•  Focusing  assistance  on  competitive  enterprises  or  commercially  viable  parts  of larger 
enterprises; 
•  c~mproving operational efficiency,  resource  allocation, and  output quality through targeted 
investment projects; 
•  Helping enterprises to restore trade links with foreign partners; and 
•  Facilitating expansion of  financial intermediation and enhancement of the saving-investment 
process. 
7.  The overall framework and priorities submitted in December 1995 and April  1996 remain valid. 
A series of investment projects prepared to rehabilitate the industrial sector will require US$612 million 
in  external  financing  within the  overall  US$5.1  billion  priority  reconstruction  program  (table  1)  -- a 
substantial increase from the initial assessment(US$400 million) for the three- to four-year program: 
8. 
•  In 1996, US$192 million was firmly committed, substantially more than the initial estimate 
of first-year needs  (US$120 million),  and  several  activities  were  successfully carried  out 
(paragraphs II to 18); 
•  In 1997, US$180  million  in external financing is  required, 62  percent of which  would 
benefit the Federation and 38 percent Republika Srpska (paragraphs 19 to 3 · 1  ); and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, some US$240 million will be necessary.  Private capital, both domestic 
and foreign,  is expected to gradually replace donor assistance, but several policy issues will 
need to be add.ressed first (paragraph 32). 
Table 1.  Industrial Recovery Program External Financial Requirements 
(US$ million) 
3- 4 year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
Lines of credit  293  115  80  98 
Political risk guarantees  135  11  65  59 
Technical assistance  60  33  10  17 
Equity funds  118  27  25  66 
Critical inputs and equipment  6  6  0  0 
Total  612  192  180  240 
The program includes four main elements: 
•  Debt financing schemes to provide short- and medium-term financing for small and medium-
scale private sector activities, mainly through lines of credit and through targeted programs 
for microenterprises that lack access to formal banking institutions; - 84-
•  Guarantee schemes to provide coverage against noncommercial  risks for  foreign  business 
partners arid to support the revival of trade with foreign partners (especially for viable parts 
of large industrial enterprises); 
•  Targeted technical assistance  to  support  small  and  medium-size  enterprise  development, 
enterprise  restructuring  and  privatization,  and  financial  sector  development,  and  also  to 
provide access to modern technology; and 
•  Equity financing schemes  to  provide  longer-term  foreign  financing  to  domestic  firms,  to 
facilitate the development of  joint ventures, and to strengthen the capital base and operations 
of  suitable private banks. 
Specific  projects  have  been  designed  for  each  component.  The  International  Financial  Institutions 
mainly  the  World  Bank,  the  International  Finance  Corporation  (IFC)  and  the  European  Bank  for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) have prepared projects that can be used as vehicles to channel 
donor resources.  In addition, several donors (including the Governments of Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
Sweden,  and  Switzerland)  have  provided  critical  inputs  and  equipment  as  emergency  assistance  to 
selected enterprises. 
Policy environment:  Reform programs for private and financial sector development 
9.  In-depth reforms are needed to stimulate recovery, maintain its pace, and ensure its. sustainability 
beyond the initial  reconstruction period.  Changes in  policies should be  aimed at developing a market 
economy, promoting private sector development, and building an  open and integrated economy within a 
reasonably short period.  Reforms should be  initiated at early stage of the reconstruction period.  The 
transition has been difficult in many Central European countries, and will be even more so in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, where  reforms,  reconstruction,  and  development of governmental  structures  have to  be 
carried out simultaneously.  Generating the right industrial strategies and regulatory regime, building a 
consensus on the required reforms, and strengthening commitment for their implementation  is  urgent. 
Donor  assistance  will  be  needed  to  facilitate  the  transition  and  assist  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina's 
authorities in designing and implementing the necessary reforms, with an emphasis on: 
•  Building a new  legal  and  institutional framework within  a substantially smaller and more 
efficient public  sector,  with  functioning  market mechanisms to  allocate of resources  and 
distribute income and improved conditions for foreign investment; 
•  Pursuing crucial reforms in trade, tax, and labor regulations to minimize barriers to internal 
and external trade and to enhance the mobility of  finance and labor; 
•  Clarifying and implementing new fiscal arrangements between the State and the Entities; and 
•  Adopting uniform foreign trade and customs tariff policies. 
The  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),  the  European  Commission  (EC),  and  the  World  Bank,  in 
cooperation with  several  multilateral  and  bilateral  agencies,  are  preparing  programs to  address  these 
issues.  Implementation  will  start  in  the  next  few  months  and  should  help  create  an  appropriate 
environment  for  restructuring  enterprises  and  banks,  stimulating  private  sector-led  growth,  and 
encouraging critically needed foreign  investments.  These developments will complement and facilitate 
implementation of  the industrial recovery program. - 85-
Donor support programs 
10.  The  recovery  program  should  be  seen  as  a  several-year  strategy,  with  priorities  gradually 
changing from emergency support to longer-term assistance: - 86-
•  Substantial  financial  resources were  required  in  1996  to jump-start industrial  acttvtttes --
which  could  benefit  from  growth  opportunities  generated  by  the  large-scale  aid  effort. 
Programs focused on lines of  credit and technical assistance.  Tangible results were achieved 
as a result of  sizable net resource transfers to Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
•  Donor assistance should  increase and  peak in  1997.  Activities pursued in  1996 should be 
continued, and new programs should  be  initiated  to  help  prepare  and  implement in-depth 
policy  reforms  (while  providing  critical  assistance  for  enterprises'  operations  and 
development).  Focus  should  progressively  shift  from  "simple"  lines  of credit  to  new 
financing  schemes,  including:  an  "enhanced"  line  of credit  aimed  at  promoting  banking 
sector reform, microcredit schemes, and projects aimed at encouraging foreign private sector 
involvement (e.g. equity funds, political risk guarantees, etc.); 
•  At the  same time,  an  adequate  regulatory  framework  should  be  put  in  place to  stimulate 
recovery, to  maintain  its  pace, and  ensure  its  sustainability beyond the three- to  four-year 
reconstruction program, when donor resources will  no  longer be available.  A recovery and 
reform strategy aimed at the economically viable parts of the prewar conglomerates with the 
objective of restarting and eventually privatizing them should be designed to attract domestic 
and foreign investors (box 3).  Simultaneously, reforms should be implemented to liberalize 
the economic system and address the issue of social ownership (and enterprise governance) 
as a precondition (and efficient incentive) for large-scale investments; and 
•  After 1997 external financing requirements will  decrease and  should  focus  on  completing 
implementation of existing projects.  Donor assistance could be gradually replaced by local 
financing  sources  and  non  debt-creating  investments  from  the  foreign  private  sector  --
conditional on  continued recovery, implementation of reforms, and economic and  political 
stability. 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
11.  Notable progress was made in  1996 in carrying out the ambitious reconstruction program, thanks 
to the complementary efforts of the donor community and government authorities.  Donors committed 
US$192  million  to  the  recovery of industry  and  industrial  finance.  Commitments for  lines  of credit - 87-
(more than US$110 million in the Federation) and for technical assistance (US$33 million) exceeded the 
estimated first-year requirements, while equity funds,  introduced late in  the year, remain underfunded. 
Only 38 percent of  commitments were disbursed, however.  The main contributions are shown in table 2. 
Lines of credit 
Political risk guarantees 
Technical assistance 
Equity funds 
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Amount 
115 
II 
33 
Main Donors 
Italy, Kuwait, Netherlands, Saudi Arabia, USAID, 
World Bank 
Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, World Bank 
Egypt, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Poland, 
USAID, World Bank 
EBRD, Italy, IFC, USAID 
Critical inputs and equipment 
27 
6  Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Sweden, Switzerland 
Total  192 
Lines of  credit:  More than US$110 million committed in the Federation 
12.  Strong  donor support to  small  and  medium-size  enterprises  had  tangible  results  in  reviving 
economic activity (particularly commerce), facilitating enterprise development, improving productivity, 
and generating employment.  Several  lines of credit were established  in  the  Federation to jump-start 
commercially viable companies, especially small and medium-size private enterprises, and to promote 
the development of a  true private sector.  In addition, US$115  million was committed by donors and 
US$56 million disbursed to small and medium-size enterprises engaged in  numerous activities including 
agroprocessing, light manufacturing, and services (box 4).  These programs gave enterprises access to 
cash, that was critically needed for working capital and to rehabilitate equipment:  lines of credit were 
almost the only source of  cash for enterprises in  1996. 
•  The Governments of Italy and the Netherlands and the World Bank cofinanced a  US$23 million 
line of  credit for small and medium-size enterprises implemented by the State Ministry of  Finance, 
with technical assistance from  the Government of Germany.  Of the  188 credit applications that 
were processed, 80 approved, 34 rejected, and 54 are under review.  Some US$13.3 million was 
disbursed; 
•  The Governments of  Kuwait and Saudi Arabia established similar credit lines, for a total ofUS$25 
million; however, no disbursement took place in  1996; and 
•  The US Agency for International Development (USAID) established a US$60 million line of  credit 
for small businesses, with an initial focus on the Tuzla area.  The project was directly implemented 
by a group of US bankers in coordination with the National Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina; two-
thirds of  the total amount (US$40 million) was disbursed. - 88-
Political risk guarantees and equity funds: Involving the private sector 
13.  In  late  1996 assistance focused  on  preparing projects to attract financing from  foreign  private 
sources as soon as the situation allows for it.
1  These projects will help make the recovery sustainable by 
gradually decreasing dependency on  donor funds.  Both  Entity Governments, with  the support of the 
EBRD, the IFC, and the World Bank, have designed schemes to promote foreign  private involvement 
through  long-term  investments  (equity  funds)  and  short- to  medium-term  transactions  (guarantees). 
Firm commitments to these projects have been made by the EBRD, the Governments of Germany, Italy, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden and by USAID, IFC, and the World Bank.  These projects are described in 
more detail in paragraphs 25 to 27 and 30 to 31. 
14.  The EBRD is  proposing to take equity stakes in  four or five private banks in  the two Entities; 
EBRD would then use its representation on the supervisory boards and organize twinning programs with 
Western banks to strengthen banks' capacities.  The objective is to enable these banks, whose capital and 
skills base  is  rather thin, to  play an  active role  in  supporting the emerging private sector and  lay the 
foundations for healthy market-based financial  sector growth (including the equity component and the 
technical assistance for project preparation and implementation).  The estimated financial  requirements 
amount to US$3.4  million  per bank on  average.  Technical assistance and,  in  some cases, part of the 
equity contribution are being financed with bilateral grants.  Preparatory steps have been taken with four 
banks  in  the  Federation  so  far,  with  funding  from  the  European  Union,  the  Government  of the 
Netherlands, and the UK Know-How Fund.  Two investments are expected to be approved by early 1997. 
This project will be closely coordinated with the World Bank's planned bank restructuring program. 
Guarantee schemes against noncommercial risk could not have been initiated before the elections. - 89-
Technical assistance: Improving conditions for private sector growth 
15.  A  number of critical  reforms were to be made to  improve the environment for private sector 
development.  In addition, assistance was required to restore normal operating conditions and financing 
mechanisms for enterprises and banks.  Commitments were larger than expected, with more than US$30 
million committed and partly disbursed, including US$26 million from  USAID, to support enterprises 
and banks, as well as the overall reform  process.  However, only a  small  part of donor commitments 
(about a fourth) was disbursed in  1996. 
16.  There was some financial sector reform in the Federation and some imfrovement in the banking 
system, notably the recent establishment of the  Federation Banking Agency.  Republika Srpska lags 
behind but is  committed to following a similar reform  program.  Still, major legislative and regulatory 
reforms remain on the agenda for both Entities. 
17.  Technical  assistance  was  designed  to  foster  private  sector  acttvtttes  by  developing  a 
commercially viable banking system and improving the internal efficiency of  enterprises. 
18. 
•  Along with the lines of credit, USAID provided technical assistance to develop credit risk 
evaluation skills within  banks (US$14.8 million) and to help enterprises prepare  business 
plans, define development strategies, and apply for credit (US$5 million).  The World Bank 
provided similar services, although on a smaller scale; and 
•  The Governments of Egypt, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland committed US$13  million to improving the performance 
and productivity of small and medium-size enterprises (including developing marketing and 
management skills for dealing with foreign  buyers,  suppliers, and competitors, as well  as 
providing critical inputs and equipment).  US$8 million was disbursed. 
.  3 
The Governments of the Netherlands and  Switzerland,  USAID,  the  World  Bank,  and  others 
provided technical assistance to  the authorities in  Bosnia and Herzegovina to address macroeconomic 
issues such as privatization, bank reform, and enterprise reform policies. 
2 
3 
•  Privatization.  Support  was  provided  to  develop  a  privatization  program  and  to  draft 
privatization laws.  The World Bank organized seminars on privatization (inside and outside 
Bosnia and Herzegovina), highlighting other countries' experiences.  USAID provided direct 
assistance  in  establishing  the  Federation  Privatization  Agency  and  in  implementing 
transactions  (an  international  consulting  group  was  contracted  to  provide  training  and 
assistance).  Discussions were held with the Government of Republika Srpska to initiate a 
similar process; 
•  Bank  reform.  Support  was  directed  at  strengthening  bank  policies,  procedures,  and 
management.  In-depth working sessions were organized to disseminate the experience of 
other countries.  USAID  provided  a  significant part of this  assistance  (US$4.8  million), 
Encouragement was given by the World Bank:  its first adjustment operation in the Federation, the Transition 
Assistance Credit, included conditionality related to the drafting of the Federation Privatization Agency Law, 
and to the adoption of  the Federation Banking Agency Law. 
The  Government  of the  Netherlands  provided  US$1  million  for  privatization  implementation,  and  the 
Government  of Switzerland  provided  US$1  million  to  support  the  operational  expenses  of the  recently 
established Federation Banking Agency, under the World Bank Emergency Recovery Project. -90-
including support to start up operations of  the newly created Federation Banking Agency and 
assistance in developing and implementing prudential banking regulations; and 
•  Enterprise reform.  Noticeable progress was achieved in  designing strategies for preparing 
enterprises  for  privatization,  and  a  comprehensive  review  of the  legal  and  regulatory 
framework was initiated. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
19.  In  1996 donors focused on jump-starting economic activity through  lines of credit and related 
technical assistance.  Support is now needed to continue stimulating the recovery process, to maintain its 
pace, and  to ensure  its  sustainability.  This will  require  longer-term  investments and  involvement of 
foreign  business.  In  light of  the  1996  experience (box  5)  donor assistance  should  be  increased  and 
gradually shift from lines of credit, which received much of  the support in  1996, to the other components 
of the  program:  guarantee  schemes are  essential  for  restoring  commercial  links  and  restarting viable 
activities; equity funds are the first long-term non-debt financing schemes.  In Republika Srpska lines of 
credit should be developed, since no such assistance was received in  1996 and there is a need to make up 
for  lost time.  Donor coordination  and  policy  consistency will  be  increasingly  important to ensure a 
balance of  support across regions and activities. 
20.  To  meet  1997  targets, US$180  million of external  financing  is  required.  Donors  should  pay 
particular attention to coordinating their efforts to ensure an adequate balance of support across programs 
and regions.  Efforts should aim to: 
•  Assist recovery of  the banking sector through well-targeted lines of  credit; 
•  Restore commercial links with foreign partners through political risk guarantee schemes; 
•  Support continued reform through technical assistance; and 
•  Promote  foreign  investments  through  venture  capital  funds  (as  a  first  nondebt  long-term 
financing scheme). 
Several programs and initiatives prepared by the IMP, the EC, and the World Bank for implementation in 
1997 aim at providing incentives for strong private sector involvement by implementing the most crucial 
reforms in trade, tax and expenditures policies, and administration. - 91  -
Lines of  credit (US$80 million): Restructuring the banking system and providing 
resources to banks for on/ending 
21 .  While donor support to industry finance  in  1996 occurred largely outside the domestic banking 
sector, in  1997 donors must pay greater attention to establishing a viable domestic banking sector so that 
finance  can  be  sustained  over  the  long-term,  with  an  increasing  share  of resources  mobilized 
domestically.  Thus donor support needs to focus on: 
•  Restructuring  and  privatizating  banks  and  developing  government's  regulatory  and 
supervisory capacity for the banking sector; 
•  Providing required  resources to  industry, such  as  lines of credit, through  banks that have 
clear plans for restructuring and privatization and that are showing significant improvement 
in their portfolio management; and 
•  Specific  microcredit  programs  to  support  micro  and  small  enterprises  that  have  trouble 
obtaining small amounts of  working capital from the formal banking sector. 
22.  Banking sector reform.  Major reforms are urgently needed in  the banking sector to develop its 
intermediation  capacity  in  line  with  the  requirements  of a  market-oriented  economy.  Reforms  are 
needed to: 
•  Clarify ownership and clearly define the governance structure of banks; 
•  Clean up and improve the financial conditions of banks; and 
•  Improve managerial capacity in savings mobilization and lending practices. 
Furthermore, new banking legislation needs to be adopted throughout the country to provide a consistent 
and  modern  framework  for  banking,  and  prudential  regulation  and  supervisory  standards  need  to  be 
introduced.  Institutions  for  bank  supervision  need  to  be  established  (in  Republika  Srpska)  and 
strengthened (in both Entities).  This process will require intensive technical assistance to both individual 
banks and to the authorities. 
23.  Lines of  credit.  As the economy recovers, demand for working capital is  growing rapidly.  But 
domestic savings are still low and resources are hard to mobilize, even for banks with better prospects for 
growth.  Donor  provision  of lines  of credit  to  qualified  banks  would  substantially  strengthen  the 
domestic  banking sector while delivering  needed  funds  for  industrial  revival.  An  estimated  US$70 
million will  be required to support continued industrial recovery in  both Entities in  the  1997 program. 
Within this program, there is  a need to pay special attention to the funding requirements in  Republika 
Srpska, since enterprises in Republika Srpska had no access to donor-financed lines of  credit in  1996. 
24.  Microcredit program.  Micro and small enterprises in Bosnia and Herzegovina often have trouble 
obtaining working capital because they have no access to the formal banking sector.  Experience in other 
Central European countries shows that these enterprises can often  generate employment opportunities 
beyond the family circle, and that their development impact on  the poorest segments of the society is 
significant.  A "Local  Initiatives Project" has  been developed with the support of the World Bank to 
provide  credit  and  technical  assistance  to  groups  currently  relying  heavily  on  social  assistance  --
widowed  refugees,  the  unemployed, and  new  microenterprises.  In  addition,  a  large  group of donors -92-
including the EBRD, the EC, the Internationale Projekt Consult (IPC),
4 
several private firms,  and the 
World Bank has agreed to sponsor a  complementary project, the establishment of the  Bosnia Micro-
Credit Bank.  This new institution, to be operated as a commercial bank with a capital of US$2 million, 
would  extend  small  loans  (less  than  US$20,000  and  averaging  US$10,000)  to  micro  and  small 
enterprises that were hurt by the war and that have no access to the formal  banking sector.  The loans, 
which would be extended on commercial terms, would be used mainly to finance working capital.  Since 
the shareholders share a common commercial orientation, the initial capitalization of  the project has been 
designed to make the Micro-Credit Bank sustainable (and profitable) quickly, so that its  impact will be 
maximized.  Services will be progressively extended to all regions of  Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
Political risk guarantees (US$65 million): Restoring links with foreign business partners 
25.  Restoring industrial capacities in  Bosnia and Herzegovina will  require the re-establishment of 
links with foreign  business partners, whether investors, suppliers, or buyers.  International companies 
have  shown  a  strong  interest  in  restarting  commercial  operations  with  companies  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina,  based  largely  on  the  companies'  past  performance  and  on  prewar  relations.  Several 
international  companies  have  already  identified  deals  that  they  would  like  to  make.  But  political 
uncertainty, threat of renewed hostilities, and lack of confidence in  the new government structures hold 
them  back.  Two main  schemes have been designed to encourage foreign  entrepreneurs to enter into 
business relationships with companies from Bosnia and Herzegovina, and donor assistance is required to 
get them  started.  One  is  political  risk  guarantees  for  short-term  business  transactions,  the  other  is 
noncommercial risk guarantees for long-term investments. 
4 
5 
The  IPC,  a German  consulting  firm  specialized  in  microfinance, will  provide  a cash  contribution  and  be 
responsible  for  staff  training,  introduction  of  management  information  systems,  and  overall  project 
management. 
The funds made available under the World Bank credit and not used for paying claims would be spent after the 
guarantee has expired to finance critical imports for industry. - 93-
26.  Political risk guarantees.  The political risk guarantee facility  will  require US$35  million  in 
cofinancing to encourage foreign investors, input suppliers, trading companies, and financial institutions 
to provide financing for short- and medium-term transactions with industrial enterprises in  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.
6  This project was  prepared by the State and  both  Entity Governments with the  World 
Bank's  support  to  provide  guarantees  against  noncommercial  risks  (mainly  renewed  hostilities  and 
misgovernance).  In view of the special nature of this project (funds are disbursed only if a guarantee is 
called),  donor  contributions  could  be  made  either  in  cash  or  in  promissory  notes  to  backstop  the 
guarantees (box 6). 
27.  Insuring equity in  the longer term.  Interest in  longer-term  investments is  expected to pick up 
once  short-term  business transactions  resume.  For such  longer-term  (equity)  investments,  a  parallel 
guarantee system for noncommercial risk should be established to cover such risks as renewed hostilities, 
civil  disturbance,  expropriation, breach of contract, and  nonconvertibility of local  currency for sound 
investment projects contributing to employment generation, technology transfer, and export generation. 
The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) has designed a Sponsorship Trust Fund for that 
purpose.
7  The Trust Fund's capital base is expected to be set initially at US$30 million, including cash 
contributions and promissory notes.  The Fund will be liquidated on a date agreed on by the sponsors --
or when its capital base is exhausted as a consequence of  claims. 
Technical assistance (US$10 million): Helping to restructure conglomerates and banks 
28.  A  comprehensive  restructuring  and  privatization  strategy  is  needed  to  revitalize  the  prewar 
conglomerates  and  to  endow  them  with  appropriate  and  competitive  structures  (box  3).  Technical 
assistance  is  required  to  assist  in  this  process  -- including  diagnostic  studies,  definition  of detailed 
measures to be  undertaken,  assistance for  implementation of these  measures, and match-making with 
foreign partners.  USAID, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO), the IFC, 
and the World Bank are working on this issue. 
29.  Technical assistance is  also  required to  restructure the  banking sector.  To be  successful, this 
effort should be linked to the strengthening of bank lines of  credit.  Reforms should focus on: 
•  Improving the legal and institutional environment by establishing a viable and harmonized 
legal and regulatory framework and corresponding enforcement capacity; 
•  Establishing Entity-level institutions  in  support of bank restructuring and privatization to 
handle  unrecoverable  assets  (an  Asset  Liquidation  Fund)  and  frozen  foreign  exchange 
deposits (a Settlement Agency), with the overall objective of  facilitating the workout of bank 
problems, accelerating privatization, and providing compensation to household depositors; 
and 
•  Developing and implementing a bank restructuring and  privatization program. 
Technical Assistance requirements are summarized in the Annex to this report (pages 157 to 160). 
6 
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While  indications are that the transactions to  be  covered could exceed US$100  million, the  initial target has 
been  fixed  at  US$50  million.  The  Governments  of Germany,  the  Netherlands,  and  Sweden  have  already 
committed US$1.3 million and the World Bank has approved a US$10 million credit on concessional terms. 
The  Fund  will  be  administrated by  MIGA  on  behalf of the  sponsors.  Investor claims  will  be  evaluated  in 
accordance with MIGA guidelines. -94-
Equity funds (US$25 million): Promoting long-term investment 
30.  The EBRD is  developing a Bosnia and Herzegovina Reconstruction Equity Fund.  This US$35 
million  fund,  cofinanced  by  the  EBRD  and  the  EC,  will  provide  equity  and  quasi-equity  capital  to 
selected small and medium-size enterprises with a view toward participating in corporate governance and 
providing management support.  The Government of Italy will provide a US$7.5 million grant to meet 
operating costs during the early years of operation.  The fund  will  be  managed by a private firm  with 
direct equity  investment  management experience (competitively selected  by the EBRD);  investments 
will range from US$35,000 to US$3.5 million and will consist of minority equity stakes combined with 
debt or quasi-equity instruments.  The fund will  initially focus on private enterprises with a successful 
prewar record of operations, that need capital to restart; later, once those firms have been privatized, it 
will support former government-owned enterprises (box 7 shows the result of  a survey undertaken during 
the preparation of  the fund). 
31 .  The EBRD  and  the  IFC  are  cosponsoring a venture capital fund  initially estimated at US$20 
million.
8  The fund will  finance the creation, modernization, expansion, and restructuring of small and 
medium-size enterprises,  and will be directed at private companies and public enterprises that are being 
privatized, whether local firms or joint ventures. Initial investments are likely to remain small (generally 
between  US$50,000  and  US$250,000)  and  targeted  at  companies  that  produce  goods  and  services 
necessary for the reconstruction effort.  The fund will be allowed to take majority ownership positions in 
firms.  Larger investments may be considered at a later stage.  The fund will be dissolved after ten years 
(with a possible two-year extension to liquidate its portfolio). 
8 
The fund will be managed by Horizonte, an asset management company based in Vienna, Austria. - 95-
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN THE YEARS AHEAD 
32.  Reaching consensus on the reforms required to  revive the  industrial  sector has  been  difficult. 
Decisionmakers in Bosnia and Herzegovina should not be misguided by postwar difficulties (particularly 
the need to generate employment rapidly): although special conditions may create a temptation to revert 
to centralized,  government-controlled  industry,  only the  strong  involvement of the  private sector will 
help  ensure  a  sustainable  revival  of the  sector -- which  will  require  comprehensive  reforms  of the 
existing economic framework.  Governments should limit their role to creating conditions for the private 
sector to develop:  maintaining a sound macroeconomic environment, establishing an  appropriate legal 
and regulatory framework that promotes the smooth functioning of free markets and facilitates domestic 
and  foreign  investments,  and  providing  essential  public  goods  and  social  services.  Such  principles 
should  now  be  transformed  into  well-targeted  and  properly  enforced  regulations,  and  Government 
authorities should initiate the reform process as soon as possible to implement the major policy changes 
in  1997.  Donor support in this endeavor is essential, both in  providing financial and advisory assistance 
and in ensuring that funds are targeted and channeled in appropriate ways to promote the needed reforms. 
Box 8 identifies key areas requiring attention. I.  BACKGROUND 
EMPLOYMENT GENERATION AND 
LABOR MARKET DEVELOPMENT 
Unemployment was increasing even before the war 
I.  Unemployment is  one of the most pressing postwar issues that Bosnia and Herzegovina faces. 
Even  before the war unemployment was becoming a serious problem  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina, as it 
was in the neighboring Yugoslav republics.  The economy began to deteriorate in the 1980s, and by 1991 
an  estimated 27 percent of the  1.3  million of the non  agricultural  labor force was  unemployed.  This 
problem was partly rooted in  the economic transition beginning throughout the region.  Before the war 
enterprise restructuring was already leading to  changes  in  labor demand  that were  resulting  in  rising 
unemployment.  Labor policies and institutions, however, were not responding to these changes in  the 
economy, leading to a widening divergence between labor supply and demand. 
The war has left a majority of  the labor force jobless 
2.  The virtual collapse of the economy during the war means that unemployment today  is  nearly 
twice that of 1991.  Though there are no reliable data, estimates put unemployment at 50 to 60 percent of 
the current labor force of about  1.1  million.  There is  also significant underemployment,  as many who 
once had formal sector jobs now rely on informal sector activities and agriculture to make a living. 
Lack of  job opportunities impedes successful demobilization and the return of  refugees 
3.  Of particular concern are the job prospects for the people most directly affected by the war --
demobilized soldiers, internally displaced persons, war widows, and returning refugees.  About 425,000 
soldiers  have  been  or  are  being  demobilized  (245,000  in  the  Federation  and  180,000  in  Republika 
Srpska),  many of them  with  lower than  average  educational  and  professional  qualifications  that  are 
unsuited  to  the  changing  economic  environment.  More  than  13,000  people,  most  of them  former 
soldiers, have permanent physical disabilities from war injuries (including 5,000 people who lost limbs) 
that  prevent  them  from  resuming  their  former  occupations.  Without  appropriate  assistance,  many 
demobilized soldiers could end  up  among the  long-term  structurally unemployed  requiring  long-term 
income support. 
4.  People displaced during the  war and  unable to  return  to  their homes  and  previous jobs  face 
particular difficulties reintegrating with the labor market, as do the widows of soldiers killed during the 
war.  Unexpectedly made heads of households, these women are forced to find employment to support 
their families yet often lack appropriate qualifications to do so. 
5.  The return and reinsertion  into the labor market of refugees also represents a major challenge 
that needs to be addressed with sensitivity.  More than one million refugees, representing a potentially 
significant portion of the labor force, still reside outside Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Many of those who 
left  the  country  to  escape  the  war  possess  important  skills  that  are  needed  for  the  immediate - 98-
reconstruction process as well as for longer-term economic development.  There is,  however, a national 
consensus that those who fled during the war should not be given preferential treatment for employment 
to encourage their return.  The issue takes on added delicacy in  light of the country's 50  to 60 percent 
unemployment rate.  A further complication is  that half the refugees who fled abroad are from  areas in 
which they would be a minority if they were to return.  Nevertheless, employment opportunities are a 
vital component of  the preconditions needed to encourage refugees to return. 
6.  There  is  no  doubt  that  unemployment  is  an  overwhelming economic and  social  problem  for 
Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Continued lack of employment opportunities could undermine economic and 
social  reintegration  and  contribute  to  a  resurgence  of  social  tensions.  But  investment  in  the 
reconstruction  and  recovery  program  alone  will  not  ensure  sustained  growth  in  employment  and 
earnings.  Cross-country evidence clearly indicates that economic growth alone is not sufficient to create 
employment.  The structure of the labor market is fundamental to employment growth.  Thus there is  a 
need for active measures to ensure that the  labor force  is  suitably skilled t()  meet the demands of the 
labor market and that labor policies and institutions are designed to ensure labor force mobility. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
7.  Employment generation is  an  overriding objective of the Priority Reconstruction and Recovery 
Program  and  a cross-cutting  issue that needs to  be  integrated with  all  sectoral  investment strategies. 
Reconstruction  and  recovery activities are  generating considerable employment, especially in  housing 
and infrastructure reconstruction and in  industry.  An estimated 250,000 jobs were created at the peak of 
the 1996 Reconstruction Program.  But further efforts are needed to maximize the employment impact of 
the Reconstruction Program and to ensure that labor market policies are in  place to  guard against long-
term structural unemployment.  Hence the need for an active employment program that: 
•  In the short term (1996-97), focuses on employment creation schemes, particularly for the 
most  vulnerable  groups,  and  on  maximizing  the  employment  creation  potential  of 
reconstruction projects.  Work also needs to begin  immediately on  reforming labor market 
policies. 
•  In the medium to  long term, turns toward the  structural  issues  underlying  unemployment 
toward  institutional  and  policy  reform  to  ensure  a  well-functioning  labor  market  and 
investments  in  training and  enterprise  promotion to  help  the  unemployed  find  permanent 
jobs in  a market economy.  Unless these  issues  are  addressed head-on, they are  likely to 
disrupt the transition to a more market-oriented economy. 
8.  The Employment Generation Program  focuses  on  investments that have job creation as  their 
primary objective.  It also highlights the structural and policy issues that need to be addressed to ensure a 
well-functioning  labor  market.  In  concept  and  scope,  the  overall  employment  generation  program 
submitted  in  April  1996  remains  unchanged.  Implementation will  require US$88  million  in  external 
support  for  the  three- to  four-year  reconstruction  period  within  the  overall  US$5.1  billion  priority 
reconstruction program (table 1): 
•  In 1996, US$54  million  was firmly committed, representing  72  percent of the  original 
US$75 million in estimated needs (paragraphs 11  to 20); -99-
•  In 1997, US$30  million of external financing is  required,
1 with  a  greater share of the 
resources going to Republika Srpska to  make up  for the lack of investment in  Republika 
Srpska during 1996 (paragraphs 21  to 28); and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, US$4 million in investment will be needed, and policy issues will need 
to be increasingly addressed to ensure the sustainability of employment (paragraphs 29 to 
32). 
Table 1.  Employment Generation Program External Financial Needs 
(US$ million) 
3-4 year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
Public employment  37.2  19.1  17.1  1.0 
Microenterprise development  25.9  18.7  5.2  2.0 
Employment counseling  4.3  3.1  1.2  0.0 
Training  14.0  7.1  5.9  1.0 
Institution building  6.6  6.0  0.6  0.0 
Total  88.0  54.0  30.0  4.0 
9.  The Employment Generation Program has five main areas of investment: 
•  Public employment: provision of  rapid, short-term employment opportunities; 
•  Microenterprise  development:  promotion  of  self-employment  and  microentreneurship 
through increased access to credit and related business training; 
•  Employment counseling:  provision  of counseling  and  placement services,  particularly  for 
demobilized soldiers and refugees wishing to return; 
•  Training: retraining  and  education  to  help  workers  to  gam  the  skills  needed  for  a  more 
market-oriented economy; and 
•  Institution building: provision of  demand-driven services to the unemployed. 
I 0.  Policy  reforms  are  critical  for  these  investments  to  have  the  desired  employment  impact. 
Employment  generation  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  is  still  impeded  by  restrictive  labor  laws  that 
artificially drive up  the real  cost of labor.  If measures are  not taken  in  the short term,  high  rates of 
unemployment are likely to persist. 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
11.  The  primary objective of the  Employment Generation  Program  in  1996  was  to  create  rapid 
employment opportunities for people made jobless by the war and to implement other active employment 
programs  (job  placement,  retraining,  microenterprise  development)  while  building  the  institutional 
Within this framework,  programs specifically aimed at facilitating refugee returns are being contemplated by 
the Refugee Return Task Force (RRTF), established under the Economic Task Force (ETF). - 100-
capacity through which to finance such programs and to provide employment and training services.  The 
main 1996 donor commitments to employment generation activities are shown in table 2. 
Public employment 
Microenterprise development 
Employment counseling 
Education and training 
Institution building 
Total 
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Amount 
19.1 
18.7 
3.1 
7.1 
6.0 
54.0 
Main Donors 
EC,  Netherlands,  Norway,  UNDP,  US,  World 
Bank, others 
EC,  Italy,  Netherlands,  Turkey,  UNHCR,  US, 
World Bank, others 
World Bank, others 
Austria, Netherlands, World Bank, others 
EC, Netherlands, World Bank, others 
Public employment: 10,000 months of  employment created through public works 
schemes 
12.  Good  progress  was  made  on  implementing  public  employment  schemes  in  1996.  The 
Governments  of the  Netherlands  and  Norway,  and  the  World  Bank  financed  a  Public  Works  and 
Employment Project implemented through Employment and Training Foundations (ETF) established in 
the  Federation  and  in  Republika Srpska (box  1).  By the  end of 1996  the  ETFs  had  contracted  an 
estimated US$6 million in  public works projects, creating more than  10,000 months of work (or 3,000 
temporary jobs based on an average project implementation period of three months).  Several bilateral 
donors, notably the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US), also allocated funds for small, 
quick-impact rehabilitation projects that sought to create jobs rapidly in their areas of  military command. 
The  Implementation  Force (IFOR) troops  played  a  central  role  in  identifying and  supervising these 
projects.  By the end of October  1996,  US$15  million  had  been  committed to  such  projects  in  the 
Federation  and  Republika  Srpska,  and  about  600  projects  had  been  approved. 
2  During  1996  the 
International  Labor  Office  (ILO)  also  carried  out  preparatory  work  for  a  prospective  Emergency 
2 
These amounts channeled through IFOR are not reported  in  table 2.  The U.K.  Government provided about 
US$10 million  in  financing to such schemes in  Multinational Division South West and the U.S.  Government 
US$5 million in Multinational Division North East. - 101 -
Employment Program, based on the creation of "unemployment companies", a model that has worked 
successfully in eastern Germany. 
Microenterprise development:  From dependence on humanitarian assistance to 
economic independence 
13.  During 1996 microenterprises and other income-generating activities received growing attention 
as a means of helping people move from  unemployment and dependency on humanitarian assistance to 
active employment and economic  independence.  Since Bosnia and  Herzegovina has  little experience 
with microenterprise financing, the Government of the Netherlands funded, through the World Bank, a 
pilot Local Initiatives Project (microcredit) in  Tuzla in  February 1996 with three NGOs -- BOSPO (a 
local  NGO), International Rescue Committee, and  World  Vision.
3  Loans up  to  a  maximum of OM 
I 0,000 were provided to  displaced women, demobilized soldiers, and  other rural  and  urban  would-be 
microentrepreneurs.  World  Vision  also  provided  business  management  training  to  potential 
microentrepreneurs.  Activities financed included trade, services, small-scale production, and agriculture. 
In  August  1996  with  financial  support  from  the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner  for  Refugees 
(UNHCR), the pilot program  was expanded to Bihac, Gorazde, Mostar, and  Sarajevo.  By the end of 
1996, about 350 loans (averaging US$2,000) had been disbursed, sustaining about 300 jobs and creating 
about  330  new  jobs  (a  good  job  creation  ratio  compared  with  microcredit  programs  in  other 
industrialized countries).  The pilot phase demonstrated a high demand for such small amounts of credit 
(OM 10,000 and less) and showed that NGOs can reach the target population and manage microcredit 
programs that achieve high repayment rates (90 to  I 00 percent) provided sufficient technical assistance 
and training are provided.  The Local Initiatives Project, which became operational in  December 1996 
under the management of the ETFs, aims to rapidly scale up the pilot microcredit efforts started in  1996. 
As well as providing financing for  microcredit programs managed by NGOs, this project is  financing 
considerable  technical  assistance  and  training  to  help  build  the  capacity  of these  organizations  in 
developing financially sustainable microfinance operations over the long term. 
14.  In  September  1996 the  U.S.  Government  launched  the  Bosnian  Women's Initiative,  a  US$5 
million fund, administered by the UNHCR and run by NGOs.  This initiative supports income-generating 
skills and training programs for returning refugee, displaced, and other war-affected women.  Projects 
financed  include  tailoring  and  hairdressing  workshops  for  women  as  well  as  microcredit  schemes 
targeted to  women.  Close collaboration  is  needed  between  the  Bosnian  Women's Initiative and  the 
Local  Initiatives  Project  to  ensure  a  common  policy  framework  on  credit  delivery  and  a  common 
institution-building approach to microenterprise development. 
15.  In  October  1996  the  ILO began  work on  the  local  economic development component of the 
Program for Rehabilitation and Sustainable Social Development (PROGRESS), financed by the United 
Nations Office of Project Services (UNOPS), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and 
the  Government  of Italy.  This  component  includes  a  small-scale  microcredit  program  in  three 
municipalities  in  the  Una-Sana  canton  (Bihac)  and  Banja Luka region.  The  UNDP  also  started  a 
3 
This represented the pilot phase of a full-scale US$18  million  Local  Initiatives Project that was  approved by 
the  World  Bank  in  December  1996.  The  Local  Initiatives  Project  complements  an  International  Finance 
Corporation (IFC)  and the  European  Bank for Reconstruction and  Development (EBRD) project to  set up  a 
microenterprise  bank  by  targeting  a  "pre-entrepreneurial"  class  of borrower  at  the  lowest  end  of the 
microenterprise spectrum (see  the "Industry and  Finance" sector report).  The  IFC/EBRD-sponsored micro-
credit bank would support existing micro and small businesses at the higher end of  the spectrum. - 102-
program to set up enterprise assistance bureaus in  Bihac, Central Bosnia, and  Mostar, beginning with 
Bihac in October 1996.  These bureaus provide business development services for enterprises of  all sizes, 
including microenterprises, with  an  initial  focus  on  providing information on  how to access available 
financial and technical assistance. 
Employment counseling and  job-finding services: Matching job seekers with job 
vacancies 
16.  In  September  1996  employment  counseling  and  job-finding  services  started,  with  primary 
attention to demobilized soldiers and refugees wishing to return.  In October the Federation ETF signed 
its first contract with an NGO, the International Catholic Migration Commission, to provide counseling 
and job-finding services for demobilized soldiers.  An additional four contracts were signed by February 
1997, reaching a total of 443  people.  A briefing campaign was initiated recently, and it is expected that 
many NGOs will prepare new proposals in the near future.  The International Organization for Migration 
took  the  lead  in  trying  to  match  refugees  with job opportunities  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina and  in 
providing assistance for them to return.  The lack of  job opportunities represented a major constraint to 
the return of refugees on any large scale in  1996. 
17.  Job-finding  services  require  sufficient  information  on  the  labor  market  - who  are  the 
unemployed, where are they, what skills do they have, where and  what types of job opportunities are 
available?  Work  started  in  September  1996  on  examining  labor  market  information  systems  and 
discussing  improvements to  the  current system  of Employment Institutes and  municipal  employment 
offices in the Federation and Republika Srpska.  Under the Demobilization and Reintegration Project, the 
World  Bank committed  US$1.5  million  to  upgrading,  broadening,  and  automating  the  labor  market 
information systems operated by municipal employment services, including ensuring that good data are 
available on job vacancies and on those seeking employment.  The US Department of Labor is providing 
technical assistance in this effort.  In  October 1996 it organized a study tour to employment bureaus in 
Ireland,  Poland and  the  United  States for  key  management and  technical  staff from  the Employment 
Institutes and  the ETFs of both the Federation and  Republika Srpska.  Agreement was  reached on  a 
common framework for the Labor Market Information network for both  Entities, as  well  as  common 
operating systems.  A working group from Republika Srpska and Federation employment services made 
an  inventory  of necessary  and  available  equipment.  Procurement  of the  corresponding  equipment 
(including automation hardware and software) was initiated with the assistance of consultants from  the 
U.S. Department of Labor.  The ILO also sent a technical specialist to examine issues related to  labor 
market information during 1996.  The ILO is coordinating closely with the U.S. Department of Labor to 
ensure that a coherent and unified labor market information system emerges. 
Education and training: Getting ready for  jobs in a restructured economy 
18.  Training and  skills  upgrading will be essential to ensure that the  unemployed  have the  skills 
needed to  qualify  for jobs in  a  changing economy.  With  the collapse of the  prewar socially owned 
industrial  sector, many prewar jobs no  longer exist.  The  industrial  sector needs to  be  restructured to 
compete in  a market economy, and the demand for labor will shift accordingly.  To find jobs, many of 
the  unemployed  will  need  to  upgrade their skills.  Through  the  ETFs,  the  World  Bank  is  providing 
financing  to  local  service  providers  (enterprises,  NGOs,  private  and  public  training  institutions)  to 
provide  on-the-job and  other skills training,  particularly for  demobilized  soldiers.  One  hundred  and 
thirty-two service contracts for skills training programs were signed through mid-February 1997, and an - 103-
additional twenty proposals to provide training services are now being appraised.  The contracts signed, 
as well as the ones presently under review, should provide training for more than 7,000 people. 
Institution building: Channeling resources and integrating employment services 
19.  Two important institutional initiatives took place in  1996.  The first was to establish ETFs in the 
Federation  and  in  Republika Srpska to  channel  grant financing  to  public,  nongovernment,  or private 
institutions for employment and training activities.  The ETFs are governed by boards of directors made 
up of ministry representatives of both Governments (including the Ministries of Finance, Social Policy 
and Refugees, and Physical Planning) and nongovernment entities (including the Chamber of  Commerce, 
Employment Institutes, and trade unions).  The Federation ETF was fully operational by July 1996, and 
the  Republika Srpska ETF  by  October  1996.  By the  end of 1996  the  ETFs had  acquired significant 
capacity  to  channel  donor  financing  for  local  initiatives  related  to  public  employment  schemes, 
microenterprise development, and job counseling and training.  Technical assistance is being provided to 
the ETFs by the U.S. Department of Labor and by several international experts in microcredit. 
20.  The second initiative explored ways to strengthen and improve the Employment Institutes, with 
donor  support from  the  ILO  and  the  World  Bank.  The  Federation  has,  de  facto,  two  Employment 
Institutes, one in  Sarajevo and one in  Mostar, which operate virtually independently.  To be effective in 
providing job listings  and job search  assistance and  to  encourage  movement of labor throughout the 
Federation, these institutes and their information systems and services need to be better integrated. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
21.  Two areas should receive primary attention in  1997.  One is to scale up and increase the impact 
of  employment generation programs.  The return of  refugees is likely to increase in  1997, and efforts will 
be needed to improve mechanisms to help refugees find employment and reintegrate with the job market. 
The second is to broaden and deepen the labor market development agenda to address the structural and 
policy  issues  underlying  unemployment in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina.  These  activities  will require  an 
estimated US$30 million infinancingfrom the donor community (table 1). 
Public employment (US$17.1 million): Continuing employment for the most vulnerable 
22.  High  unemployment  is  likely to  continue  in  1997,  and  in  the  short term  public employment 
schemes will remain an  important means of providing jobs for the unemployed, particularly for the most 
vulnerable,  least skilled workers.  In  1997 the ETFs aim  to  implement up  to US$17 million  in  public 
works  and  employment projects  prepared  by  municipalities  and  local  communities,  creating  at  least 
40,000  months of work.  Particular attention will  be  paid to getting projects under way  in  Republika 
Srpska and to setting up  employment creation schemes in  areas where refugees are expected to  return 
and  in  more  remote,  marginal  areas.  Additional  donor  cofinancing  is  urgently  needed  since  funds 
available from  1996 commitments are expected to be fully contracted by April 1997. 
23.  The ILO is also seeking financing for an Emergency Employment Program for 1997 that would 
help establish  private employment companies, with services concentrated on demobilized soldiers and 
war invalids.  Staff would be recruited from  the ranks of the unemployed,  particularly among former 
employees of large state-owned enterprises.  The project would finance the wages of the workers, who 
would be employed immediately and paid by the employment companies, which would seek contracts - 104-
for  projects  in  areas  such  as  infrastructure  rehabilitation,  repair  of war  damage,  industrial  renewal 
schemes, environmental projects, and the like. 
24.  Because it will take time for the economy to recover and for permanent employment to  reach 
desirable levels, every effort should be made to maximize employment during the three to four years of 
the Reconstruction Program by emphasizing the employment creation impact of  other investments under 
the Reconstruction Program.  This can be done, for example, by  using employment-intensive methods 
instead of capital-intensive methods where that makes economic sense.  Preparing trenches for water 
pipes  and  other  network  systems  is  one  area  in  which  manual  labor  could  be  more  economic  than 
machines. 
Microenterprise and microfinance development and self-employment (US$5.2 million): 
Building sustainable financing mechanisms 
25.  In  1997  the  objective  for  microenterprise  development  is  to  deepen  and  broaden  business 
training and other financial and related services available to people wishing tci  become self-employed or 
to  start up  microenterprises.  One such  effort is  the  Local  Initiatives  Project, which  began  full-scale 
operations  in  December  1996  under  the  management  of the  ETFs  (paragraph  13)  and  aims  to 
significantly increase the scale and  impact of microcredit programs.  The project provides credit and 
business  services  to  people  from  economically  disadvantaged  groups  who  want  to  start  income-
generating activities and  microenterprises.  Loan funds  are  managed  at the  local  level  by  contracted 
NGOs,  mainly  from  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  selected  for  their  potential  to  develop  microcredit 
programs of a large enough scale and reach to become financially sustainable over the medium to long 
term; the NGOs will receive substantial technical assistance and training to achieve this goal.  Attention 
also needs to be focused  on the legal  and  regulatory framework for microenterprises and for  nonbank 
financial  institutions  to  create  an  environment  that  encourages  microenterprise  growth  and  the 
development of institutions that can serve their financial needs. 
Employment counseling and  job-finding services (US$1.2 million): Stepping up the pace 
26.  Because of the  economic  collapse  brought on  by  the  war,  many  highly  skilled  people  from 
Bosnia and  Herzegovina are  unable  to  find  work.  Such  people  require  active  assistance  in  finding 
employment.  Areas  in  need  of continuing  improvement  in  1997  and  beyond  include  employment 
services  (job  placement  and  related  counseling  services)  through  both  public  and  private  service 
providers, and intensive job-seeking assistance for displaced workers, particularly for those with higher-
level skills (including refugees outside the country).  A system is needed for consolidating available job 
information and circulating it effectively to refugees in  asylum countries, so that they can compete for 
employment on  an  equal  basis.  The International Organization for  Migration  has  formed  a  working 
group under the auspices of  the ILO-Ied Task Force on Employment and Training to address these issues 
in  coordination with  other organizations,  ministries  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina,  and  asylum  country 
governments. 
Education and training (US$5.9 million): Learning the skills for a competitive market 
economy 
27.  A  stronger focus  on  vocational  and  skills  training  (both  on-the-job  training and  institutional 
training) is needed in  1997 to identify the skill requirements of employers, so that training programs can 
respond to market demand and achieve high job placement rates.  All programs must meet the criteria of - 105-
being  demand  driven  and  cost effective.  Nearly  US$6  million  in  new  commitments  is  required  to 
implement education and training activities on  a significant scale.  Areas  in  need of attention  include 
strengthening  training  institutes,  developing  new  training  courses,  training  trainers,  and  making 
managers  and  technicians  more  aware  of modern  management  techniques  and  new  technologies. 
Modern broadcast media are one avenue for heightening awareness and providing on-air training.  Other 
countries  have  used  the  broadcast  media  to  present  open  university-type  programs,  debates, 
documentaries, 'soaps' , and other programming to convey economic reform and other messages to the 
public.  These types of initiatives should be encouraged and developed during 1997. 
Institution building (US$0.6 million): Getting labor markets to function efficiently 
28.  A major challenge in  1997 will  be to get labor market and employment services in  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to function efficiently.  The State Government also wants to integrate the labor markets to 
the extent possible.  Today labor markets function  separately in  the Federation and  Republika Srpska 
and,  within  the  F ~ ~deration,  in  Bosniac- and  Croat-majority  areas.  This  separation  is  reflected  in 
institutional arrang(;ments: one Employment Institute based in  Sarajevo deals with the Bosniac-majority 
part of the Federation, one in  Mostar deals with the Croat-majority part, and one in  Republika Srpska 
deals  with  that area.  Each  institute  has  local  employment offices that are  supposed  to  collect  labor 
market information and provide job placement and counseling services.  Many of  these local offices were 
damaged during the war and are barely functioning,  particularly in  the Bosniac part of the Federation. 
Some linkages were established between these institutes during 1996, and they need to be encouraged in 
1997 to  facilitate  increased  labor mobility throughout the territory of Bosnia and  Herzegovina and to 
enhance labor market information systems and employment services. The ETFs will also need continued 
financial and technical assistance to play an  increasingly significant role in  implementing and financing 
effective employment-related activities. 
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
29.  The sustainability of employment creation is a major issue is  in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Many 
of the jobs created to date are temporary public works jobs or jobs related to  reconstruction and will 
come to  an  end  once the  donor-financed  reconstruction  effort is  completed.  To  encourage sustained 
growth in  employment and create permanent job opportunities, in  light of the 1996 experience (box 2), 
the challenge for the future is to ensure an open labor market and the right skills mix in the labor force. 
Labor policy reform to respond to the needs of a market economy 
30.  Government authorities and  the  Employment Institutes  in  both  the Federation and  Republika 
Srpska recognize that labor codes and other labor-related legislation do not meet the needs of a market - 106-
economy.  Current laws and regulations tend to reflect a paternalistic attitude toward worker protection, 
which restricts employment growth and labor mobility.  Areas in particular need of  reform include: 
•  Extremely high payroll taxes.  Wage taxes, including soc;ial  charges, stand at more than 50 
percent of  gross salary.  By comparison, the average for most OECD countries is  18 percent 
and for Eastern and  Central European countries is  30 percent.  Bosnia and  Herzegovina's 
high rates are likely to be a major constraint to the expansion of  employment. 
•  Restrictive  work  practices  and  contracts  that  limit  the  flexibility  of  employment 
relationships.  Employment contracts in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina are a holdover from  the 
former Yugoslavia, where employees typically were guaranteed lifetime employment with 
generous leave time and extensive protection against dismissal.  In a market economy private 
employers  are  likely  to  avoid  legal  labor  contracts,  as  they  have  in  other  transition 
economies, because of their restrictiveness.  Workers in  Bosnia and Herzegovina will find 
this  avoidance  of legal  contracts  acceptable  because  of high  unemployment  rates  and 
currently low wage levels.  With a growing informal labor market, tax avoidance will spread 
and minimum standards of  worker protection will not be upheld.  Hence the need for reform. 
•  Arbitrarily set minimum wages and wage schedules.  By law, wage scales are still officially 
set in both the Federation and Republika Srpska.  However, with private sector growth, these 
wage  levels  are  increasingly  being  ignored,  and  employers  are  setting  wages  based  on 
market conditions.  In  addition,  official  minimum  wages are  set on  a  monthly  basis.  A 
system needs to be put in place to ensure that the minimum wage is set at an affordable level 
and is not subject to such frequent change. 
•  Restrictions on hiring unemployed workers and on the listing of  job vacancies.  In the former 
Yugoslavia the  employment  bureau  was  the  only  source  of job listings  for  unemployed 
workers.  Under current laws that system  is  still in  effect.  In  OECD countries, even those 
with effective government-operated labor exchanges, private employment services and  the 
listing of  job vacancies in newspapers account for a substantial number of  job placements.  If 
employment is to recover quickly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the development of a variety 
of  job placement avenues needs to be supported by legislation. 
•  Restrictions  on  labor-management  relations.  A  single  tripartite  labor  contract  between 
unions, employers, and government has traditionally been part of the regulatory framework. 
But in  a market economy union  officials can  no  longer count on  a  completely unionized 
work  force.  To  the  extent  that  the  tripartite  agreement  contains  provisions  that  are  not 
acceptable  to  small  and  private  employers,  nonunion  employment  is  likely  to  expand. 
Focused discussions among unions, employers, and government will be essential to ensure 
that all interests are taken into consideration during the process of privatization. 
31 .  All these areas are being addressed by several international organizations, including the ILO and 
the World Bank, in the context of the overall macroeconomic discussions and government policymaking 
currently under way. 
Income support measures to ease the transition for the most vulnerable 
32.  The  unemployed  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina face  the  double  hardship  of finding  a job in  a 
postwar environment after four  years of unemployment and  of adapting to a changing job market  in 
which their skills may no longer match market demand.  Their hardship is  intensified by the fact that - 107-
currently virtually no  unemployment benefits are being paid.  Income support measures are needed to 
reduce the hardship faced by the unemployed: unemployment benefits need to be reintroduced, but they 
must be at a financially sustainable level and narrowly targeted.  Particular attention needs to be given to 
temporary  income  support  for  demobilized  soldiers,  displaced  workers,  war  invalids,  and  other 
vulnerable groups. AGRICULTURE 
I.  BACKGROUND 
An essential sector before the war 
1.  Agriculture has always played a central role in  Bosnia and Herzegovina's economy, providing 
full- or part-time employment to some 40  percent of the population.  But because prewar productivity 
was low-- particularly on the 540,000 small private farms that owned 94 percent of  the land-- the sector 
accounted for just 14  percent of Gross Social  Product (GSP)  in  the  late  1980s.  Just before the war, 
between one-third and one-half of  the country's basic food requirements had to be imported, mainly from 
other parts of  the former Yugoslavia.  Moreover, production varies substantially throughout the country: 
livestock (dairy and  meat) predominates in  the hilly and  mountainous central and western parts of the 
Federation, horticulture plays an important role in the Mediterranean climate of  the south, and wheat and 
grains grow along the northern fertile plains of the Sava river -- generating a wheat surplus in Republika 
Srpska while the Federation remains dependent on wheat and flour imports. 
2.  Bosnia and Herzegovina's forests, which cover about half of the country's land  area, provided 
substantial  and  high-quality  wood  materials  to  industry  before  the  war.  Forestry  and  wood-based 
industries accounted for more than  10 percent of GSP and generated some US$200 million in  net export 
income.  Forestry production is equally important in both Entities. 
A sector devastated by war 
3.  The war had  a devastating effect on  agriculture,  forestry,  and  food  production  (box  1).  As  a 
result, by the end of the war nearly 80  percent of the population depended on imported donor food aid, 
valued at US$20 million a month. - 110-
4.  Agriculture  and  food  production  have  rebounded  significantly  since  the  end  of hostilities. 
During 1996 many farmers were able to return to their fields and to resume production at a subsistence 
level.  Village-based  markets  have  reappeared,  indicating  surplus  production.  Still,  significant 
challenges -- making sufficient agricultural assets available to farmers and  revitalizing agriculture and 
forestry  based on  market principles  -- must be  addressed  by the Entity Governments.  Considerable 
support, both financial and advisory, is required from the international donor community. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
5.  The  reconstruction  program  for  agriculture,  food  production,  and  forestry  is  aimed  at 
redeveloping sustainable, private sector-led agriculture and forestry sectors.  Achieving this goal would 
diminish Bosnia and Herzegovina's food dependency, stimulate rural employment, increase farm income, 
eventually generate export revenues, and create favorable conditions for the return of refugees. 
6.  The overall framework designed to meet these objectives, submitted in December 1995 and April 
1996, remains valid.  It will require US$304 million in  external financial support over a three- to four-
year period within the overall US$5.1  billion priority reconstruction program (table 1): 
•  In 1996, US$73 million was firmly committed;  despite a financing gap of 25 percent (the 
first-year  program  was  initially  estimated  at  US$97  million),  a  number  of successful 
activities have been carried out (paragraphs 8 to 16); 
•  In 1997, US$90 million of external financing is required -- 52 percent of which should go 
to the Federation and 48 percent to Republika Srpska (paragraphs 17 to 29); and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, some US$141 million will be needed-- and a multitude of structural and 
policy  issues  should  be  addressed  to  ensure  the  competitiveness  and  sustainability  of 
agriculture and forestry activities (paragraphs 30 to 35). 
Table 1.  Agriculture Program External Financial Needs 
(US$ million) 
3-4 year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
Imported seasonal farm inputs  20  11  5  4 
Livestock and farm equipment  89  46  25  18 
Seed multiplication development  7  4  3  0 
Fruit trees and vineyards rehabilitation  30  0  10  20 
Forestry rehabilitation  40  0  25  15 
Rural financial markets development  20  0  5  15 
Rural industries and services  40  0  0  40 
Farmer support services development  30  9  7  14 
Agricultural policy development/Tech. Asst.  7  0  3  4 
Incremental recurrent costs  21  3  7  11 
Total  304  73  90  141 - 111 -
7.  The priority reconstruction program includes several components: 
•  Ensuring the availability of (mainly imported) critical inputs and equipment, including key 
seasonal inputs, farm equipment and livestock, and seeds; 
•  Rehabilitating critical  sectors with potential for  export,  including high-value orchards and 
vineyards, forestry activities, and wood processing; 
•  Redeveloping support services,  including rural  financial  markets (to  provide  farmers  and 
agroindustries  with  financing  solutions  for  both  working  capital  and  investments),  rural 
industries  and  services,  and  farmer  support  services  (including  minimum  extension  and 
veterinary services); and 
•  Supporting  institutional  development,  including  assistance  to  authorities  in  formulating 
agriculture policies and technical assistance for program preparation and implementation. 
In  parallel, a number of policy issues (trade and price policies, property rights, privatization) should be 
addressed to ensure the sustainability of  the recovery effort. 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
8.  In  1996 donor assistance to agriculture focused on  emergency projects with immediate impacts 
and high rates of return -- preparing a gradual transition from  ad  hoc assistance, typically provided by 
nongovernmental  organizations  (NGOs),  toward  economic  recovery  financed  by  bilateral  and 
multilateral  donors.  Efforts  focused  on  providing  key  inputs  and  equipment  (through  soft  loans  or 
grants) to farmers in order to: 
•  Sharply  increase  domestic  food  production  and  decrease  dependency  on  donor  food  aid 
(box 2); 
•  Facilitate  the  return  of displaced  or  refugee  farmers  to  their  land  and  reintegrate  forest 
workers; 
•  Support subsistence agriculture to meet the minimal needs of  the rural population; 
•  Increase the use of  farm land and return war-damaged farms to production; and 
•  Ensure donor coordination to avoid duplication of  efforts and waste of  scarce resources. 
9.  The combined efforts of bilateral and multilateral donors, NGOs, and the authorities in  Bosnia 
and Herzegovina led to a high degree of success in  implementing the  1996 agriculture program.  Of a 
total  1996  program of US$97  million,  some US$73  million  was firmly  committed  by  thirteen  donor 
countries and agencies (table 2) -- leaving a financing gap of US$24 million (about 25 percent). - 112-
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Imported seasonal farm inputs 
Livestock and farm equipment 
Seed multiplication development 
Fruit trees and vineyards rehabilitation 
Farmer support services development 
Incremental recurrent costs 
Total 
Amount 
10.5 
46.0 
4.0 
0.3 
9.0 
3.0 
72.8 
Main Donors 
EC, Germany, Islamic Development Bank 
!FAD, EC, Japan, Norway, Saudi Arabia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Switzerland, World Bank 
Japan, Norway, Switzerland 
Norway 
Germany, Japan, Sweden 
EC, !FAD, Netherlands, World Bank 
Note: No commitments were made for: forestry rehabilitation, rural financial markets development, rural industries and 
services, and agricultural policy development/technical assistance. 
Import and distribution of  inputs:  Requirements have been met 
10.  Seasonal farm inputs and seed multiplication.  In  1996 the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO),  other  donors  (table  2),  and  NGOs  supplied  some  US$10.5  million  of seeds,  fertilizers,  and 
pesticides.  About 70 percent of this assistance benefited the Federation -- where minimum emergency 
requirements,  as  estimated  by  the  F  AO,  were  adequately  met  for  many  inputs  -- and  30  percent 
Republika Srpska.  The balance of input requirements was procured by farmers on a commercial basis. 
11.  Livestock.  The  International  Fund  for  Agricultural  Development  (IF  AD)  provided  US$6.3 
million to the Federation for the import of 3,900 pregnant heifers and  1,700 goats.  Parallel financing - 113-
(US$1  million) was provided by the Government of Saudi Arabia for the purchase of an additional 700 
heifers.  The IFAD-funded animals were distributed to farmers between September and November 1996 
on  a  credit  basis  (beneficiaries  were  selected  by  municipalities  based  on  an  agreed  list  of criteria 
developed  from  comprehensive surveys).  Various NGOs -- including  the  United  Methodist  Church 
Organization  Relief,  Action  Internationale  Contre  Ia  Faim,  and  Mercy  International  -- have  also 
implemented a  number of livestock programs  in  both  Entities,  including the supply of heifers,  goats, 
chickens, and rabbits. 
12.  Farm  equipment.  Financing was provided  by the  European Commission (US$5.8  million  for 
1,300 small tractors in the Federation) and the World Bank (US$20 million for import to the Federation 
of 2, 700 tractors and tractor implements and  14 combine harvesters).  By the end of 1996 nearly all  of 
this machinery had been imported, and delivery to Federation farmers (on a credit basis) is scheduled for 
completion by March 1997.  NGOs such as Intervenir carried out additional programs aimed at supplying 
agricultural hand tools to farmers. 
Rehabilitation of  fruit trees, vineyards, and forestry: Preparing future financing 
13.  While  financial  assistance  focused  on  the  provision  of critical  inputs,  programs  were  also 
prepared to rehabilitate orchards, vineyards, and forestry as potential vehicles for future donor financing. 
The F  AO identified a US$1 0-15 million project aimed at replacing damaged high-value fruit trees and 
vineyards.  The Government of Norway established a program in Tuzla to revitalize orchards.  The two 
Entity  Governments  (with  FAO  and  World  Bank  support)  drafted  a  US$25-35  million  forestry 
rehabilitation program that would benefit both the Federation and Republika Srpska, for which financial 
support by the European Commission (EC) and the World Bank is expected. 
Redeveloping support services:  A good start 
14.  Rural financial  markets  development and rural  industries  and services.  The  EC  committed 
US$1  million  to  support  the  dairy  industry.  The  agriculture  sector  also  benefited  from  projects 
implemented as  part of the  industry and  industrial  finance  reconstruction  effort.  From  a  credit  line 
funded by the Governments of  the Netherlands and Italy, and the World Bank, loans totaling about US$5 
million were allocated to small and medium-size enterprises in the agroprocessing sector (shown as part 
of  the industrial sector and not reflected in agriculture sector totals).  Credit lines opened under the U.S.-
financed  "Bosnia and Herzegovina Reconstruction Finance Facility" were also partly disbursed  in  the 
agriculture and forestry sectors (these amounts are reported in the "Industry and Finance" section). 
15.  Farmer support services development.  The Government of  Germany provided US$2.6 million to 
repair  and  re-equip  forty  veterinary  stations  in  the  Federation;  deliveries  of drugs  and  diagnostic 
equipment were largely completed.  The EC committed an  additional US$0.3  million for a veterinary 
support program in Banja Luka.  The F  AO identified a US$31  million agricultural services development 
program. 
Support to institutions:  Government counterparts established 
16.  Agricultural policy development,  implementation support,  and recurrent costs financing.  The 
1996  agriculture reconstruction program limited expenditures for technical assistance and  institutional 
development to the minimum required for rapid and successful program implementation.  Although no 
significant  funding  was  made  available  to  support  agricultural  policy  and  strategy  and  strengthen - 114-
institutions, resources were provided by the IFAD, the Government of the Netherlands, and the World 
Bank to establish a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) within the Federation Ministry for Agriculture, 
Water  Works,  and  Forestry.  Four regional  project  implementation  units  were also  set  up  in  Tuzla, 
Zenica, Bihac, and Mostar.  These units have contributed significantly to the rapid  implementation of 
agriculture and forestry project activities. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
17.  Some US$90 million  in  external financing  is  needed to meet 1997's challenges.  A continued 
effort is  required to  reduce Bosnia and Herzegovina's food  dependency and to generate revenues and 
rural  employment (farming will  play a  key  role  as  a  rural  employment buffer  until  other economic 
sectors and major industries recover), and will provide job opportunities for returning refugees. 
18.  Continued donor assistance is  needed for  import of critical  inputs.  However, donor activities 
should shift from emergency operations to sustainable activities (box 3).  Particular attention should be 
paid to preparing for the transition from  subsistence farming to a competitive, market-based, privately 
owned  agriculture  and  food  processing  sector.  Thus  assistance  is  needed  for  activities  aimed  at 
increasing the efficiency of private agriculture -- and  in  particular for  developing key farmer support 
services, building up farmer extension and research, and helping the Governments to address essential 
policy issues. 
Critical imports (US$33 million):  A declining effort, with a focus on Republika Srpska 
19.  Imported seasonal farm inputs (US$5  million).  Donor support should be  gradually phased out 
over the next years as the farm sector recovers, farm purchasing power increases, input markets improve, 
and  business  links  between  the  Entities and  with  neighboring countries are  restored.  In  the  interim - 115 -
period,  ho~ever, the F  AO will  continue to  provide support by assessing farm  input requirements (by 
region and by type of input), preparing appeals to donors, and organizing procurement and distribution of 
inputs, in many cases with the assistance ofNGOs and municipalities. 
20.  Seed multiplication (US$3 million).  As part of this effort, the FAO will prepare additional seed 
multiplication initiatives for donor financing. 
21.  Livestock and farm equipment (US$25  million).  In  1996 most donor activities focused on  the 
Federation; during  1997 significant efforts should be  made to expand assistance to  Republika Srpska. 
Priority lists of livestock and equipment (mainly cattle and small farm tractors) are being developed by 
the Government ofRepublika Srpska, with IFAD and World Bank assistance. 
Fruit trees and vineyards rehabilitation (US$10 million):  Reviving essential export 
sectors 
22.  Some  US$1 0  million  is  initially  required  to  begin  implementing  the  FAG-designed  project 
proposal, prepared in  1996, aimed at rehabilitating high-value fruit trees and vineyards.  Funds will either 
be used for procurement by the Government or onlent through commercial banks to farmers (who would 
select and  procure the most appropriate  plants on  a commercial  basis).
1  Expected benefits from  this 
project include rural  employment generation,  soil  improvement,  substitution of high-quality domestic 
fruits  and  vegetables  for  imports,  and  eventually  exports  of wine  and  fresh  fruits  to  neighboring 
countries. 
The project would aim  to achieve full cost recovery from  beneficiaries, at commercial interest rates, but with 
maturities adjusted to the long payback periods of replacement plants. - 116-
Forestry rehabilitation (US$25 million):  Tripling wood harvesting capacity 
23.  Up  to US$25  million is  required to implement the Forestry Rehabilitation Project, designed  in 
1996  by the Entities Governments with  World  Bank support (box 4).  Several  benefits are expected: 
increasing wood production; reviving the wood processing, furniture making, and construction materials 
industries;  generating  employment  in  rural  areas;  and  possibly  generating  export  revenues  -- since 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was a major exporter of  wood products before the war. 
Rural financial markets development (US$5 million):  On the road to sustainability 
24.  Lack of access to seasonal credit is becoming a major constraint for the recovering private farm 
sector  (box  5).  Given  the  problems  faced  by  banks,  formal  commercial  lending  is  unlikely  to  be 
available to farmers in the years to come.  To address farmers' needs, a US$5 million rural finance pilot 
program, combined with a technical assistance component, should be initiated during 1997.
3  In parallel, 
the establishment of a land bank, which would purchase land from  retiring farmers and rent it to others 
wishing to expand, could be considered.  Such an institution could prove attractive to long-term investors 
(such as pension funds), which typically hold a portion of  their assets in real estate. 
2 
3 
Harvesting and transport equipment for commercial purposes (such as chain saws, skidders, logging tractors, 
and trucks for log transport) will be  ceded to  State Forest Enterprises and private operators against  in  kind 
credit and supply arrangements with five-year terms and at near-commercial interest rates.  Road maintenance 
and forest nursery equipment will be provided to the State and Forest Enterprises on similar loan terms.  Credit 
will be repaid through local credit institutions. 
The rural finance pilot program could be carried out within the framework of the World Bank-supported Local 
Initiatives Project, which  is  being implemented.  Through local NGOs, loans (currently limited to US$7,000 
per  beneficiary)  would  be  extended  to  small  businesses  throughout  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  under  the 
supervision of  a newly established nonprofit Employment and Training Foundation. - 117-
Farmer support services development (US$7 million):  Helping to increase productivity 
25.  Major  productivity  gains  would  result  from  the  modernization  of agricultural  technology  in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which currently lags far behind Slovenia and Croatia.  Adequate farmer support 
services are urgently needed, and it should be possible to ensure their suitability to a market-economy, 
since  there  is  no  structure  inherited  from  the  socialist  period.  In  1997,  US$7  million  is  required, 
including: 
4 
•  Re-equipment of agricultural  and  forestry  research  and  veterinary  institutes  m  Sarajevo, 
Banja Luka, and Mostar; 
•  Institutional support to set up Entity-wide agricultural extension service networks,
4 
including 
required initial equipment, staff training, and technical assistance; and 
•  Establishment  of an  agricultural  market  information  system  and  database  accessible  to 
farmers, agroindustries, researchers, and donors. 
A newly created public agricultural and forestry extension service could constitute the initial advisory network 
for  small  farmers  and private forest  owners  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina -- but attention  should be  paid  to 
ensuring that this system remains demand driven, possibly through the involvement of municipalities.  Donor 
support is  required to finance local diagnostic surveys, training programs for extension officers, mass media 
activities, and on-farm demonstration programs.  In parallel,  private advisory services should be established --
possibly starting with private advisers to farmer associations. - 118 -
The return on investment in  such a program will be high, since many farmers will already have at their 
disposal imported high-quality livestock and modern farm equipment as a result of  the 1996 activities. 
Agricultural policy development and aid coordination (US$3 million):  Filling institutional 
gaps 
26.  Both Entity Ministries of Agriculture, Water Works, and Forestry are still insufficiently staffed 
(the  Republika Srpska ministry was created  during the  war)  and  lack  adequate  budgetary  resources. 
External  assistance  is  required  to  develop  policies  and  strengthen  institutions,  with  an  emphasis  on 
remedying existing  institutional  gaps  in  both  ministries (box 6).  To the extent possible,  inter-Entity 
institutional capabilities should be developed to lower costs, expand geographical coverage, and benefit 
from increased sources of information and experience.
5 
27.  Required activities in policy development for 1997 include: 
5 
•  Preparing an agricultural strategy and investment plan for both Entities; 
•  Assessing the environmental impact of  agriculture, agroindustries, and forestry; 
•  Supporting the development of  budgets and organizational structures for both ministries; and 
The  outbreak  of foot  and  mouth  disease  in  the  Former  Yugoslav  Republic  of Macedonia  in  August  1996 
demonstrated  the  need  to  strengthen  agriculture  communication  channels  and  cooperation  mechanisms 
between the Entities. - 119-
•  Providing corresponding support to canton agricultural administrations in the Federation. 
Incremental recurrent costs (US$7 million):  A gradual handover to the governments 
28.  Continued external financing is  required in  1997 for incremental recurrent expenditures, such as 
project management staff and other operating costs.  However, with the gradual economic recovery in 
both  Entities,  Governments can  be  expected to  cover some of these  costs  with  their own  budgetary 
resources.  Incremental recurrent costs should be  financed  by donors on  a declining basis,  while cost 
recovery  through  user  fees  and  taxes  should  be  gradually  introduced.  By  the  end  of 1997  donor 
financing for the incremental recurrent expenditures of agriculture projects should not exceed 50 percent 
of actual expenditures.  By the end of 1998 donors should aim to reduce this percentage to 25  percent of 
recurrent expenditures. 
Recommended implementation arrangements 
29.  In  1996 donors relied heavily on international agencies-- mainly the FAO, UNHCR, and various 
NGOs --to implement their programs.  The involvement of  these organizations is expected to continue in 
1997.  However, in  light of  the 1996 experience (box 7),  implementation responsibility should be shifted 
gradually toward the Entity Governments through the Project Implementation Units established  in  the 
Federation (and the four regional project units located at the Canton level  in  Bihac, Tuzla, Zenica, and 
Mostar) and being established in  Republika Srpska.  With the improvement of the local financial sector 
and  banking  system,  donor  funding  for  farm  investments  should  increasingly  be  channeled  through 
domestic financial intermediaries that can extend loans to farmers who would then be in  charge of their 
own procurement -- so that Governments can abandon their implementing role and focus on establishing 
an enabling environment for the sector. - 120-
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
30.  To ensure that the efforts undertaken by donors and local authorities are sustainable, a number of 
policy issues should be addressed.  Although complete resolution of these  issues  will  require several 
years of  effort, first steps should be taken as early as possible. 
Budgetary support and cost recovery 
31.  Agricultural  subsidies  of  any  kind  (for  example,  transfer  payments  to  state-owned 
agroprocessing enterprises and state farms, agricultural loans at low interest rates, and free provision of 
public services) should in  principle be avoided.  Once the first few years of reconstruction have ended, 
beneficiaries must be charged the full cost for loans and public utilities.  Substantial investments (such as 
the replacement of fruit trees and  vineyards or restocking of large-scale animal  reproduction centers) 
should not be  implemented without full  cost recovery from  farmers  and enterprises that benefit from 
them.  And remaining price controls (e.g. for timber) should be abolished. 
Privatization of  government-owned assets 
32.  An  important effort should be made to ensure rapid privatization of government-owned assets, 
including: 
•  The assets of  state farms and agrocombinats;
6 
•  Noncore activities in  state forest enterprises -- including wood transport and harvesting and 
activities that have little to do with forest management; and 
•  State-owned enterprises in food processing and agrotrade. 
Both Entity Governments are committed to such a privatization process.  In the Federation substantial 
discussions have already been held between the Government and the Cantons to contemplate options for 
agricultural  development.  While  the  reforms  should  be  conducted  within  the  overall  privatization 
framework, donors could consider providing additional support to both  Entities through an  agriculture 
sector adjustment project. 
7 
Property rights and land market development 
33.  Large population movements took place during the war and will continue to take place in  the 
months  and  years to  come.  Property rights  are  obviously a  complex issue.  The Dayton-Paris  Peace 
Agreement established a Commission for Real  Property Claims of Displaced Persons and  Refugees to 
register  claims,  particularly  those  related  to  farm  assets,  land,  and  other  real  property.  The 
Commission's work will be key since budgetary funds for compensation are not likely to be available, 
and other solutions (possibly exchanges) for addressing rights to  land and farm  assets will  have to  be 
6 
7 
Before the war these organizations dominated the sector - - even though most agricultural land was owned by 
small private farms - - and many of them are still in operation, particularly in  Republika Srpska.  Their land, 
buildings, livestock, equipment, and other holdings should be privatized as soon as possible. 
The cost of this  operation  has not been  included  in  the three- to  four-year reconstruction  program  financing 
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developed between the new residents and farmers.  Meanwhile, temporary user rights  may have to be 
issued to the current occupants of the land if such a law is to be productively used.  Speed in  processing 
contested  land  user  rights  is  essential  to  allow  for  the  development of a  land  market  in  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (a precondition for part-time farmers to give up their land holdings and for consolidating 
the currently fragmented structure of  agricultural land). 
Other issues 
34.  Several other issues should be  addressed to ensure that the reconstruction effort is  sustainable, 
including ensuring the environmental sustainability of  agriculture and forestry redevelopment, promoting 
the  establishment  of farmers  associations  (which  has  proven  to  be  an  effective  way  to  reduce 
procurement costs and disseminate best practices), and developing agricultural markets that respond to 
the needs of  the sector. 
Resolving policy issues:  A precondition for a sustainable development 
35.  Addressing policy issues -- cost recovery, privatization of governments' assets, property rights 
and landmarket development-- is critical for the future development of  agriculture and forestry in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  Donors should strongly urge the Entity Governments to make rapid progress on  this 
matter.  Decisive governments' action in resolving these issues should significantly influence the amount 
and timing of donor assistance to the sector. EDUCATION 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Functioning system before the war 
I.  Prior to  the  start of hostilities,  Bosnia-Herzegovina  had  a  well-developed  education  system, 
financed by public expenditures accounting for about 6 percent of GOP.  Despite the disruptions caused 
by  the dissolution of the former Federal  Republic of Yugoslavia,  virtually all  children completed the 
eight-year primary cycle; most also completed a four-year secondary cycle.  As elsewhere in the region, 
the preponderance of secondary education was offered  in  the form  of narrowly specialized vocational 
education  programs,  oriented  to  the  needs  of industry.  Higher  education  was  offered  through  four 
universities  comprising  forty-six  institutes  and  faculties.  Higher  education  enrollments  emphasized 
science and engineering. 
Damaged infrastructure and a reduced teaching force 
2.  All aspects of education were severely disrupted by the war.  Many teachers were drafted into 
military  service,  killed,  displaced,  or took  refuge  in  other  countries.  Approximately  70  percent  of 
schools  were  damaged,  destroyed,  or  requisitioned  for  military  uses.  Many  schools  were  rendered 
useless by losses of windows, furniture, and educational materials.  Budgetary resources to pay teachers 
and provide textbooks and other educational materials dried up completely in many parts of  the country. 
3.  The situation differed substantially among regions, however.  The Bosniac-majority part of the 
Federation suffered the  most damage, both  to  its  facilities  and  its  teaching force;  budgetary resources 
were critically lacking, and salaries were not regularly paid.  The situation in  the Croat-majority part of 
the Federation is  somewhat better: damage was more limited, and operational expenditures were more 
adequately covered through assistance provided by Croatia.  In  Republika Srpska the education system 
was  seriously  affected  by  the  international  embargo  and  hyperinflation,  which  drastically  reduced 
budgetary  resources  and  availability of materials  despite  substantial  support  provided  by  the  Federal 
Republic  of Yugoslavia;  physical  damage  to  schools  was  significant  but  less  extensive  than  in  the 
Federation. 
4.  Despite  these  difficulties,  the  extraordinary  efforts  of parents,  local  governments,  and  aid 
agencies  ensured  that  most children  continued  their  education  throughout the  war,  though  in  a  very 
disrupted form.  Because the school year was abbreviated and educational inputs -- teachers, classrooms, 
and educational materials -- were lacking or improvised, the quality of education was far below prewar 
standards.  Where there was heavy fighting,  instruction  was  halted  for  almost a year.  Where classes 
managed  to  continue,  the  school  year  was  shortened  to  less  than  half  its  normal  duration.  To 
accommodate students displaced from  destroyed schools and the  influx of displaced  persons  in  some 
areas, most schools now function in two or three shifts of 3 1/2 hours each.  With the collapse of public 
transport,  children  in  rural  areas  and  even  in  city  suburbs  have  difficulties  reaching  school.  Many 
teachers are wartime volunteers and lack pedagogical training.  Although the issue is now under study in 
the Federation by the Ministry of Education, no clear policy has been established on whether returning - 124-
teachers will be able to recover their former teaching positions, or if  the volunteer teachers will be given 
the opportunity to keep their jobs if  they obtain the pedagogical training required of  a normal teacher. 
5.  Since the  signature of the  Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement,  much  progress has  been  made and 
classes have resumed in  most parts of the country on a reasonably regular basis.  Still, serious problems 
remain.  Education facilities need substantial repairs.  Educational materials, reading materials, and basic 
furniture  are  scarce.  Even  in  schools  that  have  been  "repaired"  by  the  bilateral  donors  and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), electricity, heating, and/or water are often lacking-- making the 
facility unfunctional for parts of  the year.  Education programs at all levels need to be revamped, and the 
teaching force of war-time volunteers needs to be professionalized.  Finally, salaries have to be restored 
to levels that attract a qualified teaching force. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
,  The priority reconstruction program 
6.  To address the needs  in  the education sector, a priority education reconstruction program was 
developed jointly by the Government and various donors, and presented to donors at meetings hosted by 
the European  Commission (EC) and the World Bank in  December 1995  and  April  1996.  Indicative 
estimates  were  included  for  reconstruction  needs  in  Republika  Srpska,  for  which  little  concrete . 
information  was  then  available.  Setting reconstruction  priorities  inevitably  involves difficult choices 
among  the  many  urgent  and  legitimate  needs  throughout  the  education  system.  Because  available 
resources are so  limited, these choices involve tradeoffs between the highest priority needs and needs 
that can appropriately be deferred to a later stage in the reconstruction process. 
7.  The priority program was designed to address ~  the most urgent requirements for restoring 
minimal operations in the sector in a coherent fashion, starting with those investments that could have an 
immediate impact and benefit the largest possible number of  schoolchildren.  The program focuses on: 
•  Ensuring that all classrooms are at least minimally supplied with textbooks and educational 
materials for students and teachers; 
•  Reconstructing  lightly  damaged  primary  and  general  secondary  schools  to  make  them 
functional quickly; 
•  Upgrading teaching skills; 
•  Providing remedial  education for young people whose education suffered during the war; 
and 
•  Strengthening capacities for education administration at all levels. 
The priority program does not include essential and well justified reconstruction activities that would be 
more appropriately addressed at the next stage of  the reconstruction effort-- either because they will take 
longer to implement, or because they require policy decisions not yet made.  On that limited basis, total - 125-
foreign  financing  needs  for  priority  education  investments  in  the  first  three  to  four  years  of the 
reconstruction program are then estimated at about US$180 million.
1 
8.  Updated damage estimates and better data on the situation  in  Republika Srpska have  increased 
somewhat the overall foreign financing requirements for education reconstruction.  The current estimate is 
that the  priority education  reconstruction  program  will  require  US$273  million  in  external  investment 
support for the three- to four-year period within the overall US$5 .1  billion priority reconstruction program 
(table 1). 
•  In 1996, US$104 million was firmly committed, 44 percent more than the initial first-year 
estimate (US$72 million); about 45  percent of this amount was disbursed (paragraphs 9 to 
15); 
•  In 1997, US$70 million is required, of  which about US$25 million is for Republika Srpska 
(paragraphs 16 to 27); and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, a  further US$99 million is required, along with a concerted effort to 
address sector reform and sustainability issues (paragraphs 28 to 33). 
Table 1.  Education Program External Financial Needs 
(US$ million) 
3-4 year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
School reconstruction  221  87 a  58  76 
Educational materials  25  6  6  13 
Student recovery  II  2  8 
Teacher training  7  4  2 
Institution building  9  6  2  I 
Total  273  I04  70  99 
a Includes commitments reported by donors as part of their "municipal infrastructure projects" and the reconstruction of 
universities and related recurrent costs. 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
Donor inputs 
9.  Tracking and tabulating overall  achievements in  the education sector in  1996  is  difficult for 
several reasons.  Information on donor activities in Republika Srpska is still very sketchy.  The education 
sector received assistance from the humanitarian and reconstruction assistance programs of  many donors, 
In  addition,  requirements  for  initial  budget support for  very  modest teachers'  salaries and  school  operating 
requirements for communities that lack resources for these needs are  estimated at US$50 million during the 
three- to  four-year  reconstruction  period.  Not  all  of the  I, I  00  schools  and  30,000  teachers  in  the  system 
require support; some communities have the resources to provide at least minimal support for these needs.  But 
many  communities do  not  yet  have  such  resources.  For these  communities,  temporary  budget support  is 
crucial  to  help  fill  the  gap  until  local  revenues  begin  to  recover.  Because  the  donor  community  has 
demonstrated no willingness in  I996 to provide significant funds  for recurrent budget support, this category 
receives no  further  consideration here.  However,  continued operation of the  education system  will  require 
budget support for recurrent expenditures for teachers and schools in communities without financial resources 
(see the section on "Fiscal and Social Support"). - 126-
and  the  distinction  is  not  always  clear  in  the  information  provided,  especially  when  humanitarian 
assistance  involves  compensation  for  teachers.  Implementation  often  took  place  in  a  decentralized 
manner  directly  with  individual  schools  or  municipalities.  This  is  particularly  true  of resources 
channeled through NGOs.  In such cases the authorities in  Bosnia and Herzegovina at the Entity or (in 
the Federation) canton  level  were often  not  informed of donor activities.  Such  separately concluded 
financing  arrangements,  while  producing  quick  results  on  the  ground,  may  have  generated 
inconsistencies among reconstruction activities.  They also cannot ensure that donor financing is directed 
to the most urgent needs as defined in the priority reconstruction program. 
I 0.  These caveats notwithstanding, table 2 summarizes available information on  firm  commitments 
to the sector for 1996.  The bulk of donor assistance was allocated to school rehabilitation, benefiting 31 
pre-primary  schools,  307  primary  schools,  36  secondary  schools,  and  2  tertiary  institutions  in  both 
Entities.  A total of US$1 04 million was firmly committed to education activities in  1996.  This amount 
is  shown  in  table  I  as  committed  entirely  for  the  priority  program.  But  to  the  extent  that  these 
commitments  were  for  less  urgent  activities  that  may  be  more  appropriate  for  a  later  stage  of the 
reconstruction program, the 1996 commitments for priority investments would be  less than the amounts 
sh\ wn in column two of  table I, and the unmet needs were greater than shown in columns three and four. 
II.  1  To  obtain  badly  needed  improvement  in  donor  coordination  in  the  education  sector,  the 
Education  Sector  Task  Force  in  Sarajevo  is  intensifying  its  work.  Led  by  the  United  Nations 
Educational,  Scientific  and  Cultural  Organization,  the  Task  Force  comprises  representatives  of the 
Ministries of Education in  both Entities-- thus far,  the Ministry of Education  in  Republika Srpska has 
not  yet  participated  -- the  European  Commission  (EC),  the  United  Nations  High  Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the United Nations Children's 
Fund (UNICEF), the World Bank, and bilateral donors and key NGOs represented in  Sarajevo.  Toward 
the end of 1996 the Task Force started to develop a more accurate consolidated picture of pledges, firm 
commitments, contract values under implementation, and disbursements in the several components of  the 
program, based on  a database of individual contracts at the school  level.  This effort will continue  in 
1997. 
School reconstruction 
Educational materials 
Student recovery 
Teacher training 
Institution building 
Total 
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Amount 
6 
I 
4 
6 
104 
Main Donors 
Albania, Austria, EC, Finland, Greece, ISDB, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Saudi Arabia, Slovenia, Switzerland, UNDP, US, World Bank 
EC, Malaysia, Norway, UNICEF, World Bank 
Austria, Malaysia, UNICEF 
EC, Indonesia, Luxembourg, Norway, Slovenia, Switzerland, UNICEF 
US, World Bank, various European countries 
a Includes commitments reported by donors as part of  their "municipal infrastructure projects" and the reconstruction of 
universities and related recurrent costs. 
The Emergency Education Reconstruction Program 
12.  The program's content.  The largest and most fully documented set of financed  reconstruction 
activities  in  the  priority  program  are  those  included  in  the  Emergency  Education  Reconstruction - 127-
Program, which is being implemented by the Federation Ministry of Education and being prepared by the 
Republika Srpska Ministry of Education.  The program comprises:  a) the refurbishment of ninety-one 
large  primary schools throughout the Federation and  the construction of five  new  primary schools  in 
areas with no alternative school capacity, b) the provision of selected books and educational materials to 
schools in  the Federation, c) strengthening of education implementation capacity at the Federation and 
canton levels, and d) preparation of similar reconstruction activities for education programs in Republika 
Srpska. 
13.  The program was designed to meet only the most urgent needs for education reconstruction. 
Two objectives that guided the design of  the program were, first, to improve the educational situation of 
as  many  schoolchildren  as  possible  with  the  very  limited  resources  available  and,  second,  to  do  so 
quickly -- preferably by the start of  the 1996-97 school year.  Those principles led to the program's focus 
on  primary education.  They  also  led  to  the  compressed  implementation  period  for  the  program  --
eighteen  months  in  duration,  with  most  work  done  in  the  first  six  months.  Within  the  Federation 
program activities are apportioned roughly according to population -- with about two-thirds of project 
expenditures occurring in Bosniac-majority cantons and one-third in Croat-majority cantons. 
14.  The total cost of the program is estimated at US$32.8 million, of which $10 million is  provided 
by the World Bank-- half in the form of a grant (approved in  May 1996) and half as a credit (approved 
in  June  1996).  Even  before this  financing was approved,  project implementation was  initiated  in  the 
spring of 1996 with support from the Government of  the Netherlands. 
15.  Good implementation progress.  There  was  considerable  progress  in  implementation  of the 
Emergency Education Reconstruction Program in  the Federation.  Preparation of program activities for 
Republika Srpska is under way; implementation is expected to start soon. 
•  School reconstruction and rehabilitation.  Damage assessments were completed for all  the 
schools  that are  to  be  refurbished  under  the  program.  Of the  US$10  million  financing 
initially provided by the World Bank, more than 90 percent was committed; more than US$5 
million was disbursed.  Contracts were signed and  rehabilitation  is  under way for twenty-
eight primary schools -- twelve  in  Croat-majority cantons and sixteen  in  Bosniac-majority 
cantons.  Other  donor  financing  is  supporting  the  rehabilitation  of twenty-two  schools 
located  in  Bosniac-majority cantons.  Another twenty schools are  ready for  tendering for 
rehabilitation;  only the  necessary donor financing  is  lacking.  Architectural  designs  were 
completed  for  the  remaining  sixteen  schools  to  be  constructed  or  refurbished  under  the 
program.  Work cannot proceed until additional donor financing is provided, however.  With 
financing from the UNDP, preparation of designs for the five new schools to be constructed 
under the  program -- all  in  Bosniac-majority cantons -- is  under way.  Two of these new 
schools are  being financed  by NGOs.  Financing for the three other new schools  is  being 
sought; 
•  Educational materials.  Contracts were signed for US$1.5  million of educational materials 
and twenty textbook titles to  be  provided under the first  donor commitments.  Additional 
titles  are  being  procured  with  financing  provided  by  the  Soros  Foundation  and  the 
Government of Germany.  An  additional  twenty-four  textbook  and  supplementary reader 
titles are ready for tendering; again, only the necessary financing is  lacking.  This material 
will go to schools in Bosniac-majority areas since education officials in  the Croat-majority 
areas of the Federation and Republika Srpska prefer to get these supplies from  Croatia and 
the Federal Republic of  Yugoslavia, respectively; and - 128-
•  Institutional development.  On the institutional development front, a Program Coordination 
Unit (PCU)  was  established  in  the  Federation  Ministry  of Education  and  is  overseeing 
implementation of all  aspects of the Emergency Education Reconstruction Program.  This 
coordination  is  working  well  for  activities  being  implemented  by  the  Ministry,  but 
coordination with  reconstruction activities implemented by other levels of government has 
been hampered by the PCU's lack of information and jurisdiction over these activities.  This 
process  is  now working better,  based  upon  shared  information between the PCU  and  the 
implementing agencies.  But full  articulation  between  the Ministry-implemented  program 
and other reconstruction activities will continue to require special attention.  More generally, 
there is a serious need for better coordination among education authorities at various levels 
of government.  Clarifying the roles of these bodies (paragraphs 28 to 30) should improve 
coordination. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
16.  The key challenge for implementation of the priority program for education reconstruction is to 
mobilize additional resources to fill  the large financing gap required to carry out the priority education 
reconstruction program, to be implemented in  light of the 1996 experience (box 1  ).  An immediate need 
is  to  secure  financing  for  the  large  unfinanced  portion  of the  Emergency  Education  Reconstruction 
Program, and to extend its coverage in Republika Srpska. - 129-
17.  Beyond these priority efforts to jump-start the primary school system, however, there are very 
extensive financing needs for all of the activities listed in table 1, for which donor financing is  urgently 
needed.  These needs are described in the following paragraphs. 
School reconstruction (US$58 million) 
18.  The  Emergency  Education  Reconstruction  Program,  when  fully  funded,  will  rehabilitate  or 
reconstruct one-eighth of the primary schools  in  the Federation, including most of the largest primary 
schools.  The program deliberately focuses on lightly damaged schools, however, because these schools 
could most quickly be made fully functional.  The many (often smaller) primary schools that suffered 
more  extensive  damage are  not  included;  nor  are  damaged  primary  schools  in  Republika  Srpska or 
damaged educational institutions above the primary level  in either Entity. There is as yet no  systematic 
plan  to  repair  and  reconstruct  these  educational  facilities,  although  a  few  establishments  have 
undoubtedly received ad hoc support from donors. 
19.  Beyond the schools covered under the Emergency Education Reconstruction Program, the main 
priorities are to  repair and reconstruct:  a) more heavily damaged primary schools,  b)  lightly damaged 
general secondary schools, and c) carefully selected higher education and vocational training facilities 
throughout the country.  The Federation Ministry of  Education has developed a list of schools in the first 
two categories, to serve as the basis for donor financing commitments.  Similar lists will be prepared in 
Republika Srpska.  For reconstruction of  facilities at the post-primary level, it will be important to avoid 
expensive  reconstruction  and  re-equipping  of curricular streams  whose  relevance  in  the  new  market 
economy is questionable.  Although reconstruction efforts to date have focused on the Federation, school 
reconstruction in  the future will  need to redress the balance by paying special attention to the needs in 
Republika Srpska. 
Educational materials (US$6 million) 
20.  The Emergency Education Reconstruction Program  is  starting to  provide textbooks to  primary 
schools in the Federation.· But there is an urgent need for donor assistance to enlarge this effort to cover 
carefully selected other textbooks  and  additional  materials  such  as  supplementary readers  in  primary 
schools, and to extend the provision oftextbooks (particularly in  science, math, and foreign  languages), 
readers,  and  educational equipment to  other levels of education.  There  is  also a need to  improve the 
pedagogic content of textbooks, and especially to  reduce the number of required titles.  In all  of this, 
donor efforts should give priority to  curricular material of common acceptability to  all  groups  in  the 
country,  which  may require  devoting  a  larger  portion  qf the  overall  effort to  supplementary reading 
materials. 
Student recovery (US$2 million) 
21.  Most students missed significant amounts of schooling during the war.  Those that have been 
displaced from  their homes have been even more seriously affected.  Many children from  rural  areas, 
especially girls, worked for their families and did not regularly attend school.  Many displaced children 
as well as others affected by the war have fallen behind in basic skills such as reading and math. As the 
economy recovers around them, this cohort will tend to bear an educational handicap throughout their 
lives.  As these young people enter the labor force, their educational deprivation will make them less able 
to contribute to-- and to benefit from-- postwar recovery.  Remedial education programs are needed to 
help these students catch up to their peers.  For students who will already have left the school system, - 130-
nonformal programs are needed to provide an opportunity to catch up in missed skills that are relevant to 
labor market demand. 
22.  Psychologically traumatized and mentally retarded children also have vast needs.  In  the past 
children  with  handicaps  were  usually  segregated  from  other children.  The  Government  intends  to 
provide better and more cost-effective care for these children by educating them, to the extent possible, 
in  regular schools.  Early diagnosis and treatment is essential to the success of this strategy.  A proposal 
for  a  program  to  provide  such  care  has  been  developed  by the  Government with  the  support of an 
international foundation.  Implementation of  this and other aspects of  the student recovery program await 
donor financing. 
Teacher training (US$2 million) 
23.  Bosnia and Herzegovina lost most of its qualified teachers during the war, and much of its pre-
service and in-service teacher training capacity.  Teacher training needs to be revived and modernized, 
both to upgrade the skills of unqualified teachers and to introduce a more modern pedagogy throughout 
the education system.  A well-coordinated  initiative  is  currently under way with the participation and 
funding of UNICEF, the U.S.  Agency for International Development (USAID), the Soros Foundation, 
the United States Information Agency, and the World Bank to help the Federation Ministry of Education 
modernize teacher training programs.  The Ministry of Education, in cooperation with the University of 
Pittsburgh,  is  working closely with educators from  each of the ten  Federation cantons to develop new 
teacher  education  programs  and  to  prepare  a  plan  for  renewing  the  teacher training  infrastructure. 
Findings and recommendations of this work,  in  the areas of programs, teaching methodology, finance, 
legislation,  structure,  and  management of teacher training,  will  be  presented  in  May  1997.  Donor 
financing will be needed to implement these recommendations. 
Institution building (US$2 million) 
24.  There  are  major  needs  to  strengthen  capacity  at  the  local  level  for  routine  education 
administration,  and  at  the  central  level  to  set  educational  standards,  provide  quality  control  and 
pedagogical  support,  and  carry  out  other  professional  leadership  functions  that  are  appropriate  in  a 
decentralized education system.  This will require not only clarifying the roles of education authorities at 
various  levels  of the  system  (paragraphs  28  to  30),  but  also  vastly  improving  communication  and 
coordination  among them.  Training  and  equipment  are  needed  to  make  this  happen,  as  well  as  to 
introduce the program changes that are necessary to ensure sustainability (paragraphs 31  to 33). 
25.  In  summary,  in  1997,  there  is  urgent  need  beyond  the  Emergency Education  Reconstruction 
Program to work with the Federation and Republika Srpska Governments to develop a much broader yet 
coherent and carefully targeted program for continued rehabilitation and development of the education 
sector.  This  effort  would  extend  the  support  provided  thus  far  for  rehabilitating,  reconstructing, 
refurnishing and re-equipping primary schools, covering more heavily damaged schools which require 
more  extensive  repairs  than  were  possible  under  the  accelerated  implementation  schedule  of the 
emergency program.  If still  necessary,  it  might also  support demining  of schoolyards  and  adjacent 
terrain. 
26.  This broader education recovery effort should also support repairs to educational facilities and 
support for educational programs at other levels -- including preschool, secondary and higher education. 
As  in  primary education,  selectivity will  be  necessary  in  order to  focus  donor efforts on  the highest - 131  -
priority areas for reconstruction.  The first criterion for selecting education recovery actions should be to 
provide support for children or young people whose education suffered directly as a result of the war, 
through remedial education programs and programs for traumatized children (paragraphs 21  and  22). 
Another selection  criterion should  be  the extent to  which  proposed actions  address  sustainability and 
reform needs, as summarized in the following section.  For example, textbook investments for secondary 
level should be considered for support to the extent that they permit the delivery of improved curricula, 
designed to address excessive subject matter specialization and fragmentation, especially in  vocational 
and  technical  schools.  Higher  education  investments  should  be  considered  to  the  extent  that  they 
promote the objectives of  efficiency and system integration. 
27.  To  achieve  this  broader coverage the  program  will  require  significant donor  financing.  An 
urgent priority is to develop the program into prioritized, modular elements from which donors can select 
for financing.  Moving into implementation of this expanded education recovery program as quickly as 
possible, and in  a manner which addresses the most urgent needs first, will require intensive work with 
the Government to  identify priorities:  for reconstruction of specific facilities,  for  provision of specific 
book  titles  and  educational  materials,  for  development  of specific  remedial  programs,  etc.  Once 
priorities are established, work will need to be launched immediately to prepare designs for schools to be 
reconstructed, to prepare manuscripts for printing, and to develop new programs.  Donor assistance will 
continue to be crucial for supporting these preparatory activities for education recovery, as it has been in 
the past. 
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
Roles of  education authorities need to be clarified 
28.  The most important structural issue that needs to be resolved in the education sector involves the 
role of different levels of government in  financing and delivering education at various levels.  With the 
dissolution of the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina needs to establish.an  effective education 
system  from  the  structures  and  programs  that  it  inherited  from  the  former  Federal  Republic  of 
Yugoslavia.  Education administration in the former Yugoslavia was quite decentralized, but the war has 
seriously affected the resources and capacity of government at all  levels to plan and provide education. 
Resolution of  this issue is particularly crucial to the resumption of  teacher salaries. 
29.  According to the 1994 Federation Constitution, cantons are responsible for delivering 
education, but cantons may delegate this responsibility upward to the Federation or downward to 
communities.  In the short term this policy is impractical because most cantons lack the capacity 
to manage education delivery, and all cantons lack the budgetary resources to do so.  More 
fundamentally, the small size of  some cantons is inconsistent with efficient management of some 
education functions.  In higher education, for example, cantonal universities would be too small 
to capture economies of  scale and allow for program diversity.  Efficient administration may also 
call for particular functions such as curriculum development, educational materials development, 
and quality control being carried out at the Federation or State levels.  Given the sizable 
differences in income among cantons, there is also likely to be a need for some intercantonal 
transfers to provide for education of  at least minimally acceptable quality in the poorest cantons. - 132-
30.  Although  the  unitary  structure  of  government  in  Republika  Srpska  presents  fewer 
decentralization  issues,  there  are  nonetheless  similar  issues  to  be  resolved  involving  the  roles  and 
responsibilities of local education authorities relative to central authorities. 
Teacher qualifications need to be improved 
31.  A  related  policy  question  that  is  crucial  to  the  sustainability of the  education  reconstruction 
program  is  how  to  retain  qualified  teachers  in  the  system,  how  to  upgrade  the  skills  of unqualified 
teachers,  and  how  to  convince teachers who  have  left to  return  to the  profession.  The  Federation's 
Ministry of Education has collected data on teachers and their qualifications in primary education, and is 
studying  secondary education  teacher  needs.  The  Ministry  estimates that  about  8,000  teachers  lack 
formal  qualifications.  In  addition, the Federation Ministry of Education  has  maintained  contact with 
many  of the  former  teachers  who  are  now  engaged  in  "temporary"  other  work  in  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina, are performing military service, or are  refugees  in  other countries -- many of whom  are 
currently working as  teachers.  The Ministry estimates that as  many as  4,000 teachers are abroad and 
could potentially re-turn to Bosnia and Herzegovina to teach.  Essential to managing and supporting this 
process of  rebuilding a strong, qualified teaching force will be specific decisions on: 
•  Resumption and level of  teacher compensation; 
•  Incentives to attract qualified teachers to return to teaching; and 
•  The process for raising the qualifications of  unqualified teachers. 
The content of  education programs needs to change 
32.  There are  needs  for  content change at all  levels of the education system  to  promote postwar 
reconciliation among the parties to the former conflict.  At the secondary level -- especially in vocational 
and  technical  programs  -- a  significant  reform  of structure  and  content  is  also  needed  to  reorient 
education to the requirements of a modern market economy and post-communist society.  At the same 
time, secondary vocational education could play a major role  in  providing qualifications to those who 
dropped  out of school  or were otherwise deprived of access to secondary education  during the  war. 
Rather  than  rebuilding  all  the  secondary  vocational  and  technical  schools  that  were  destroyed  or 
damaged during the war, reconstruction should take the form of developing practical, "second chance" or 
remedial  education  programs  for  students and  young  adults.  These  programs  should  stress  adequate 
preparation  in  general  subjects  while  starting  the  process  of developing  vocational  and  technical 
education programs that embody a more modern curriculum than was in use before the war.  This effort 
should start by reinforcing general academic studies in secondary education and orienting more students 
to  general education.  The science and  math content of vocational education should be  strengthened. 
Vocational  education  should  be  developed  for  broad  occupational  families,  rather  than  for  narrow 
occupations.  More  generally,  pedagogy  should  be  modernized  to  emphasize  to  the  synthesis  and 
application of facts rather than the simple mastery of facts.  And there should be more emphasis on self-
directed  learning  and  teamwork  learning  rather  than  passive  absorption  of material  provided  by  the 
teachers  or  textbooks.  Application  of these  changes  has  far-reaching  implications  for  new  teacher 
training programs and new educational materials, including school  libraries.  Over time there is  also a 
need to modify the content of  social studies and other courses to explain recent political developments in 
the region in a way that encourages reconciliation among the parties of  the former conflict, and the return 
to a common language. - 133-
A need for change in higher education administration and finance 
33.  To  offer higher  education  programs  of high  quality  and  diversity,  a  number of changes  are 
needed in the administration and financing of higher education.  Because it  is  not possible to  maintain 
high-quality programs  jn  multiple, small, free-standing universities, there is  a need to  move toward an 
integrated higher education system with critical mass in  particular fields and open access to specialized 
programs  in  different  parts  of the  country.  Doing  so  will  require  harmonization  of program  and 
admission  requirements,  reciprocity  agreements  across  faculties,  and  consolidation  of some  small 
programs and facilities to a more economical scale.  To contain the budgetary cost of higher education, 
student fees  should be  introduced and needs-based and merit-based fellowships developed.  Finally, to 
ensure the market relevance of program  offerings  in  higher education,  budgetary resources  should be 
allocated  to  programs  based  on  student  demand  and  efficiency  of past  use  of budget  resources. HEALTH 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Systemic problems before the war 
1.  Despite  significant  improvements  during  the  1970s  and  1980s,  prewar  health  indicators  in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina reflected a mixed picture: for some indicators the country was one of the most 
advanced in  Central Europe, while for others it lagged behind.  A supply-dominated, centrally planned 
had  resulted  in  the  proliferation  of large  hospitals  and  a  heavy  reliance  on  specialized  polyclinics. 
Relatively little attention was paid to primary health care or family practice.  The use of resources was 
far from optimal, with health expenditures totaling around 6.5 percent ofGDP (about US$150 per capita 
per year in  1991 ), a relatively high amount in Central Europe.
1 
The war has taken a heavy toll 
2.  The  health  status of the population deteriorated severely during the war (box  1  ).  Damage to 
health infrastructure has been unevenly distributed throughout the country, however, and reconstruction 
efforts must take these differences into account.  For example, failure to maintain medical equipment, 
though  significant in  both  Entities,  seems to have been  more severe in  Republika Srpska than  in  the 
Federation  (which  received  significant  international  assistance),  whereas  direct  war-related  physical 
damages are heavier and more widespread in the Federation. 
3.  After the unified health and health financing system collapsed at the beginning of the war, three 
systems emerged:  two  in  the  Federation  and  one  in  Republika Srpska.  At the end of hostilities the 
Dayton-Paris  Peace  Agreement  assigned  the  responsibility  for  the  health  sector to  the  Entity  level. 
Regional differences remain: Republika Srpska has a  unified, though weak, system with no  significant 
Source:  World  Bank  estimate.  Authorities  in  Bosnia and  Herzegovina use  a prewar health  expenditure per 
capita figure of US$245.  Regardless of the exact figure,  Bosnia and  Herzegovina's health expenditures were 
high. - 136-
difficulty between the Government and the municipalities;  in  the Federation tension  between the two 
constituent peoples and an unclear delineation of authority and responsibilities between the Government 
and the Cantons have resulted in persistent difficulties, still not resolved. 
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
4.  The rehabilitation strategy for the health sector is based on three principles: 
•  The sector must continue functioning on an emergency basis while it recovers and prepares 
for the transition to a modern and efficient system; 
•  Scarce resources should be optimally used to ensure the sustainability of health services; and 
•  A  balance must be  struck  between  modern  primary health  care services and  high-quality, 
streamlined hospital services; the unwieldy prewar system should not be rebuilt. 
5.  The  overall  reconstruction  program  presented  to  donors  in  December  1995  and  April  1996 
remains valid.  It will require US$413 million (down from the original estimate of US$540 million) 
2  in 
external  financial  support for the  three- to four-year  reconstruction  period  within  the overall  US$5.1 
billion priority reconstruction program (table I): 
2 
•  In 1996, US$111 million was firmly committed; despite a financing gap of nearly 23  percent 
(the first-year program was initially estimated at US$145 million), a number of activities were 
carried out successfully (paragraphs 7 to 17); 
•  In  1997,  US$90  million  in  external  financing  is  required,  including  US$70  million  in 
investments,  65  percent  of  it  for  the  Federation  and  35  percent  for  Republika  Srpska 
(paragraphs 18 to 26); 
•  In  1998  and  1999,  some  US$212  million  will  be  needed,  and  policy  issues  should  be 
addressed to ensure the program's sustainability over the medium term (paragraphs 27 to 30). 
The estimate was revised downward for two reasons.  First, massive support for health personnel salaries was 
initially  foreseen;  given  the  current  salary  structure  within  the  country  (and  the  reluctance  of the  donor 
community to finance such costs), this amount has been substantially reduced.  Second, the  1996 experience 
shows that cost estimates for program management can be cut substantially, since management costs are often 
funded  as  part of each  project,  and  the  use  of local  capacity  reduces  the  need  for  external  management 
assistance. - 137-
Table 1.  Health Program External Financial Needs 
(US$ million) 
3-4 year  1996 Firm  1997 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/ 
Allocation 
1998-99 
Requirements/ 
Allocation 
Public health interventions  16  9  4  3 
157 
I 
49 
Reconstruction and rehabilitation  277  66  54 
Rehabilitation of War Victims  30  26  3 
Budget support for recurrent expenditures  76  5  22 
Sector reforms  8  3  4 
Program management  6  2  3 
Total  413  Ill  90  212 
6.  The  program  has  been  defined  by the  Entity  Governments with  the assistance of the  World 
Health Organization (WHO) and the World Bank (box 2).  The immediate objectives of the program are 
to: 
•  Prevent and  control  epidemics and  communicable diseases through  priority public  health 
interventions; 
•  Reconstruct  and  rehabilitate  pnonty  health  infrastructure,  including  civil  works  and 
equipment to restore key outpatient and hospital facilities; 
•  Rehabilitate war victims by addressing both physical disability and psychological trauma; 
•  Define a human resources development strategy; 
•  Support recurrent expenditures,  including salaries for  health  sector staff and purchases of 
essential  generic drugs and  supplies; this  support would  be phased  out over a  three-year 
period as the Entity Governments take over financing responsibility; and 
•  Support the first stages of sector reform, to render the sector more cost-effective and fiscally 
sustainable. - 138-
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
7.  Efforts  in  1996  focused  on  preventing further  deterioration  of the overall  he.alth  situation  by 
providing emergency  assistance to the health  sector (mainly through  the  direct provision of essential 
goods  and  services).  Additional  assistance  was  provided  to  initiate  the  physical  and  functional 
rehabilitation of the health care delivery system  in  the context of both  Entities'  sectoral development 
strategies. 
8.  A  number  of activities  were  carried  out  through  the  combined  efforts  of the  two  Entity 
Governments and the international community.  Some US$111  million in  external financing was firmly 
committed  out  of an  estimated  US$145  million  for  the  first-year  program  (table  2).
5  The  main 
achievements are described below, although the decentralized nature of the sector and the large number 
of  actors make it difficult to draw a comprehensive picture. 
3 
4 
5 
Federation  Health  Program.  Health  Reform and Reconstruction Program of  the Federation of  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina.  Federation Ministry of Health.  January 1996. 
Strategy of  Health Development for Republika Srpska by the Year 2000. Republika Srpska Ministry of Health. 
1996. 
Several bilateral donors also provided support through humanitarian programs and budget lines that may not 
have been reported to the donor database. - 139-
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Public health interventions 
Reconstruction and rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation of  war victims 
Budget support for recurrent 
expenditures 
Program management 
Sector reforms 
Total 
Amount 
9 
66 
26 
5 
3 
2 
Ill 
Main Donors 
Belgium, Canada, Spain, Switzerland, UNICEF, UK, 
SIDA 
EC, Italy, Japan, Denmark, SIDA, UK, UNICEF, 
USAID, World Bank 
Canada, Council of Europe Social Development 
Fund, EC, Iceland, ICRC, Italy, Netherlands, SIDA, 
Soros Foundation, UK, UNDP, UNHCR, World 
Bank 
EC, Denmark, Italy, ICRC, UK 
WH0,
6 World Bank 
EC, Italy, SIDA, UNICEF, UK, WHO, World Bank 
Public health interventions 
9.  Public  health  interventions  in  both  Entities  focused  on  preventive  medicine,  with  particular 
attention to the most vulnerable groups (displaced persons, children).  These decentralized activities (for 
a  total  commitments of US$9  million)  were  supported  or carried  out  by  a  number of agencies  and 
Governments,  among them  the  WHO,  the  United Nations  Children's Fund  (UNICEF),  the  U.K.  Red 
Cross,  the  U.K.  Government,  the  Swedish  International  Development  Agency  (SIDA),  and  Action 
Internationale Contre Ia Faim. 
Reconstruction and rehabilitation: Urgent repairs and planning 
I 0.  Urgent repairs and the re-equipment of health  facilities received commitments totaling US$66 
million.  Efforts focused on: 
•  Hospitals  in  both  Entities,  with  financing  mainly  from  the  European  Commission 
Humanitarian Office (ECHO), the U.K. Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); and 
•  Dispensaries (ambulanta and dom zdravlja), with the support of  ECHO, SIDA, UNICEF, and 
the Governments of Denmark, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom. 
These projects are being implemented to a large extent ly the International Management Group (IMG) 
and by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). 
11 .  In  parallel,  the  Entity  Ministries  of Health,  with  the  support  of international  organizations, 
designed a  series of priority  investment programs  in  the health  sector.  By translating strategies  into 
concrete  projects,  these  programs  are  an  important  step  in  the  reconstruction  process.  They aim  to 
provide a rational and cost-effective framework for donor involvement and thereby to reduce the risk of 
uncoordinated and ultimately unsustainable investments: 
6 
WHO extra-budgetary resources. - 140-
•  Preparation of an Essential Hospital Services Program was completed (including support for 
sectorwide finance reform) in both the Federation and Republika Srpska; 
•  Preparation  began  for  a  rehabilitation  and  restructuring  plan  for  a  Basic  Health  Services 
Program (including Primary Health Care and Public Health) initiated by the Entity Ministries 
of Health with WHO support; and 
•  UNICEF initiated pilot projects for the Primary Health Care Project in  eleven ambulantas in 
Sarajevo to test new approaches to health care planning and care giving. 
Rehabilitation of war victims: A comprehensive program under implementation 
12.  With the support of  the WHO, the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), and the 
World Bank, the Federation Government designed a comprehensive US$30 million program to address 
the war-related  physical  and  psycho-social  rehabilitation  needs of the  population.  Launched  in  June 
1996,  the  program  is  establishing  community  care  centers  throughout  the  country,  strengthening 
orthopedic and reconstructive surgical departments, and developing the production of prostheses.  Efforts 
include the reconstruction of facilities (US$5.5  million) and the supply of drugs and  medical  supplies 
(US$3.5 million) and equipment (US$10 million).  Three-quarters ofthe required amount was committed 
by the Council of Europe's Social Development Fund, the Governments of Canada, Iceland, and Italy, 
the  WHO,  the United Nations Development Program  (UNDP) and  the  World  Bank;  ECHO also  has 
contributed by financing in-kind support (drugs and supplies) through NGOs. 
13.  A number ofNGOs also implemented decentralized projects, with funding from  ECHO, ODA, 
SIDA, and the Governments of Italy and the Netherlands.  However, it was often difficult to coordinate 
these decentralized initiatives with activities undertaken as part of the Government-designed program. 
In  Republika Srpska, which has not yet developed a comprehensive program, NGOs and  international 
agencies  such  as  the  International  Committee  of the  Red  Cross  (ICRC),  the  United  Nations  High 
Commissioner  for  Refugees  (UNHCR),  ECHO  (through  Medecins  Sans  Frontieres),  and  the  WHO 
provided services and supplies for rehabilitation activities. 
Budget support for operating expenditures: Drugs and medical supplies first 
14.  Support  for  recurrent  expenditures  focused  heavily  on  essential  drugs  and  medical  supplies 
directly procured and distributed by donors on a decentralized basis through NGOs.  ECHO and ODA 
were the main financiers.  In  addition, a number of donors included support for recurrent expenditures 
(drugs and supplies) in  larger support programs aimed at physical rehabilitation and repairs of facilities. 
No significant support was provided health workers' salaries. 
Program management: Substantial involvement of  the Entity Ministries of  Health 
15.  The Federation Ministry of Health took substantial responsibilities for preparing and supporting 
the  implementation  of program  activities.  Initially,  specialized  working  groups  were  established  to 
prepare the three priority investment projects (War Victims Rehabilitation, Essential Hospital Services, 
and Basic Health Services).  The War Victims Rehabilitation Working Group was later transformed into 
a  professional  advisory  team  in  support  of the  Project  Implementation  Unit  (PIU).  A  similar 
development  is  expected  for  the  other working  groups.  Although  more  limited  in  scope,  a  similar 
approach  was  followed  in  Republika  Srpska,  where  the  Ministry of Health  also  expressed  a  strong 
willingness to undertake the required activities. - 141  -
16.  To ensure donor coordination, a Task Force on Health and the Social Safety Net, chaired by the 
WHO, was established in  Sarajevo in  May 1996.  Through this framework the main actors in  the health 
sector met regularly to exchange information, discuss strategies, and prepare a compendium of  the needs 
and priorities in the health sector. 
Sector reforms: A productive dialogue initiated 
17.  In  1996 sector reform activities focused on  initiating dialogue between the Entity Governments 
and international orfanizations such as the WHO and the World Bank and on preparing for health reform ' 
and reconstruction.  Policy issues were often addressed as part of the preparation for priority investment 
projects.  Three main areas were identified: 
•  Structure and organization of  the health care delivery system.  Discussions were held during 
preparation  of the  Essential  Hospital  Services  Rehabilitation  Program;  accordingly,  this 
program calls for the rehabilitation of a streamlined health system (a marked departure from 
the pre-war model based on large hospital infrastructure), with hospital capacity reduced by 
30 percent from the prewar level, and for incentives to improve the quality and efficiency of 
health care; 
•  Health financing mechanisms.  The underlying principles for the Federation's future health 
financing  system  (universal  access,  efficiency,  cost-containment and  sustainability)  were 
agreed  on  during  negotiations of a  World  Bank-funded  Transition  Assistance  Credit and 
preparation of the Essential Hospital Services Program;
8 the Republika Srpska Ministry for 
Health is developing a similar approach; and 
•  Sector  governance.  Discussions  on  the  roles  and  responsibilities  of various  levels  of 
government (State, Entity, Cantons/regions) were held between the Federation Government 
and the Cantons, and between the Republika Srpska Government and regional and municipal 
health  planners,  with  the  support of the  WHO;  progress  was  slowed  by the  widespread 
political uncertainty during the pre-election and the  immediate post-election period and by 
the persistent disagreements on budgetary flows among the various levels of  government. 
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
18.  Some US$90 million in external financing is required for 1997.  While support is still needed for 
emergency activities,  assistance  should  increasingly  be  directed  to  the  development of a  sustainable 
health  system, and donor contributions should  be  directed to the  investment projects prepared  by the 
Entity Governments.  The 1997 program aims to: 
7 
8 
•  Restructure basic health  services, with a focus on  public health  interventions and  primary 
care services at the local (ambulanta and dom zdravlja) level; 
•  Restore essential secondary-level hospital services; 
•  Provide continuing support to the physical and psycho-social rehabilitation of  war victims; 
Efforts were impaired by the understaffing of the Ministries of Health and the subsequent limited availability 
of qualified personnel. 
Substantial technical assistance was provided by the U.K. Government through the Know-How Fund. - 142-
•  Ensure the short-term functioning of the health care system by providing consumables and 
medical supplies (in support of primary and secondary health care networks); 
•  Initiate health sector reform to ensure the financial  sustainability and effectiveness of the 
health care system; and 
•  Undertake a program for human resources development, including training and retraining of 
health workers. 
Public health interventions (US$4 million) 
19.  Public health  interventions  in  1997 will  build  on the gains of 1996 and  broaden the scope of 
activities to preempt future epidemics of  avoidable chronic diseases.  Activities will focus on: 
•  Continuing  disease  prevention  and  health  promotion  activities  through  immunization, 
tuberculosis control, rabies control, water purification and testing, toxic waste management, 
and nutrition monitoring and promotion; 
•  Strengthening the functions of public health institutes in  both Entities to ensure appropriate 
surveillance,  database  management,  disease  notification,  and  planning  of public  health 
interventions; and 
•  Developing  medium-term  programs  for  the  prevention  and  control  of chronic  diseases, 
particularly lung cancer and heart disease. 
Reconstruction and rehabilitation (US$54 million):  Restoring essential services 
20.  Reconstruction  and  rehabilitation of health  services are the  primary focus of 1997  activities, 
building on the programs prepared in  1996 as a vehicle for implementing donor contributions: 
9 
10 
•  The Essential Hospital Services Program focuses on addressing the most urgent needs in the 
hospital  subsector
9  and  on  initiating  health  financing  reform.  The  program  consists  of 
several modules, the completion of which would result in  fully functional  service delivery 
units:  physical repairs, provision of equipment and supplies, improvement of clinical skills, 
and provision of  technical assistance in support of health finance reform.  The total financing 
required over a three-year period  is  estimated at US$192 million (US$122 million for the 
Federation  and  US$70  million  for  Republika  Srpska).  By  mid-February  1997  Program 
donors included the Governments of  Italy and the United Kingdom, and the World Bank 
10
-
with  part of the  costs  borne  by the  Entity  Governments.  The Governments of Canada, 
Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, and Spain also expressed interests in supporting this program. 
•  The  Basic  Health  Services  (Primary  Health  Care  and  Public  Health)  Program  aims  to 
develop primary health care and public health services as the basis of the new health care 
system  (box  3).  Priority  will  be  given  to  renovating  and  equipping  of ambulantas, 
In  the  Federation  the  program  includes  eight  Canton-level  hospitals  (Zenica,  Livno,  Bihac,  Travnik,  Jajce, 
Orasje,  Gorazde,  and  Sarajevo  State  Hospital),  and  parts  (secondary-level services) of three clinical centers 
(Mostar,  Tuzla,  and  Sarajevo  Kosevo  Hospital).  In  Republika  Srpska  it  includes  eight  regional  hospitals 
(Prijedor,  Gradiska,  Doboj,  Bijeljina,  Pale/Kasindoi/Sokolac, Trebinje,  Brcko,  and  Zvomik) and  part of the 
Banja Luka Clinical Center. 
A World Bank US$15 million credit on concessional terms was approved on December 14,  1996. - 143-
particularly  those  partiCipating  in  family  medicine  retrammg,  and  to  renovating  and 
equipping  portions  of  polyclinics  (dom  zdravljas)  that  could  support  dispensaries 
(ambulantas),  such  as  centralized  laboratory  and  x-ray  facilities.
11 
Ongoing  preparatory 
work  for  these  programs  should  be  completed  by  both  Ministries  of Health  in  the  first 
quarter of 1997. 
Rehabilitation of war victims (US$3 million): A community-based approach 
21.  In  1997  efforts  for  war  victims  should  be  directed  toward  implementing  the  remaining 
commitments from  1996.  The emphasis  should  be  on  increasing the  availability of services to  war 
victims  through  community-based  rehabilitation  centers  providing  physical  and  psycho-social 
rehabilitation,  acute  psychiatry  services,  and  access  to  orthopedic  and  reconstructive  surgery.  The 
production and fitting of  prostheses will receive special attention. 
Support for recurrent expenditures (US$22 million): Meeting shortfalls and strengthening 
coordination 
22.  Budgetary  resources  for  the  operating  costs  of  health  facilities  will  most  likely  remain 
insufficient in  1997.  Effective rehabilitation of  the sector and efficient use of repaired facilities require a 
minimal  level  of operating  resources,  particularly  in  terms  of medical  supplies,  spare  parts,  and 
consumables.  Temporary  assistance  is  still  required  to  help  cover  these  operating  costs,  until 
government  and  health  insurance  resources  increase  enough  to  insure  self-sustainability.  Donor 
assistance is not designed to substitute for local resources but to complement them on a decreasing basis 
over a short interim period. 
23.  An adequate supply of essential drugs and medical supplies is  particularly critical.  Donors are 
likely to continue provide such goods "in  kind" and to implement projects in  a decentralized manner.  In 
1996  expired  or  unnecessary  pharmaceuticals  and  supplies  were  delivered  to  a  number  of health 
facilities, and efforts should be made to prevent such a situation in  1997.  Emphasis should be placed on 
strengthening  coordination  mechanisms  by  systematically  involving  Government  agencies  in  the 
quantitative and qualitative definition of needs and allocation of  supplies. 
11 
The  Program would also  include undergraduate educational  reforms at  faculties  of medicine (starting  in  the 
1996-97  academic  year)  aimed  at  introducing  family  medicine  principles,  ambulatory  care  experience, 
supportive seminars, and tutorials.  Analogous reforms would be  introduced in  nursing education to  facilitate 
team development.  A strategy for credentialling family physicians should also be developed. - 144-
Sector reform (US$4 million): Improving sustainability with management and 
administrative reforms 
24.  Management capacities at the Entity, canton, and municipal  levels are crucial for ensuring the 
success and long-term efficiency of planned investments.  Substantial donor support is  required to build 
capacity  and  prepare  a  number of reforms  -- from  designing  financing  mechanisms  to  establishing 
management and information systems (box 4). 
Program management (US$3 million): Strengthening donor coordination 
25.  Continued support, both financial  and advisory,  is  required to strengthen project management. 
Assistance should be directed to the PIUs established within the Entity Ministries of Health.  Now that 
the emergency activities of 1996  are  largely  in  place,  donors  should  increasingly  involve the  Entity 
Ministries of  Health in  implementing their projects.  PIUs for each sector should eventually be given full 
implementation responsibility -- with foreign technical assistance as needed -- in  coordination with all 
relevant authorities. 
26.  While the Sectoral Task Force on Health and the Social Safety Net will continue to provide a 
forum  for setting priorities among the Entity Ministries of Health and donor agencies, the Ministries 
should progressively assume responsibility for mobilizing resources and coordinating assistance from the 
12 
The Government of the United Kingdom, through the  Know-How  Fund,  has  decided to  support key  finance 
reforms in  both  Entities through a technical assistance program estimated at  US$1.5  million.  This  initiative, 
which will affect the entire health sector, is part of  the Essential Hospital Services Program (for both Entities), 
designed by the Government with the support of  the World Bank. - 145-
donor community.  A  first  step  in  this  direction  was the  establishment of an  executive  office and  a 
coordinator of external assistance within the Federation Ministry of  Health to oversee these functions. 
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
27.  Even before the war, the health sector suffered systemic problems.  Health sector recovery will 
therefore require  much  more than  external financing  assistance.  Major policy reforms are  needed  to 
ensure the financial sustainability of reconstruction efforts, to promote cost-effectiveness, and to involve 
the private sector in activities so far dominated by the Governments.  Because the changes required are 
so extensive, reforms should be accompanied by measures to protect the most economically vulnerable 
groups, especially in the early stages of postwar recovery, to help ensure the acceptability and feasibility 
of the reforms.  Donor support, both financial  and advisory, is  required for an  intense startup phase in 
1997 that includes policy analysis, limited scope surveys, and local and external training with a view to 
the experience gained  in  1996 (box 5).  Continued support will  be  needed for  implementation over a 
period of  several years.  Some of  the most important policy issues are discussed below. 
Sector governance 
28.  Sector governance  in  both  Entities should  be  clarified, and  responsibilities and  corresponding 
resources  clearly  shared.  Particular attention  should  be  paid  to  revenue  generation  and  expenditure 
patterns, responsibility sharing among the various levels of  authority (Entities, Cantons in the Federation, 
municipalities),  and  private  sector  involvement.  Governance  issues  are  particularly  critical  in  the 
Federation where the health system is  split between the Croat-majority and the Bosniac-majority areas. 
In  addition,  the Federation's Constitution gives important health sector responsibilities to the cantons. 
In  developing this sector at the cantonal  level, steps should  be  taken to ensure that a fragmented  and 
inefficient system of  health financing and delivery does not emerge. - 146-
Sector financing 
29.  The Federation's health  financing  system  is  largely demonetized and  urgently  needs  reform. 
Most health workers are paid  insufficient salaries.  The Federation Government should  proceed with 
implementation of the recently decided health financing reform (box 6).  Reforms should also focus on 
potential economies of  scale. 
30.  Similar steps  are  under way  in  Republika Srpska,  where  substantial  effort  will  be  required. 
Health  care  is  currently  financed  through  a  Public  Health  Fund,  that collects  and  distributes  funds 
through regional branches that in  turn pay health  institutions.  Prices are set by the Fund and are not 
based on actual costs.  Payments to health institutions are insufficient to cover even the minimal needs of 
the health care system.  In its Strategy of  Health Development for Republika Srpska by the Year 2000, the 
Ministry of Health has identified potential reforms.  Although a step in  the right direction, the proposed 
set of measures is  still  insufficient to  resolve current difficulties and  remains vague on  a  number of 
critical  questions (financial  projections,  governance and  regulatory  mechanisms,  and  so  on). 
13  The 
Ministry of Health is currently working, with the support of the WHO, on a detailed set of measures to 
implement reforms -- and donor assistance will be required. 
13 
The proposed reform  is  based on the establishment of a two-tier·  financing system: (i) compulsory insurance, 
financed through payroll taxes paid by the employer and the employee and administered by the Public Health 
Fund, would cover the entire population; and (ii) optional private insurance.  Prices would be determined by 
the Public Health Fund.  Republika Srpska's Government would pay for services for economically vulnerable 
groups (which have not yet been clearly defined). FISCAL AND SOCIAL SUPPORT 
I.  BACKGROUND 
Building a new system of  governance 
1.  The conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina caused the country's prewar government to disintegrate. 
The  new  institutional  framework  laid  out  in  the  Dayton-Paris  Peace  Agreement  implies  substantial 
changes  to  the  legislative  and  policymaking  institutions.  At  the  State  level,  the  ministries  and 
institutions  responsible  for  functions  designated  to  the  State  must be  set  up,  including  Ministries  of 
Finance (with a foreign debt management unit), Foreign Trade and Communications, and Justice, as well 
as the Central Bank.  The startup cost of these efforts will  be significant, both to attract well-qualified 
individuals, and to provide adequate facilities for these institutions to function. 
2.  Ministries  and  institutions  also  need  to  be  set  up  or  strengthened  at  the  Federation  level, 
including line and sector ministries, tax and customs administrations, the payments bureau, and the bank 
supervision agency.  Cantonal administrative structures also need to be set up or strengthened to develop 
capacities  for  governance,  including  budget  preparation  and  execution.  Republika  Srpska  needs  to 
strengthen  institutions,  establish  a  bank  supervision  agency,  and  develop  capacities  for  budget 
preparation and execution, as well as for treasury functions," auditing, and financial control.  Customs and 
tax administrations need to be modernized and harmonized between the Entities. 
Protecting the most vulnerable groups 
3.  In  addition to  building new government institutions, a major challenge for the authorities is  to 
protect the most vulnerable members of society.  About 400,000 elderly or disabled persons depend on 
pension benefits to survive, and the number of orphans reached 14,000 during the conflict.  In  addition, 
at  least  7,000  disabled  depend  on  government  support  for  survival  and  reintegration  into  economic 
activity.  Finally, a number of households need  minimum cash  support during the transition back into 
employment, especially when the head of  the household is sick or a single parent. 
Limited fiscal resources 
4.  The Governments have extremely limited fiscal  capacity to address these needs.  Tax revenues 
shrank dramatically as economic activity slowed and wage payments fell to a minimum during the war. 
By  1995, for example, the base for sales tax had fallen to perhaps one-quarter of its prewar level, as had 
GDP.  Payroll taxes have also plummeted, since both employment and wage levels are a fraction of their 
prewar  levels.  Furthermore,  Bosnia and  Herzegovina's  prewar  fiscal  and  tax  collection  system  has 
collapsed.  In  its place three separate fiscal systems developed, with divergent tax policies and separate 
administrations.  To  the  extent  that  tax  revenues  are  collected,  they  are  kept  by  different  fiscal 
authorities.  As  the economy recovers and new tax systems are established  in  the Entities, revenue is 
expected to recover.  This will take time, however, and in the interim period resources have to be found 
to help cover key spending requirements and ensure minimal provision of  social protection. - 148-
II.  THE RECONSTRUCTION AND FINANCING CHALLENGES 
5.  The strategy of donor assistance in this area is  to restore, within a limited period (three to four 
years), the government's capacity to efficiently raise revenue, and to strengthen institutions to cover all 
necessary public expenditures on a sustainable basis.  During the transition financial assistance should be 
provided to help develop and strengthen institutional capacity and to provide minimal social protection 
to the most vulnerable groups. 
6.  Achieving  these  objectives  will  require  an  estimated  US$514  million  in  external  financing 
support for  the three- to  four-year  program  within  the  overall  US$5.1  billion  priority  reconstruction 
program  (table  1  ).  The  program  submitted  in  December  1995  remains  valid;  it  includes  support to 
government institution-building  (US$122  million),  protection,  on  a  supplementary basis,  of the  most 
vulnerable groups during the transition (US$99 million), and general fiscal  support to the government 
budget  (US$293  million)  to  cover  counterpart  costs  associated  with  donor-financed  reconstruction 
programs,  recurrent  social  expenditures  in  health  and  education,  and  liquidity  needed  for  ongoing 
external obligations.  Of the total requirement: 
•  In 1996, US$276 million was firmly committed, substantially more than the initial estimate of  first-
year needs (US$75 million), and several activities were successfully carried out (paragraphs 7 to 12); 
•  In. 1997, US$120  million  in  external financing  is  required for  the  State,  the  Federation,  and 
Republika Srpska (paragraphs 13 to 17); and 
•  In 1998 and 1999, some US$118 million will be necessary.  The need for support to government 
institutions  and  social  protection  will  fall  after  1997,  while  general  fiscal  support  will  still  be 
required (paragraphs 18 to 21 ). 
Table 1.  Fiscal and Social Support Program External Financing Needs 
~~mill~~  · 
3-4 Year  1996 Firm  1997  1998-99 
Program  Commitments  Requirements/  Requirements/ 
Allocation  Allocation 
Support for key government institutions  122  69  20  33 
Support for social expenditures  99  59  20  20 
General fiscal support  293  148  80  65 
Total  514  276  120  118 
Ill.  1996 ACHIEVEMENTS 
7.  In  1996 assistance focused on supporting Government institutions (primarily at the Federation 
level, and to a lesser extent at the State level) on supporting vulnerable groups in the Federation, and on 
general fiscal support.  Of  the US$276 million committed for these purposes in  1996, US$69 million was 
allocated to institution building, US$59 million to support for vulnerable groups, and US$148 million to 
general fiscal support.  By January 1997, some US$210 million had been disbursed. 
Support to government institutions 
8.  In  1996 support to State and Federation governments amounted to US$69 million, including: - 149-
•  A US$17.4 million Building Repair Fund to rehabilitate buildings and office space for key 
government institutions, financed by the Governments of Japan and the Netherlands, and the 
European Commission (EC); 
•  Technical assistance of US$46.6 million to provide office equipment (such as furniture and 
computers,  and  vehicles),  advisory  services,  and  training  to  key  State  and  Federation 
institutions.  Funds came from  the Governments of Japan,  Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Switzerland,  the  EC,  the  U.S.  Agency  for  International  Development (USAID),  the  U.S. 
Treasury,  the  German  Agency  for  Technical  Cooperation  (GTZ),  the  U.K.  Overseas 
Development Administration (ODA), and the World Bank; and 
•  A US$5  million  Wage  Fund to  provide salary supplements to  staff in  the core  State and 
Federation  government institutions (financed  by the  Governments of the Netherlands and 
Switzerland, and the World Bank, under the Emergency Recovery Project; table 2). 
9.  With  these  resources  and  the  funds  provided  for  the  general  fiscal  support,  donors  directly 
supported more than ten Government institutions, including: 
•  Federation Customs Administration (US$11.6 million from the EC, USAID and others); 
•  Federation Tax Administration (US$1.8 million from the U.S. Treasury and others); 
•  Federation Payments Bureau (US$0.4 million from the World Bank's Transition Assistance 
Credit); 
•  Federation  Banking  Supervision  Agency  (US$2.7  million  from  the  Government  of 
Switzerland, USAID, and others); 
•  Federation Privatization Agency (about US$1.5 million from  USAID and the World Bank's 
Transition Assistance Credit); 
•  Cantonal privatization agencies (about US$6.0 million  from  the World Bank's Transition 
Assistance Credit); 
•  Public finance control institutions, including financial police and a procurement monitoring 
and auditing unit (about US$2.0 million from  the Government of the Netherlands and the 
World Bank's Transition Assistance Credit); and 
•  Cantonal budget offices (US$2.0 million from USAID and others). 
Table 2. Firm Donor Commitments in 1996 
(US$ million) 
Support for key government institutions 
Support for social expenditures 
Other fiscal support 
Total 
Amount 
69 
59 
148 
276 
Main donors 
Austria, EC, Germany, Iceland, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Switzerland, Turkey, UK, US, World Bank 
Austria, Canada, EC, Ireland, Italy, 
Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, UNICEF, 
World Bank, 
Japan, Netherlands, and the World Bank - 150-
Support to social safety net 
10.  In  1996 donors committed US$59 million to  support vulnerable groups through two different 
types of programs: (i) transitory emergency relief  to ensure that minimum consumption needs and living 
standards  were  met  (cash  benefits  to  the  poorest  households  to  complement  food  aid  programs, 
emergency repairs and provision of equipment to institutions for children and the mentally ill,  pension 
support  for  the  elderly),  (ii) programs  designed  to  bring  lasting  improvements  in  living  standards 
(mobility aids, health care assistance, professional training and employment services for the disabled and 
the blind, foster parents and small villages for orphans). 
11.  In the Federation, the following programs received assistance: 
•  Emergency cash benefits for the poorest households from the Governments of Canada, Italy, 
the Netherlands, and Sweden, and the World Bank's Emergency Recovery Credit; 
•  Emergency repairs for institutions for children and the mentally ill  from the Government of 
Switzerland, the World Bank, and other donors; 
•  Mobility and other equipment for the disabled, from the World Bank; other donors  (Austria, 
EC) provided similar support through nongovernmental organizations; 
•  Microprojects for the retraining of  the disabled and blind, from the Governments of Austria, 
and Ireland, the World Bank and other donors; 
•  Foster  parents  for  children  without  parental  care,  from  UNICEF,  the  World  Bank  and 
individual donors; and 
•  From  the  general  fiscal  support  (see  below)  the  Federation  government  established  a 
Federation  Pension  Agency  and  a  Federation  Health  Insurance  Agency  to  develop  and 
implement reforms in these areas. 
General fiscal support 
12.  In  addition to the  institution building and  social  safety net programs, the Federation and State 
Government budgets received firm commitments for US$148 million in fiscal support in  1996 (including 
counterpart funding to donor reconstruction assistance for US$38 million from the Government of  Japan, 
a  US$20  million  grant from  the  Government of the Netherlands,  and  a  US$90  million  World  Bank 
Transition Assistance Credit).  These resources supported: 
•  Recurrent government expenditures, including coverage for part of public sector employee 
(such as teachers and doctors) costs; 
•  The social safety net, including pension and health programs; 
•  Government institutions, including those mentioned above; 
•  External debt service; and 
•  Economic recovery, including critical imports for  industrial sectors and a line of credit for 
small and medium-size enterprises. - 151  -
IV.  1997 CHALLENGES AND FINANCING NEEDS 
13.  About  US$120  million  in  external  financing  will  be  needed  in  1997  for  fiscal  support. 
Assistance  to  government  institutions  should  focus  on  establishing  key  State  institutions,  on  further 
strengthening Federation  institutions,  and  on  establishing and  strengthening  institutions  in  Republika 
Srpska.  Required  assistance  includes  advisory  services  and  training,  office  equipment (computers, 
vehicles,  furniture,  communications  equipment),  and,  equally  important,  buildings  and  office  space. 
Technical assistance requirements are summarized in the Annex to this report (pages 157 to 160).  Social 
assistance needs will progressively decline in  1997 to reflect the economic recovery that started in  1996. 
Nevertheless,  there  are  still  significant gaps  between  the  need  to  protect  vulnerable  groups  and  the 
revenues that can possibly be generated by the domestic economy.  Thus social safety net assistance in 
1997 should continue to focus on pension and pension reform and on programs for the most vulnerable 
groups.  Assistance also needs to be delivered to the entire country. Finally, general fiscal support will be 
needed to cover the country's financial and other obligations. 
Support to government institutions (US$20 million) 
14.  Technical  assistance  will  be  needed  to  help  establish  new  agencies,  rationalize  current 
institutional  structures,  train  government  workers  for  their  new  role  in  a  market  economy,  furnish 
institutions with equipment needed to modernize, strengthen auditing and financial  capacities, and the 
like. 
15.  In  addition, office space should be  provided, with  particular attention paid to the needs of the 
new State Government.  A  general  investment facility of about US$20  million will  be  established to 
rehabilitate,  rebuild,  and  repair  existing  government  buildings  for  use  by  State,  Entity,  and  local 
governments.  The facility will  focus  on  basic repairs that bring buildings and  offices up  to minimal 
standards, maximizing the impact of available resources -- as did the 1996 Building Repairs Fund. Areas 
and  institutions that need support in  1997 are listed  below (costs are reflected  in  table  1;.  projects are 
included in box 1  ): 
Developing State Institutions 
•  A new independent Central Bank needs to be created at the earliest possible date to act as the 
sole agency for monetary policy and currency issuance in  Bosnia and Herzegovina (about 
US$2 million); 
•  A new external debt management system, with units at the State and Entity levels, needs to 
be created to: (a) prepare and negotiate loan agreements and monitor the use and repayment 
of government debt; (b) develop and implement an  external debt recording system; and (c) 
formulate proposals for debt strategy and policy (about US$1  million); 
•  A new trade policy department needs to be established to set trade policy and initiate reform. 
This department will:  (a) establish a common external trade structure for both Entities; (b) 
enact  a  new  foreign  trade  law;  and  (c)  negotiate  membership  in  the  World  Trade 
Organization  (WTO)  and  agreements  on  trade  liberalization  with  other  trading  partners 
(about US$1  million); and 
•  The overall State judiciary system needs to be strengthened and coordinated with the Entity 
jurisdictions (at least US$1  million). - 152-
Developing Entity Institutions 
•  Both  Entities'  customs  administrations  need  to  modernize  their  border  facilities  with 
neighboring  countries.  Moreover,  the  procedures  used  by  the  Entities'  customs 
administrations  need  to  be  coordinated  to  the  greatest  extent  possible  to  avoid  customs 
evasion.  Harmonized methods and coordinated training programs also need to be developed 
(about US$3.5  million  for  both  Entities,  without taking  into  account construction  of any 
large border facilities); 
•  The Entities' tax administrations, particularly that of  the Federation, require major support to 
become fully operational and further develop.  Both Entities require a major rationalization 
of their tax administrations - staffing, structure, and functions together with modernization 
of  procedures and facilities (about US$4 million for both Entities); 
•  Banking  supervision  agencies  require  further  strengthening  (Federation)  or  need  to  be 
established  (Republika  Srpska)  to  provide  a  uniform  legal,  regulatory,  and  institutional 
framework  for  bank  licensing,  regulation,  and  supervision  throughout  Bosnia  and 
Herzegovina.  This effort is a precondition for the development of a sound financial system 
(US$2 million for both Entities); 
•  Auditing and  budget control  should  be  strengthened to  build  confidence and  trust  in  the 
Government at all levels (US$2 million for both Entities); 
•  Budget preparation  and  execution at the  Entity  and  local  levels  should  be  improved and 
made transparent.  Major assistance is also needed to develop the treasury functions of the 
Entities (about US$2 million for the State, both Entities, and local governments); and 
•  Basic  data  for  economic  management  need  to  be  improved,  including  population  and 
migration statistics, household surveys on income, consumption, unemployment, and cost of 
living data (about US$1  million for both Entities). - 153-
Assistance to provide a minimal social safety net (US$20 million) 
16.  In  1997 some US$20 million is needed to provide financial and institutional support to maintain 
minimum pension and social protection for the most vulnerable groups in  both Entities.  In  particular, 
about US$12 million will be needed as supplementary financing to provide a minimum monthly pension 
for  all  pensioners  in  the two Entities.  This  amount  includes  institutional  support to  develop  a  new - 154-
pension system that is affordable and that offers an adequate floor of  coverage.  In addition, resources are 
needed to support microprojects for  the disabled (including retraining and employment programs and 
provision of mobility, hearing, and vision aids).  Resources will also be required to support continuation 
of the Government foster  parents program,  as  well  as  pilot programs to motivate family  members to 
provide basic assistance to the mentally ill or the disabled (about US$8 million for both Entities). 
General fiscal support (US$80 million) 
17.  Additional fiscal  support of US$80 million will  be needed to cover the budgetary needs of the 
State  and  Entities,  particularly  in  providing  domestic  counterpart  funding  for  the  donor-financed 
reconstruction program, in supporting recurrent expenditures for education and health, and in  helping to 
provide liquidity for ongoing external obligations. 
V.  STRUCTURAL AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE YEARS AHEAD 
18.  Underlying these institution-building efforts and social safety net provisions are two objectives: 
providing sustainable government finances and readjusting the role of  the public sector to support private 
sector development.  Major reforms will  be  needed to  establish  a  new,  efficient government finance 
system capable of achieving these objectives.  Sustainability can be achieved by:  (a) establishing  new 
fiscal arrangements between State, Entities, and local governments; (b) introducing new tax policies and 
a modernized revenue collection system to raise domestic resources efficiently; (c) cutting government 
spending; and (d) improving management of  public outlays, including better targeting of  social spending. 
Public sector restructuring should occur at the same time that new institutions are established and overall 
government spending rationalized. 
Establishing a new system of  intergovernmental fiscal relations 
19.  A new system of government finance should be set up,  based on the outline in  the Dayton-Paris 
Peace  Agreement,  to  clearly  assign  responsibilities  and  allocate  revenues  to  different  levels  of 
government.  According to the  agreement, two-thirds of the  State  budget should  be  financed  by  the 
Federation and one-third by Republika Srpska.  However, the specific means by which the Entities will 
raise the money and transfer funds  to the State have not yet been  determined.  At the Entity level  an 
asymmetric fiscal  system is envisaged: decentralized in  the Federation (mostly at the canton level) and 
centralized in  Republika Srpska.  In the Federation decisions for assigning responsibilities, and sources 
of revenue have not yet been made although they are critical at this stage.  To a lesser extent this is also 
an issue in Republika Srpska. 
Efficiently raising revenue 
20.  Efficiently  raising  revenue  will  require  well-defined  tax  policies  as  well  as  significant 
improvements in the revenue collection administration.  Tax policies should focus on harmonizing and 
reducing tax rates and on defining tax bases that support private sector development by setting incentives 
for compliance: 
•  Payroll contributions.  The current high  payroll taxes  undermine tax collection, motivate 
evasion, and introduce perverse effects to the labor market.  Furthermore, these rates vary - 155-
greatly across the country.  Tax and contribution rates on payrolls should be reduced and 
harmonized across Entities; 
•  Customs  tariffs.  Import  duties  differ  between  the  Entities,  and  are  excessively  high  in 
Republika Srpska.  Customs duties should be  reduced and  made uniform for all  of Bosnia 
and  Herzegovina;  import  quotas,  export  controls,  and  other  trade  restrictions  should-.  be 
phased out; 
•  Corporate  and personal income  taxes.  These taxes  are  not  yet important  in  Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, but their importance will  increase as  the economy moves toward a  market-
oriented system.  Major reform will be needed to introduce modern tax codes in these areas 
on a harmonized basis for the entire country; and 
•  Tax  and customs administrations.  Major overhaul  will  be required to  rationalize tax and 
customs administrative structures in  both Entities, to make them compatible, to  modernize 
assessment and enforcement, and to improve procedures and hardware and train staff. 
Reducing the size of  the public sector and improving management of  public spending 
21.  Public spending accounted for the bulk of Bosnia and Herzegovina's economy in  1995, even as 
significant arrears accrued.  Private sector development would be facilitated by cutting public spending 
and taxes as a share ofGDP. 
•  Cutting spending.  Major cuts are  needed in  certain areas of public expenditure, including 
defense, subsidies, and entitlement programs.  Avoiding the buildup of large administrative 
structures  is  also  crucial  to  controlling expenditures.  Public  employment  in  government 
institutions should be rationalized, in  line with economic recovery and in  coordination with 
retraining and employment generation programs; 
•  Improving expenditure management.  The public sector's share of  the economy also needs to 
be  reduced  by developing a  more  systematic,  less  ad  hoc approach  to  budgeting.  Budget 
preparation  and  execution  need  to  be  modernized  to  increase  accountability  and 
transparency.  Some  expenditures,  such  as  public  investment,  require  developing  an 
institutional mechanism for evaluating alternatives; and 
•  Setting sustainable wage and pension levels.  Wage and pensions should be  established at 
levels that are sustainable over the medium-term.  This requires setting them in  accordance 
with the Government's capacity to generate revenue. ANNEX 
TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
IN SUPPORT OF MACRO-ECONOMIC POLICY REFORMS 
1.  To ensure the success and the sustainability of  the reconstruction effort, major policy reforms are 
required from the Governments of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of both Entities.  New institutions have 
to be set up, developed and strengthened and a full  legal and regulatory framework has to be put in place. 
At the same time, measures need to be taken to ensure the transition from the pre-war socialist system to 
a market economy.  The transition has been difficult in  many Central European countries, and will be 
even  more  so  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,  where  the  reform,  reconstruction,  and  development  of 
governmental  structures  have  to  be  carried  out  simultaneously.  Generating  the  right  strategies  and 
regulatory regime, building a consensus on the required reforms, and strengthening commitment for their 
implementation is  urgent.  Substantial technical assistance is  required to help the authorities in  Bosnia 
and Herzegovina design and implement the necessary policy measures. 
2.  The  most critical  reforms  are  those  aimed  at establishing and  developing the  necessary joint 
institutions, privatizing and restructuring banks and enterprises and designing and implementing a budget 
reform.· Such reforms should reflect the need to balance public expenditures and potential revenues, to 
reduce the role of the public sector and allow private sector development.  Technical assistance includes 
provision of expert advise for the design of appropriate regulations, direct assistance in  establishing or 
strengthening key institutions, training of civil servants, and the like. 
1996 Achievements 
3.  In 1996, the donor community committed about US$55 million in advisory services and training, 
and  an  additional  US$20  million  in  equipment  and  provision  of office  space  (primarily  in  the 
Federation), in  support of: (i) fiscal  policy and institutions (e.g. support for the creation of Federation 
tax  and  customs  policies  and  administration,  improvement  of  public  revenue  and  expenditure 
management);  (ii)  development of an  appropriate  regulatory  framework  for  privatization  and  private 
sector  development  (e.g.  banking  regulation,  establishment  of the  Federation  Banking  Supervision 
Agency, enterprise and banking privatization in  the Federation); and (iii) provision of support services 
for  enterprises (e.g. business support services, mainly directed towards small  and  medium enterprises 
and support to industrial restructuring). 
Overa/11997 Requirements 
4.  About US$30 million will  be  required for  1997.  Technical  assistance programs and  financial 
requirements are described in  more detail  in  several of the sectoral chapters in  this report.  This annex 
aims to summarize the various technical assistance components and to list the areas where support from 
the donor community is required. - 158-
Developing Joint Institutions 
5.  Technical assistance is  required to establish and  develop key macroeconomic institutions (see 
page 151 ), and in particular: 
•  a  new Central Bank, which will act as the sole agency for  monetary policy and  currency 
issuance in Bosnia and Herzegovina; 
•  an external debt management system, with units at the State and Entity levels, to: (a) prepare 
and negotiate loah agreements and monitor the use and repayment of government debt; (b) 
develop and  implement an  external debt recording system; and (c) formulate  proposals for 
debt strategy and policy; and 
•  other joint institutions as mandated by the Dayton-Paris Peace Agreement. 
Fiscal Policy 
6.  Authorities  in  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina  will  require  technical  assistance  to  develop  an 
appropriate fiscal policy, aimed at ensuring that all  levels of government obtain the revenues necessary 
for effective operation while limiting taxes to a sustainable level which will not impede growth (see page 
152).  Technical assistance is needed in particular to help: 
•  develop fiscal federalism, including the assignment of tax and spending responsibilities (e.g. 
determination of the responsibilities of the various levels of government for the delivery of 
education,  health  care,  and  the  like)  and  the  definition  of financial  transfer mechanisms 
between the State, Entities, and local governments; 
•  support the Entities' tax administrations, in order to render them fully operational and further 
develop  them;  this  includes  modernization  of procedures  and  rationalization  of staffing, 
structure, and functions; and 
•  modernize tax administration, with an  emphasis on  rationalizing structures, functions,  and 
procedures,  developing  cross-Entity  coordination  mechanisms,  establishing  registries  of 
taxpayers, and training in tax assessment and compliance methods. 
Public Expenditure Management 
7.  Technical assistance is  necessary to improve public expenditure management, with an emphasis 
on  budget preparation and execution (with improved transparency in  the budgeting process), including 
support for the management of both extrabudgetary funds (mainly pensions) and external debt (see page 
152).  Assistance is needed in particular to: 
•  ensure adequate and transparent budget preparation and execution at the  Entity and  local 
levels; 
•  organize  basic  data  collection  for  economic  management,  e.g.  population  and  migration 
statistics, household surveys on income, consumption, unemployment, and cost of living; 
•  develop the treasury functions of  the Entities; and 
•  strengthen audit and budget control. - 159-
Private Sector Development and Development of  a Regulatory Framework 
8.  To ensure the most needed economic growth through private sector development, the regulatory 
environment for private sector development should be adjusted (see page 95).  Technical assistance is 
particularly required to support the authorities in Bosnia and Herzegovina in: 
•  liberalizing  restrictive  regulations  which  limit  the  potential  for  rapid  economic  recovery, 
including trade barriers,  labor regulations, and tax -- particularly payroll taxes,  which  are 
now about 1  00 percent of net salaries; 
•  establishing a legal framework (or clarification of  an existing one) to facilitate private sector 
activities,  particularly with  regard to  property rights (over physical,  legal,  and  intellectual 
assets),  and  laws  on  contracts,  corporations,  bankruptcy,  competition,  banking,  and 
investment; 
•  reducing the size a~d improving the effectiveness of  the public sector; and 
•  developing measures to attract  foreign investors. 
Support to Privatization 
9.  To  promote  private  sector  involvement  and  increase  the  perspectives  for  growth,  technical 
assistance  is  needed  in  support  of rapid  and  effective  privatization  programs,  which  will  require 
designing and  passing privatization  laws  at the  Entity  level  (see pages 93  and 95).  Special  attention 
should be given to providing the technical assistance required for: 
•  privatizing the large conglomerates; this includes diagnostic studies, definition of detailed measures 
to be undertaken, assistance for implementation of these measures, and match-making with foreign 
partners; and 
•  supporting small and medium-size enterprise development, enterprise restructuring and privatization, 
and improving knowledge of  and access to modern technology. 
Financial Sector Reform 
10.  To improve financial  intermediation, savings mobilization, and investment financing within the 
private sector, technical assistance efforts should focus on reforming the financial sector (see pages 93 
and 152), including: 
•  clarifying the ownership and governance structure of banks, and restructuring and eventually 
privatizing them; 
•  improve banks' managerial capacity in savings mobilization and lending practices; 
•  establishing both  an  Asset Liquidation Agency, to take over banks'  bad assets and try to 
maximize recovery  in  a  short period,  and  a  Settlement Agency,  to  handle  frozen  foreign 
exchange deposits and other liabilities (such as wage and pension arrears) in  exchange for 
issuance of  privatization certificates; and - 160-
•  establishing strong regulatory and supervisory frameworks, introducing prudential regulation 
and  supervisory  standards,  setting  up  (in  Republika  Srpska)  and  strengthening  (in  both 
Entities) institutions for bank supervision. 
Trade Policy 
11.  To re-start economic activities, barriers to internal and external trade should be minimized (see 
pages 151  and 152).  Technical assistance will therefore be required to: 
•  develop, at the State level, a trade policy department to set trade policy and initiate reform, 
and  particularly to:  (a)  establish a  common external  trade  structure  for  both  Entities;  (b) 
enact  a  new  foreign  trade  law;  and  (c)  negotiate  membership  in  the  World  Trade 
Organization (WTO) and agreements on trade liberalization with other trading partners; and 
•  harmonize the Entities' customs administrations methods and training programs, to improve 
coordination and avoid customs evasion. 
Safety Net 
12.  Since continued support will be needed during the next years for the poorest households, a major 
technical  assistance  effort  should  be  made  in  designing  a  sustainable  safety  net,  with  a  particular 
attention to developing a new  pension  system  that both  is  affordable and offers an  adequate minimal 
coverage, and to developing programs for other vulnerable populations (see page 153). 
IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS 
13.  Implementing  technical  assistance  requires  careful  donor  coordination:  (i)  sufficient  untied 
resources should be available to fill-in  areas not covered by tied resources; (ii) local ownership of the 
technical  assistance  should  be  encouraged;  and  (iii)  technical  assistance  flows  should  complement 
national economic policies -- a principle that was not always followed in  1996. 
14.  Technical assistance could take different forms, including: 
•  seconding of  foreign experts to appropriate institutions for helping designing policies; 
•  organizing of  training programs for governments officials; and 
•  developing of  twinning programs with foreign public administrations. 
Specific programs should be discussed with the relevant authorities, as  described in  the corresponding 
sector chapters. 